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I. INTRODUCTION

In an exhaustive article published in the Fall 1995 edition of the West
Virginia Law Review, Michael E. Caryl identified a multitude of due process
issues with West Virginia's current procedures for administrative and judicial
review of property tax assessments and proposed a broad policy-based solution
to these issues.'
In its September 2008 term, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had the opportunity to address several of the most critical fairness issues.
In In re Tax Assessment of Foster Foundation's Woodlands Retirement Communit)? and Bayer MaterialScience,LLC v. State Tax Commissioner,' taxpayers
raised two of the due process issues described by Mr. Caryl: the institutional
bias of the administrative tribunal that hears the taxpayer's first-level appeal of
its appraisal, and the impermissibly high standard of proof the taxpayer is required to meet before that tribunal.
In the same term, in State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha
County v. Bayer Corp.,4 a taxpayer objected to a circuit court's application of a
low standard of review in a proceeding conducted via certiorari. There, the Circuit Court refused to pay any deference to a decision of a county commission
granting relief to a taxpayer from an erroneous property tax assessment.5 In a
cross-assignment of error, the Kanawha County Commission objected to the
Circuit Court's finding that a low standard of proof is applicable in the firstlevel hearing on such an exoneration request.
In all three cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court ruled against the
taxpayers and in favor of the taxing authority. Confirming Mr. Caryl's observation that the court is "essentially blind to the inherent institutional bias," 6 the
court held that "W. Va. Code § 11-3-24 (1979) (Repl. Vol. 2008), which establishes the procedure by which a county commission sits as a board of equalization and review and decides taxpayers' challenges to their property tax assessments, is facially constitutional"

I

See Michael E. Caryl, The Illusion ofDue Process in West Virginia's Property Tax Appeals
System: Making the Constitution'sPromisea Reality, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 301 (1995).
2
672 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 2008).
3
672 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 2008).
4
672 S.E.2d 282 (W. Va. 2008).
5
Id. at 289-291.
6
Caryl, supra note 1, at 307.
Syl. pt. 4, Foster,672 S.E.2d at 152.
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The court recognized that its prior case law on the standard of proof at
the first adjudicative level hearing before a board of equalization and review
was inconsistent8 and specifically overruled two of its prior decisions 9 which
held that the preponderance of the evidence standard was applicable. The court
held that "a taxpayer challenging an assessor's tax assessment must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that such tax assessment is erroneous." 0 Dismissing the taxpayers' claims to the contrary, it ruled that the clear and convincing standard of proof "does not violate the constitutional due process protections
provided by section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution or by section ten of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution.""
On the cross assignment of error in Bayer Corp. as to the standard of
proof in an exoneration hearing before a county commission, the court's ruling
was at least consistent with its other two decisions. The court ruled that "a taxpayer seeking relief from an erroneous tax assessment under W. Va. Code § 113-27 (2000) (Repl. Vol. 2008), must establish entitlement to relief by clear and
convincing evidence."l 2 In its decision, the court cited the Foster Foundation
case and observed that "[w]e can discern no justification for applying separate
burdens of proof for assessment issues raised under W. Va. Code § 11-3-24 and
assessment issues brought under W. Va. Code § 11-3-27."
While the court was able to discern no justification for different standards of proof in valuation appeals and exoneration cases, it was nevertheless
able to do so with respect to the applicable standards of review. In Bayer Corp.,
the taxpayer found itself in circumstances that were quite unusual. Seeking credit against future years' taxes in the amount of taxes it overpaid, Bayer applied
to the County Commission of Kanawha County for "relief from erroneous assessments" (commonly called an "exoneration") under the provisions of section
11-3-27 of the West Virginia Code. The County Commission ruled in favor of
the taxpayer, and the Prosecuting Attorney appealed that decision to the circuit
court.
One might expect that in those circumstances, the taxpayer would at
least have the benefit of the same high standard of review as benefits the taxing
authorities have in valuation appeals-but no. The West Virginia Supreme
Court ruled that "unless otherwise provided by law, the standard of review by a
circuit court in a writ of certiorariproceeding under W. Va. Code § 53-3-3
See Caryl, supra note 1, at 308 (stating that the court has "spastically oscillated between
vastly disparate concepts when describing the applicable standard of proof under administrative
review").
9
See Killen v. Logan Cnty. Comm'n, 295 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1982); E. Am. Energy Corp. v.
Thorn, S.E.2d 56 (W. Va. 1993) (per curiam).
10
Syl. pt. 5, In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150,
152 (W. Va. 2008).
"
Id. at Syl. pt. 6.
12
Syl. pt. 3, Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d 282, 291 (W. Va. 2008).
13
Id. at 291.
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(1923) (Repl. Vol. 2000) is de novo." 1 4 In other words, the circuit court was
free to substitute its own conclusion on the merits of the request for exoneration
for that of the tribunal charged by the legislature with the responsibility for deciding the taxpayer's request. By contrast, in the cases in which the taxpayer
disputed the assessed value of its property, the court has held that
[t]itle 110, Series IP of the West Virginia Code of State Rules
confers upon the State Tax Commissioner discretion in choosing and applying the most accurate method of appraising commercial and industrial properties. The exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed upon judicial review absent a showing
of abuse of discretion.
In either situation, the standard of review always favors the taxing authority.
These cases dispel any lingering illusions as to whether West Virginia's
system for resolving disputes over property tax assessments is fundamentally
fair. As a result of these decisions, any taxpayer who believes that the assessed
value of his property is too high must bear the significant expense of obtaining
professional appraisal of his property. He will have his complaint heard by a
tribunal that does not have the technical expertise to understand the technical
appraisal questions before it, is severely constrained in the amount of time it has
available to hear his case, has insufficient financial resources to meet all of the
demands placed on it by its constituents, and will directly benefit from ruling
against him. Moreover, because of the applicable high standard of proof, the
tribunal can't rule in favor of the taxpayer even if the tribunal believes that it is
more likely than not that the assessment is too high.
A taxpayer's only avenue of appeal from the inevitable adverse decision
in a valuation protest is to a circuit court that can't hear any new evidence but
that can only review the undoubtedly sparse record made before the board of
equalization and review, and then only if the taxpayer bore the significant expense of having a court reporter transcribe that hearing. Finally, the circuit
court can't rule in the taxpayer's favor on the basis of that limited record absent
a finding that the county commission abused its discretion-a very high standard indeed. As these cases also demonstrate, further appeal to the West Virgi
nia Supreme Court will surely be met with a court determined not to interfere
with the taxing authority's discretion.
Mr. Caryl observed in his article that the then "unsettled posture of such
fundamental issues as standard of proof, scope and standard of judicial review,
while having an historical explanation, does little to provide a taxpayer-litigant,
or his or her legal counsel, with the reliable guidance that is expected of a sysId. at Syl. pt. 2.
15
Syl. pt. 7, Foster, 672 S.E.2d at 152-53 (citing Syl. pt. 5, In re Tax Assessment Against
Am. Bituminous Power Partners, L.P., 539 S.E.2d 757 (W. Va. 2000)).
14
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tem of laws-not of men."l 6 These three recent cases have now settled some of
the most fundamental issues to which Mr. Caryl referred. Unfortunately, the
outcome of these cases all too well demonstrates the validity of Mr. Caryl's
suggestion that judicial review by the Court is generally superficial 7 and confirms his prediction that the Court is unlikely to be "the principal agent of
reform."18
In the Regular Session of the Legislature in 2010, the Legislature made
significant changes to the procedures for challenging the value of property assessed by the county assessors and the Tax Commissioner. The Legislature
certainly had it within its power to make the system more fair, but it elected
instead to protect the advantages enjoyed by the taxing authorities. While it
made changes to the provisions designating the tribunal that hears appeals, it
didn't take the opportunity to eliminate the fundamental unfairness having a
county commission act as the tribunal. And while it enacted new language dealing with the presumptions and burdens and standards of proof, that language
was inserted only to confirm that it was making no fundamental changes to the
rules established by the three cases discussed in this article. When the new provisions take effect for the assessment year beginning July 1, 2011, taxpayers
will still be confronted with a system that is fundamentally biased against them.
II.BACKGROUND
A.

Valuation Appeals

Bayer MaterialScience and Bayer CropScience each own and operate
chemical plants in Kanawha County, West Virginia. By law, industrial property
is appraised by the State Tax Commissioner.' 9 The appraisal of industrial property such as the machinery and equipment in a chemical plant is, of course, a
highly specialized technical endeavor. Traditionally, the Tax Commissioner has
used the cost approach when valuing machinery and equipment. The cost approach is a means of estimating fair market value from the original cost of the
equipment after accounting for inflation and all forms of depreciation. For tax
year 2006, the taxpayers (herein referred to collectively as "Bayer") found fault
with only a single aspect of the Tax Commissioner's cost approach appraisals:
both taxpayers asserted that the Tax Commissioner failed to give sufficient consideration to the amount of economic obsolescence that affected their respective
facilities.

18

Caryl, supra note 1,at 330.
Id. at 336-37.
Id. at 337.

19

W. Va. Code § 1l-lC-10(c) (2009).

6

17
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The Tax Commissioner's legislative ruleS20 require that "[i]n applying
the cost approach, the Tax Commissioner will consider three (3) types of depreciation: physical deterioration, functional obsolescence, and economic obsolescence," 21 and define economic obsolescence as "a loss in value of property arising from 'Outside Forces' such as changes in use, legislation that restricts or
impairs property rights, or changes in supply and demand relationships."22
That both of Bayer's plants suffer from economic obsolescence is evident from the fact that both of the chemical plants operate at only a fraction of
their full capacity, which the testimony indicated is caused by competition from
other worldwide suppliers. In some instances, legacy costs unrelated to its current operations also impose a burden. Under these circumstances, unless an
appropriate deduction for economic obsolescence is made in the appraisal, the
plant would effectively be valued by the Tax Commissioner exactly as it would
if it were operating at 100% capacity and were not subject to excessive nonop erating costs. The Tax Commissioner refused to consider these factors as
economic obsolescence, resulting in a substantial overvaluation of both plants.
Both taxpayers appealed the value of their industrial personal property
as appraised by the State Tax Commissioner for tax year 2006 to the Kanawha
County Commission sitting as the Board of Equalization and Review. Following a contentious hearing at which the President of the Commission openly declared his overriding intention to protect the county's fisc, the Board voted 2-1
to uphold the Tax Commissioner's assessment. Each taxpayer elected to pursue
a separate appeal to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. In these appeals,
both taxpayers explicitly argued that the statutory process by which taxpayers
can appeal excessive values violates their Due Process rights.
The circuit court rendered a final decision in the Bayer MaterialScience
23
appeal on June 28, 2006. Bayer MaterialScience filed a Petition for Appeal to
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which granted the appeal by order
dated April 18, 2007.24 The West Virginia Supreme Court also ordered that the
briefing schedule in that appeal be held in abeyance until a Petition for Appeal
was filed with the Court in the related appeal by Bayer CropScience.2 5 The circuit court issued its decision in that case on October 2, 2007, and Bayer CropScience filed a Petition for Appeal from that decision for the 2006 tax year with
the West Virgina Supreme Court on February 1, 2008.26

See W. Va. Code. R. § 1 10-1P-1 et seq. (1991) (Valuation of Commercial and Industrial
Real and Personal Property for Ad Valorem Property Tax Purposes).
21
Id. § 110-1P-2.2.11 (emphasis added).
22
Id. § 110-1P-2.3.5.
23
Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Commissioner, 672 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 2008).
24
Id
20

25

Id

26

Id
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While Bayer MaterialScience's original appeal to the West Virginia Supreme Court was pending, Bayer filed a new round of appeals for tax year 2007
on essentially the same issues for the subsequent tax year. Again, the County
Commission denied both appeals, and Bayer again appealed to the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County. The circuit court consolidated those cases,2 and again, by
Order entered October 23, 2007, the Circuit Court affirmed the Order of the
Board. Bayer filed a Petition for Appeal for the 2007 tax year with the West
Virginia Supreme Court on February 11, 2008.28 Bayer filed a motion to consolidate its three appeals in the West Virginia Supreme Court on February 12,
2008 (which order was granted) and filed its opening brief on May 16, 2008.
Also while Bayer MaterialScience's original appeal was held in abeyance, the Foster Foundation on January 24, 2008 appealed a decision of the
Circuit Court of Cabell County upholding a determination of the Cabell County
Commission sitting as the Board of Equalization and Review, which denied the
Foundation's appeal of the appraised value of the Woodlands Retirement Community (Woodlands) for tax year 2007. In short, the Foster Foundation asserted
that the value assigned to Woodlands did not reflect its true and actual value
pursuant to West Virginia law and that the County Commission failed to account for Woodlands being a not-for-profit home for the aged. The Foster Foundation also asserted that the process by which the Cabell County Assessor's
office and the County Commission arrived at the assessed value of the Woodlands violated due process of law, citing the Bayer MaterialScience appeal then
pending before the West Virginia Supreme Court.2 9 The court heard oral arguments in Foster Foundation and Bayer MaterialScienceon the same day. It

27

Id.

28

Id

In In re Tax Assessment of FosterFound. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 150 (W.
Va. 2008), and Bayer Materia/Science,LLC v. State Tax Commissioner, 672 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va.
2008), the taxpayers raised and the court addressed various technical objections to their assessments. Since these technical issues are of interest only to a narrow range of taxpayers, this article
does not address the court's treatment of those issues. Suffice it to say that in Stone Brook Ltd.
P'ship v. Sisinni, 688 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 2009) (No. 34863), the court summarized the Bayer
MaterialScience case as one in which the court rejected the "'taxpayers' request to apply [a] particular appraisal method where taxpayers had not provided data necessary to apply that appraisal
method because taxpayers' corporate financial structure did not produce that type of data." Id. at
20. This description is exactly backwards, because in that case, the Tax Commissioner valued
Bayer's machinery and equipment with the cost approach, yet insisted on determining the amount
of economic obsolescence present with the income approach, even though Bayer couldn't provide
the relevant plant-specific income data. There, it was the Tax Commissioner that insisted on
using a method for which the requisite data was not available. Despite the Tax Commissioner's
admission in testimony that he had "no idea" what percentage of the income he calculated for the
companies as a whole was actually attributable to the specific plant and that his approach was
"fairly arbitrary" and left him with "no idea" whether he had accurately determined the value of
Bayer's property. See Brief of Appellant at 13, Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Commissioner, 672 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 33881). The Court upheld the value established by
the Tax Commissioner's method.
29
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released its decision in Foster on November 5, 2008 and in Bayer MaterialScience on November 19, 2008.
B.

Exoneration Case

In Bayer Corp., the taxpayer discovered errors that it made in its property tax returns for tax years 2001, 2002, and 2003 .30 Seeking credit against future years' taxes in the amount of taxes it overpaid, Bayer applied in August
2003 to the County Commission of Kanawha County for "relief from erroneous
assessments" ("exoneration") under the provisions of section 11-3-27 of the
West Virginia Code. There was no dispute that Bayer had overpaid its taxes by
$457,000 for these three years.31
Pursuant to the provisions of section 11-3-27 of the West Virginia
Code, the Kanawha County Commission heard testimony and received evidence
on the two issues it is charged by statute to determine: whether Bayer's request
for exoneration was timely and whether the nature of the errors entitled Bayer to
relief. After considering the testimony of Bayer's witnesses, the Commission,
by a vote of two to one, granted Bayer's request for exoneration (considering
the fact that the credit ordered by the Commission cost the county almost
$500,000, this decision could be regarded as being highly unusual, if not unprecedented).32 The State Tax Commissioner, who appeared at the hearing to
"defend the interests of the state, county, and districts," declined to seek review
of this decision.
Nonetheless, the Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha County filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the name of the State of West Virginia in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County seeking review of the Commission's decision.34
By Order dated August 10, 2006, the Circuit Court ruled that it heard the matter
de novo, reversed the decision of the County Commission, and ruled that Bayer
was not entitled to the requested exoneration. On April 30, 2007, the Circuit
Court denied Bayer's Motion for New Trial and Motion for Reconsideration.
Bayer appealed that decision to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court in Bayer Corp. on November 5,
2008.

State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha Cnty. v. Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d 282, 285
(W. Va. 2008).
31
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 152-53, Bayer MaterialScience, 672 S.E.2d 174 (Tax
Commissioner's witness admitting that Bayer pays more taxes than it should have paid had it filed
correct reports and declining to dispute the amount of the discrepancies).
32
Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d at 285 (W. Va. 2008).
30

33

Id.

State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, State ex rel.Clifford v. Bayer Corp., No. 04-AA26 (Cir. Ct. Kanawha Cnty. 2004).
34
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III. THE COUNTY COMMISSION'S INHERENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST VIOLATES
DUE PROCESS

Quoting Professor Jerome Hellerstein, Mr. Caryl observed that
[a] fair hearing before an impartial reviewer is indispensable if
the citizenry are to feel, whether they agree or disagree with the
decision, that they have had a fair hearing and that the property
tax system, too, effectively operates as government by law and
not merely by the caprice or favoritism of the local assessor.
In West Virginia, a taxpayer who wishes to contest the appraised value
of his property for ad valorem property tax purposes never has the opportunity
to appear before a disinterested tribunal and prove his case by a simple preponderance of the evidence. At every turn, he is confronted either by officers acting
in a judiciary capacity that are inherently hostile to his interests and/or by standards of proof or review that, as a practical matter, are virtually impossible to
overcome. Mr. Caryl's article focuses on the unfairness of the current system to
smaller taxpayers; large industrial taxpayers are at an additional disadvantage.
Since the magnitude of their claims is higher, and the negative impact on the
government's fisc is correspondingly greater. For those taxpayers, the inherent
institutional bias is more obvious.
In its brief to the Supreme Court of Appeals, Bayer framed this issue as
follows:
In West Virginia, a county commission has the ultimate responsibility for the fiscal affairs of each county. Accordingly, a
commission has an inherent interest in maximizing the revenue
available to the county, and thus in denying tax appeals that
would result in a reduction of revenue available to the county.
This partisan interest presents a conflict with the commission's
statutory role to adjudicate tax appeals. Such an inherent conflict of interest on the part of the tribunal constitutes a denial of
due process to those who must appear before it.36

3s
Caryl, supra note 1, at 360 (quoting Jerome R. Hellerstein, JudicialReview ofProperty Tax
Assessment, 14 TAX L. REV. 327, 352 (1959)).
36
See Brief of Appellant at 16, Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Conunissioner, 672

S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 2008).
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Foster Misinterpretedthe Applicable United States Supreme Court Precedents
1.

A Review of the Case Law Predating Foster

In Foster, the West Virginia Supreme Court misinterpreted the relevant
United States Supreme Court precedents of Tumey v. Ohio37 and Ward v. Village
of Monroeville.3 8 The West Virginia Supreme Court summarized the United
States Supreme Court's precedent with this language:
[w]hen faced with cases questioning the impartiality of a hearing tribunal, the United States Supreme Court generally has
found a hearing tribunal to be partial when there exists a direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation.... However,
when no such pecuniary interest is present, the United States
Supreme Court typically has found the tribunal to satisfy the requirements of due process.39
While the first of these assertions is certainly correct, the second clearly misstates the law. While a direct pecuniary interest was present in Tumey,
that interest was not the only factor that gave rise to the Court's finding that the
tribunal was not impartial. In Ward, the Court found the tribunal was not impartial in the absence of any direct pecuniary interest.
As the West Virginia Supreme Court correctly ascertained, the Supreme
Court of the United States has recognized that "officers acting in a judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be
decided is of course the general rule."40 In its seminal decision in Tumey, the
Court ruled that a system by which an inferior judge was paid for his service
only when he convicted the defendant in a criminal proceeding violated due
process requirements. The Court held that "it certainly violates the Fourteenth
Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to
subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has
a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against
him in his case."4A West Virginia has long recognized this general rule. Syllabus Point 1 in State ex rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet 42 provides that "'It is a funda-

3

273 U.S. 510 (1927).
38
409 U.S. 57 (1972).
39
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 160 (W.
Va. 2008).
4
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 522 (1927).
41
Id. at 523.
42
202 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1974).
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mental rule in the administration of justice that a person can not be a judge in a
cause wherein he is interested, whether he be a party to the suit or not."
In Foster, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court either missed or
simply ignored the fact that direct pecuniary interests are not the only sources of
potential bias which disqualify a tribunal. In Tumey, the impartiality of a village
judge was questioned because he also was mayor of the village. As mayor and
the "chief executive of the village," he was "charged with the business of looking after the finances of the village."4 Given those duties, the Court found that
The Court recogthe mayor could not "escape his representative capacity.
nized that
[t]he minor penalties usually attaching to the ordinances of a
village council, or to the misdemeanors in which the mayor may
pronounce final judgment without a jury, do not involve any
such addition to the revenue of the village as to justify the fear
that the mayor would be influenced in his judicial judgment by
that fact. 46
However, in Tumey, income from the mayor's court "offers to the village council and its officers a means of substantially adding to the income of the
village to relieve it from further taxation."47
Accordingly, the Court concluded that it was reasonable for a party to
question whether he or she could receive a fair trial or sentence given the
judge's "interest as mayor in the financial condition of the village and his responsibility therefor" and his accompanying implicit "motive to help his village
by conviction and a heavy fine."" In light of the mayor-judge's dual roles, the
Court established a rule that "[a] situation in which an official perforce occupies
two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other
judicial, necessarily involves a lack of due process of law."" The Court emphasized that "[e]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
average man as a judge . .. not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between
the state and the accused denies the latter due process of law."50 The Court then
concluded that the statutory scheme there under consideration was unconstitutional because it "vested the judicial power in one who by reason of his interest,
both as an individual and as chief executive of the village, is disqualified to ex-

4

Id. at Syl. pt. 1 (quoting Findley v. Smith, 26 S.E. 370 (W. Va. 1896)).
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 533.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 534.

47

Id. at 533.

48

Id

49

Id. at 533-534.

5o

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).

43
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ercise it in the trial of the defendant."" In Tumey, then, the combination of the
mayor's direct pecuniary interest in the outcome and his inherent bias due to the
inconsistent responsibilities of his duties as judge and chief executive resulted in
a denial of due process.
In Ward, the Supreme Court of the United States directly addressed the
question of whether, absent a direct pecuniary interest, executive responsibilities
for governmental finances alone was sufficient to disqualify a mayor from acting in a judicial capacity. In this case,
[t]he Mayor of Monroeville has wide executive powers and is
the chief conservator of the peace. He is president of the village
council, presides at all meetings, votes in case of a tie, accounts
annually to the council respecting village finances, fills vacancies in village offices and has general overall supervision of village affairs. A major part of village income is derived from the
fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees imposed by him in his mayor's
court.52
Over a five year period, an average of approximately 42% of the village
income came from the mayor's court.s3
The Court recalled that in Tumey, "[t]he fact that the mayor there shared
directly in the fees and costs did not define the limits of the principle"; rather,
[a]lthough "the mere union of the executive power and the judicial power in him cannot be said to violate due process of law,"
the test is whether the mayor's situation is one "which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget
the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused."54
The Court held that
[p]lainly that 'possible temptation' may also exist when the
mayor's executive responsibilities for village finances may
make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution
from the mayor's court. This, too, is a 'situation in which an
official perforce occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, (and) nec"1
52

Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58 (1972).

5

Id.

5

Id. at 60 (citations omitted).
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essarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him., 5 5
Even absent a direct pecuniary interest, then, the simple fact that the
mayor occupied two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, rendered the tribunal in Ward unconstitutional.
In fact, the Supreme Court of the United States has explained that "[t]he
requirement of neutrality has been jealously guarded by this Court,"56 and has
held that even the appearance of impropriety must be avoided, observing that
"justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."57 In In re Murchison" the
Court explained:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in
the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored
to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no
man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to
try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest
cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and relationships must be considered. This Court has said, however, that
'Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to
the average man as a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice,
clear, and true between the State and the accused denies the latter due process of law.' 59
The Supreme Court of the United States has also held that these principles apply equally in civil proceedings.60
In earlier years, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recog6
nized these due process concepts. Syllabus Point 2 of Williams v. Brannen 1
cites Tumey and provides that
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
5

Id.

56

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).

5

349 U.S. 133 (1955).
5
Id. at 136 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
6
See, e.g., Marshall,446 U.S. at 242 ("The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases."); see also Concrete Pipe & Prods.
of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (holding that the
requirement of an unbiased tribunal extends to situations where a private party is given statutory
authority to adjudicate a dispute).
61
178 S.E. 67 (W. Va. 1935).
58
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convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused,
denies the latter due process of law.
And in Louk v. Haynes,62 the West Virginia Supreme Court stated:
Due process requires that the appearance of justice be satisfied.
The United States Supreme Court has stated: 'A fair trial in a
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of
course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases.
But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge
in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he
has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined
with precision. Circumstances and relationships must be considered. This Court has said, however, that 'every procedure
which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a
judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between
the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.'
Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who
have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh
the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to
perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy
the appearance ofjustice.' 6 3
In other cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has recognized that taxpayers, in fact, do have due process rights in hearings before a
board of equalization and review. 4 Specifically, in In re Tax Assessments
Against Pocahontas Land Co., 65 the West Virginia Supreme Court held that a
county commission's failure to accord taxpayers fair procedures during valuation proceedings violates due process.66 These earlier cases, however, and the
223 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1976).
63
Id. at 791 (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955)) (citations omitted).
6
See, e.g., State ex rel. Ellis v. Kelly, 112 S.E.2d 641, 644 (1960) (holding all government
branches and subdivisions "are bound by the prohibition of the due process guaranties, which
extend to legislative, judicial, administrative, or executive proceedings") (citation omitted).
65
303 S.E.2d 691 (W. Va. 1983).
62

Id. at 701-02 (lack of quorum of commission and the commission's decision given the
absence of evidence contradicting the taxpayer's "claim that the assessment was made in an arbitrary fashion" violated due process); see also Syl . pt. 2. In re E. Associated Coal Corp., 204
S.E.2d 71 (W. Va. 1974) ("Refusal by the county court to permit the introduction of such evidence
... is a violation of the taxpayer's right to due process of law as required by Article III, Section 10
of the Constitution of West Virginia.").
6
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principles upon which they were based, were entirely absent in the Fosterdecision.
2.

How the Majority in FosterMisapplied the Previous Case Law

The Tumey and Ward cases were cited in the Foster decision for the
proposition that a judge should be disqualified if he or she has a direct, personal
pecuniary interest in the outcome. As demonstrated above, citing these cases as
standing only for that limited proposition misses completely the fact that, in the
absence of a direct, personal pecuniary interest in the outcome, a judge holding
two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other
judicial,necessarily denies to the litigants due process of law.
The Foster decision also cited Concerned Citizens of Southern Ohio,
Inc. v. Pine Creek Conservancy District,67 and Gibson v. Berryhill68 for the
proposition that a judge should be disqualified if he or she has a direct, personal
pecuniary interest in the outcome. Of these, only the latter squarely addresses
that point,6 9 but that issue was not implicated in Foster or Bayer MaterialScience since no taxpayer asserted that the county commission has a direct, personal pecuniary interest. And in Concerned Citizens, the Court didn't resolve
the issue of whether the tribunal was impartial; rather, as the Foster court recognized, it remanded the case for full consideration of the issues presented by
appellants, including the issue of whether the tribunal had a financial incentive
and that, therefore, persons objecting to its actions are deprived of a hearing
before an impartial judicial office. 70
In support of its proposition that "when no such pecuniary interest is
present, the United States Supreme Court typically has found the tribunal to
satisfy the requirements of due process," 7 the Foster Court cites Dugan v.
Ohio7 2 and (weakly) Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Calfornia,Inc. v. Construction
Laborers Pension Trust for S. Calhfornia.73 Yet the Court in Ward held that the
situation there was "wholly unlike" that in Dugan, in which the mayor had "no
67

429 U.S. 651 (1977).
411 U.S. 564 (1973).
69
Gibson also stands for the proposition that if all members of the tribunal are equally infected
with the same interest, the entire tribunal is disqualified. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475
68

U.S. 813, 827 (1986).
See Concerned Citizens, 429 U.S. at 652. On remand, the Court below never reached the
issue of bias, because, following Justice Rehnquist's lead, it found that the question in that case
was not an adjudicative one but a legislative one and therefore the requirement established in
Tumey and Ward for an unbiased hearing officer in an adjudicative setting simply was not implicated. See Concerned Citizens of S. Ohio, Inc. v. Pine Creek Conservancy Dist., 473 F. Supp.
334, 337 (1977).
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 160 (W.
71
Va. 2008).
72
277 U.S. 61 (1928).
70

7

508 U.S. 602 (1993).
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executive, but only judicial duties." 74 As the Supreme Court of the United
States itself explained, Dugan is not applicable in Ward since "the Mayor's relationship to the finances and financial policy of the city was [in that case] too
remote to warrant a presumption of bias toward conviction in prosecutions before him as judge."7 s Here, however, the West Virginia constitutional and statutory provisions alone as cited by the Foster Foundation reveal that a county
commission exercises plainly executive functions. 76
Nor should Concrete Pipe be cited for what the outcome should be
when no direct, pecuniary interest is present. There, the Supreme Court of the
United States found that trustees of a retirement fund who were required to act
in a fiduciary capacity with respect the beneficiaries (retirees) of the trust were
potentially biased when they were required to determine the extent of the liability of an employer who withdrew from the fund.77 In that case, the potential bias
of the trustees did not result in a denial of due process, but only (as the West
Virginia Supreme Court failed to recognize) because the court found that the
trustees acted in a prosecutorial rather than in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. The trustees were "not required to hold a hearing, to examine witnesses, or
to adjudicate the disputes of contending parties on matters of fact or law." 7 8
However, in the Bayer MaterialScienceand Foster cases, there is no question
that the Board acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, as it performed all of
those functions. Thus, ConcretePipe does not support the FosterCourt's assertion that "when no such pecuniary interest is present, the United States Supreme
Court typically has found the tribunal to satisfy the requirements of due
process."
It should not have been difficult to synthesize the holdings of the cases
cited by the court in Foster into a coherent rule. If the judge of a tribunal acting
74

7
76

n

Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 65 (1928) (emphasis added).
Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60-61 (1972).
See infra Part I1l.B.
The Court explained:
The trustees could act in a biased fashion for several reasons. The most obvious would be in attempting to maximize assets available for the beneficiaries of the trust by making findings to enhance withdrawal liability. The next
would not be so selfless, for if existing underfunding was the consequence of
prior decisions of the trustees, those decisions could, if not offset, leave the
trustees open to personal liability. A risk of bias may also inhere in the mere
fact that, fiduciary obligations aside, the trustees are appointed by the unions
and by employers. Union trustees may be thought to have incentives, unrelated to the question of withdrawal, to impose greater rather than lesser withdrawal liability. Employer trustees may be responsive to concerns of those
employers who continue to contribute, whose future burdens may be reduced
by high withdrawal liability, and whose competitive position may be enhanced to boot.

Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 617.
78

Id. at 619.
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in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity has a direct, personal pecuniary interest in
the outcome of the case, the judge is disqualified. However, if the tribunal acts
in prosecutorial rather than in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity or performs
legislative as opposed to executive functions, no due process issue arises. However, when an official occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, and when the situation is one which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and
true, a denial of due process results. This is true whether or not the judge also
has a direct, personal pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case. Yet somehow this relatively straightforward analysis eluded the West Virginia Supreme
Court.
B.

The Evidence in FosterAmply Demonstratedthe County Commission's
Bias

Having conducted its analysis of the relevant (and irrelevant) cases from
the Supreme Court of the United States and having (incorrectly) concluded that
only a direct pecuniary interest could disqualify the Board, the court in Foster
then found that the Board members had no direct pecuniary interest because the
individual commissioners did not directly benefit from the additional funds their
decision generated and because their compensation was not affected by their
decisions, and because the County Commission itself did not directly benefit
from the additional revenue.79
Neither the Foster Foundation nor Bayer have any reason to complain
about that finding, since neither argued that any member of the Board had direct, pecuniary interest in the form of additional compensation or otherwise.
The real question before the West Virginia Supreme Court, however, was
whether the members of the Board occupy two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, and whether the situation is
one which would offer a possible temptation for the average man as a judge to
forget the burden of proof or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear, and true. Although the West Virginia Supreme Court paid some slight lip
service to this issue, stating that "the Foundation has not proved the Cabell
County Commissioners' partiality or that their dual role as members of the
Board of Equalization and Review was compromised by this alleged divided
loyalty,"80 all of its reasoning was directed to the question of whether the Commissioners had a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case.
There should not have been any confusion as to the basis of the Foster
Foundation's complaint. In fact, the Foster Foundation was quite specific; as
See infra Part III.C. for a more detailed discussion of the court's findings as to the insufficiency of the evidence introduced by the Foster Foundation.
80
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 160 (W.
Va. 2008) (emphasis added).
7
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the Court recognized, it cited specific constitutional and statutory provisions that
establish the County Commission's responsibility for administering the fiscal
affairs of Cabell County and the tax revenue at issue provides the funding for
such fiscal affairs 8 ' and detailed the amount (approximately $200,000 annually)
by which the tax base for the county and its levying bodies would be reduced by
a decision in favor of the taxpayers in this case. 82
Under the West Virginia Constitution, County Commissioners "have the
superintendence and administration of the internal police and fiscal affairs of
their counties. By statute, county commissions have the duty "to supervise the
general management of the fiscal affairs and business of each county," clearly
an executive function. 84 Moreover, the executive role of the county commissions (formerly called county courts) has long been recognized by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which has stated that
[c]ounty courts are the central governing body of the county.
The constitution and laws of this State have committed to county courts certain legislative, executive and judicial powers directly connected with the local affairs of the county. Included
among its powers, county courts ". . . have the superintendence

and administration of the internal police and fiscal affairs of
their counties ... "

Nor is there any question that property taxes make up the vast majority
of a county commission's budget. The Court has recognized that "[t]he ad valorem tax is the most fundamental tax imposed upon the citizens of this State to

Id. at 157 (citing W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 11 (establishing duty of county commissions over
county's fiscal affairs); see also W. VA. CODE § 7-1-5 (2009)).
82
In its decision, the Court recited the allegations of the appellant, including the fact that
81

[t]he County Commission's interest in maximizing revenue is at odds with
granting reductions in the assessment values of real property (regardless of validity of claims) because it would directly result in a reduction of the tax base.
For example, the Foster Foundationbelieves its assessment was excessive by
approximately $14,859,000. Had the Foster Foundation been successful before the County Commission, the County's tax base would have been reduced
by approximately $200,000 annually. In every contested valuation there is an
inherent conflict between the County Commission's inconsistent roles as the
overseer of the county finances and as the tribunal for hearing individual tax
appeals. This conflict is magnified as the amount in controversy increases.
Foster,672 S.E.2d, at 159 (citing Brief of Appellant at 9-10 (emphasis added)).
83
W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 11.
8
W. VA. CODE § 7-1-5 (2010).
85
State ex rel. Dingess v. Scaggs, 195 S.E.2d 724, 725 (W. Va. 1973) (emphasis added, citations omitted) (citing W. VA. CODE §§ 7-1-1 to -9 and § 7-1-3); see also Butler v. Tucker, 416
S.E.2d 262, 267 (W. Va. 1992).
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fund local government, including schools."86 Further, a substantial portion of
the budget which the County Commission oversees and manages is generated
When revenues from property taxes fall, the County
from property taxes.
budget cuts and other sacrifices that directly affect its
make
must
Commission
88
constituents.
As Justice Neely observed in his dissent in Rawl Sales & Processing
Co. v. County Commission of Mingo County,8 9 a county commission that is responsible for the operating budget of a county is inherently biased against taxpayers appealing their assessments. This bias is particularly applicable to large
corporate taxpayers that can't vote:
... the county commission lacks expertise in property evaluation

but is extraordinarily knowledgeable about the government's
need for money, an ingrainedbias that is particularly harmful to
non-voting entities. Although someone should review the assessor's property evaluation, assigning this important review to
the county commission is perhaps not a scheme whose design
would prompt nomination for the Nobel Prize in jurisprudence.
Indeed, a hearing before a county commission on a tax appeal is
probably best described by the old Jewish expression:
".

11HT

ITT11

1-II

'

T)

1-1--T

119n390

Justice Neely also observed in his dissent in Killen v. Logan County
Commission9 1 that "[t]he pressures on the county commissions are probably

See State ex rel. Ayers v. Cline, 342 S.E.2d 89, 94 (W. Va. 1985) (noting that property taxes
were a principal source of revenue for local governments); State ex rel. Cnty. Comm'n v. Cooke,
475 S.E.2d 483, 491 (W. Va. 1996).
87
See, e.g., Cooke, 475 S.E.2d at 491.
88
See State ex rel. Lambert v. Cortellessi, 386 S.E.2d 640, 642 n.2 (W. Va. 1989). Indeed,
adequate funding for the counties of West Virginia and the effective use of such funding are frequent campaign issues. See, e.g., Meet the Candidates: PrimaryElection; Putnam County Commission, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Apr. 20, 2008 at 13J (reporting agreement among
county commission candidates that Putnam County's greatest issue was to find and provide "adequate funding" in the county); Janet Metzner, Mon Commission Candidates Square Off
DOMINION PosT, Oct. 5, 2006 at 2-B (noting one candidate for county commissioner explained
that one of his core accomplishments was the funding which the county was able to provide its
fire departments); Dawn Miller, It's tough to be Kanawha County, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept.
7, 2007, at 4A (discussing residents' competing interests, expressed "through their elected representatives," in funding various initiatives in the county.
89
443 S.E.2d 595 (W. Va. 1994).
90
Id. at 601 (emphasis added). The literal translation is "From your mouth to God's ear."
Loosely translated from Yiddish, this expression means that you should say it should happen and
God should hear it and make it true, but that never happens.
91 295 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1982).
86
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such that they will quickly use all money available to them." 92 The responsibility of the commissioners for the fiscal affairs of the county, together with the
large percentage of the county's budget made up by property taxes, clearly
creates an inherent conflict of interest and obliterates the appearance of justice.
The West Virginia Supreme Court also recited the Commission's response in Foster asserting that only a small fraction of taxpayers whose assessments increased bothered to appeal their increases and that for the subset of
those who did appear for a hearing, all of the appeals were either resolved or the
assessments (including the Foster Foundation's) were reduced. Of course, the
Commission's response cuts both ways. The Foster Foundation was complaining that the process by which taxpayers must appeal assessments that they believe are excessive is inherently unfair because the tribunal (the County Commission) is biased against them. If that's true, it's hardly surprising that most
taxpayers recognize the futility in appealing in the first place. It's even more
true when the taxpayer is required to go to the expense of presenting testimony
from a licensed appraiser or other expert to meet his or her standard of proof94
-why pay for an appraisal when one is certain to lose? The fact that only
twenty-one taxpayers out of 27,000 who received increased assessments, and
the fact that some of these twenty-one didn't appear for a hearing, is at least
equally likely to be an indication of the inherent unfairness of the system as it is
to be indication that the current system is generally perceived as fair.
Amazingly, the West Virginia Supreme Court also recognized that the
Commission conceded that there "might appear" to be a conflict of interest and
that it does, in fact, receive a portion of every dollar in increased tax revenue
that it generates from its decisions on taxpayers' appeals. 95 How can the Su92

Id. at 712.

The Court recognized that the Commission argued:
The Commission responds that the appeals procedure does not create a conflict of interest and does not unconstitutionally deny appealing taxpayers due
process of law. With regard to the tax year in issue in this case, 2007, the
Commission asserts that, in Cabell County, over 27,000 pieces of property had
increased assessment values; of those, only twenty-one property owners requested a hearing on their assessments, and all except one of those property
owners either had their dispute resolved, did not appear for the hearing, or received a lower assessment. The Woodlands received a lower tax assessment.
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 157 (W. Va.
2008).
9
See discussion of the standard of proof before the Board infra Part III.
9
The Commission also argued:
Although the Commission concedes that there might appear to be a conflict of
interest, the pecuniary interest of the Commission in tax revenues is slight: for
every one dollar in ad valorem tax revenue, the County Commission receives
sixteen cents while the Cabell County Board of Education receives sixtyseven cents. Thus, argues the Commission, it has no real incentive to artificially inflate tax assessments.
Id. at 157-158.
9
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preme Court be blind to a conflict that even the Commission itself recognizes?
The County Commission's admission that it does, in fact, get the benefit of being able to spend 16% of every dollar in tax revenue that their decisions generate is proof of the very conflict of which the Foster Foundation complained.
The fact that the school board receives 67% of every dollar in tax revenue, or
that other levying bodies also receive smaller direct benefits, doesn't prevent the
individual Commissioners from taking credit for the additional revenue their
decisions generate in their reelection campaigns. Finally, the fact that the Foster
Foundation and other taxpayers received reductions in their assessments as a
result of their appeals indicates that the assessor does make errors and that, even
under the current unfair system, some of these errors get corrected. How many
more errors would be corrected, and how much more fair would taxation be, in a
fair system for taxpayer appeals?
C.

Yet the Result in Foster Turned on a Lack ofEvidence

The West Virginia Supreme Court noted that "the Foster Foundation
does not argue that W. Va. Code § 11-3-24 is unconstitutional as applied; rather,
the Foundation argues only that this statute is unconstitutional, which questions
the statute's facial constitutionality" and that a statute that establishes the procedure that taxpayers must follow to contest their assessed taxes must be construed in favor of the government. 96 Nevertheless, the court stated that a taxpayer can overcome this presumption and establish the statute is unconstitutional if he meets his burden of proof to "establish that a taxing statute, valid on its
face, is so unreasonable or arbitrary as to amount to a denial of due process of
law when applied in a particular case, the taxpayer must prove by clear and coThe magent evidence facts establishing unreasonableness or arbitrariness.

96

Id. at 159.

Id. at 158-59. (footnote omitted) (citing Schmehl v. Helton, 662 S.E.2d 697 (W. Va. 2008)).
The Court's analysis is somewhat muddled here, too. The traditional test for whether a statute is
facially constitutional has been articulated by the United States Supreme Court:
Petitioners are challenging the facial validity of the regulations. Thus, we are
concerned only with the question whether, on their face, the regulations are
both authorized by the Act and can be construed in such a manner that they
can be applied to a set of individuals without infringing upon constitutionally
protected rights. Petitioners face a heavy burden in seeking to have the regulations invalidated as facially unconstitutional.
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745
(1987)). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has applied this standard:
... a facial challenge to the constitutionality of legislation is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully. The challenger must establish that no set
of circumstances exists under which the legislation would be valid; the fact
that the legislation might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable
set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.
9
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jority opinion then repeatedly cited a lack of evidence as to the statute's unconstitutionality as a basis for overruling the Foster Foundation's claims.
The Court noted that
the Foundation argues that W. Va. Code § 11-3-24 is unconstitutional because the County Commission, sitting as the Board
of Equalization and Review, is an impartial tribunal to hear taxpayers' appeals insofar as the Commission is the entity responsible for administering the fiscal affairs of Cabell County and
the tax revenue at issue provides the funding for such fiscal affairs,98
but then found that "[a]lthough the Foundation makes this assertion, it does not
offer specific proof of the Commission's, or the Commissioners',partiality."99
Rather, the Foundation contends generally that .'[t]he County Commission has
an impermissible conflict of interest in serving as both a decision maker on the
Foster Foundation's appeal of an excessive tax assessment and a beneficiary of
an increased tax revenue resulting from a higher assessed value of Woodlands'
without providingfactual support therefore." 100 The West Virginia Supreme
Court recognized that the Foster Foundation argued that "its assessment was
excessive by approximately $14,859,000. Had the Foster Foundation been successful before the County Commission, the County's tax base would have been
reduced by approximately $200,000 annually,"' but concluded that "[i]n making these assertions, though, the Foundation does not present any specific evidence to suggest how the county commissioners, themselves, directly benefitted
Randall v. Fairmont City Police Dept, 412 S.E.2d 737, 746 (W. Va. 1991); see also Lewis v.
Canaan Valley Resorts, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 634, 641 (W. Va. 1991); Tony P. Sellitti Constr. Co. v.
Caryl, 408 S.E.2d 336, 344 (W. Va. 1991).
In addition, a statute that is valid on its face may also be unconstitutional when applied to a specific set of facts. The standard cited and applied by the Court in Fosteractually applies in this type
of analysis:
'To establish that a taxing statute, valid on itsface, is so unreasonable or arbitrary as to amount to a denial of due process of law when applied in a particular case, the taxpayer must prove by clear and cogent evidence facts establishing unreasonableness or arbitrariness.' Point 4, Syllabus, Norfolk and Western
Railway Company v. Field, 143 W.Va. 219 [, 100 S.E.2d 796 (1957) ]." Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Haden v. Calco Awning [ & Window Corp.], 153
W.Va. 524, 170 S.E.2d 362 (1969).
In re Tax Assessment ofFosterFound. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 159 (citing Syl. pt.
1, Schmehl v. Helton, 662 S.E.2d 697 (2008) (footnote omitted)).
98
Foster,672 S.E.2d at 159 (citing W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 11 (establishing duty of county
commissions over county's fiscal affairs); W. VA. CODE § 7-1-5).
9
Id (emphasis added).
1oo

Id (emphasis added).

101

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/7

24

Broadwater: The Illusion of Due Process in West Virginia's Property Tax Appea

2011]DUE PROCESS IN WEST VIRGINIA'S PROPERTY TAXAPPEALS SYSTEM 815

from thesefunds or to indicate the commissioners had a direct,pecuniary interest in such revenue."' 0 2 Finally, the Court's ultimate holding on the issue of the
biased tribunal turned entirely on the lack of evidence:
... having reviewed the statute at issue herein and the parties'
arguments regarding its constitutionality, we conclude that W.
Va.Code § 11-3-24 is valid on its face. Accordingly, we hold
that W. Va.Code § 11-3-24 (1979) (Repl.Vol.2008), which establishes the procedure by which a county commission sits as a
board of equalization and review and decides taxpayers' challenges to their property tax assessments, is facially constitutional. Therefore, because the Foundation has not presented evidence to prove that it was denied due process when the Commission sat as the Board of Equalization and Review to hear
and decide its appeal of the Woodlands property's tax assessment, the Foundation has not sustained its burden of proving
that W. Va. Code § 11-3-24 is unconstitutional.1 03
D.

Should the CourtHave Considered the Due ProcessIssue in Foster?

It is important to realize that the Foster Foundation did not raise the issue of whether the tribunal was impartial until it filed its Petition for Appeal in
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in which it simply echoed the due
process claims Bayer raised in its first appeal.'0 In fact, the first issue discussed
by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Fosterwas whether it was necessary or
appropriate to address any due process issues at all, since they had not been
raised in the circuit court proceedings below and had not been ruled upon by the
lower court.' 05 This was hardly a trivial issue; on three previous occasions, 06
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 160 (emphasis added). The Court's confusion as to the correct standard to apply
didn't really matter; if the taxpayer didn't introduce clear and convincing evidence to prove that
the statute was unconstitutional is a particular set of circumstances, it certainly wouldn't be able to
prove that no set of circumstances exists under which the legislation would be valid.
'
The Foster Foundation's Petition for Appeal stated:
102
103

On or about April 18, 2007, the Supreme Court of Appeals entered an Order
granting Bayer MaterialScience, LLC's ("Bayer") Petition for Appeal (Appeal
No. 062955). In its Petition, Bayer argued, inter alia, that 1) the various County Commissions have an inherent conflict of interest in considering appeals
from tax assessments which violates due process; 2) that the clear and convincing evidence standard imposed on taxpayers also violates due process;
and 3) that the appraised value of Bayer's applicable industrial property was
excessive.
Petition for Appeal at 15, In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672
S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 07-C-214).
105
Interestingly, the Foster Respondents didn't raise this issue in their briefs; the Supreme
Court nevertheless apparently felt it necessary to explain why it decided to address the issue.
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taxpayers attempted to raise this due process issue in appeals to the West Virginia Supreme Court without first raising the issue in the circuit court below. In
all three of those cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court refused to consider
07
the issue "since it was not raised below and is a nonjurisdictional question."'
In its determination to hear and decide Foster, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court decided to consider the constitutional issue despite the fact
that the circuit court had not had the opportunity to address it. The majority
opinion cited Louk v. Cormier 08 as authority for its decision to plow ahead.109
In Louk v. Cormier, the court reiterated the general rule that "when nonjurisdictional questions have not been decided at the trial court level and are then first
raised before this Court, they will not be considered on appeal." 0 Louk did,
however, recognize that the general rule is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to an
appeal but, rather, is a gatekeeper provision ... embodying appellate respect for
the circuit court's advantage and capability to adjudicate the rights of our citizens.11 Thus, under extraordinary circumstances, the West Virginia Supreme
Court will consider an issue for the first time on appeal.1 2 Those extraordinary
circumstances include a case in which the court is confronted with "very limited
and essentially undisputed facts"" 3 and in which "by neglecting to raise an issue
in a timely manner, a litigant has [not] deprived this Court of useful factfinding.""l4 The case must also be one raising an issue of constitutional magnitude" 5 of substantial public interest which may recur in the future."16
See Keith v. Gerber, 197 S.E.2d 310, 311-12 (W. Va. 1973); In re Tax Assessments Against
Pocahontas Land Corp., 210 S.E.2d 641, 648 (W. Va. 1974); In re Tax Assessments Against
Pocahontas Land Corp., 303 S.E.2d 691, 701 n.13 (W. Va. 1983).
107
In re Tax Assessments Against Pocahontas Land Corp., 303 S.E.2d at 701 n.13 (citing
Wells v. Roberts, 280 S.E.2d 266 (W. Va. 1981)); Boury v. Hamm, 190 S.E.2d 13 (W. Va. 1972).
1os
622 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 2005).
109 The Court stated:
106

[W]e nevertheless may consider [the issue of whether it is a denial of due
process for the taxpayer's appeal to be heard by a body that was not impartial]
for the first time on appeal to this Court insofar as it raises an issue of constitutionality that is central to our disposition of this case.
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 159 (W. Va.
2008) (quoting Syl. pt. 2 Cormier,622 S.E.2d at 788 ("A constitutional issue that was not properly preserved at the trial court level may, in the discretion of this Court, be addressed on appeal
when the constitutional issue is the controlling issue in the resolution of the case.")).
110 Cormier, 622 S.E.2d at 793-94 (quoting Whitlow v. Bd. of Educ. of Kanawha Cnty., 438
S.E.2d 15, 18 (W. Va. 1993)).
"
Id. at 793 (quoting State v. Greene, 473 S.E.2d 921, 926-27 (W. Va. 1996) (Cleckley, J.,
concurring)).
112
Id. (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).
1"
Id. (citing Whitlow, 438 S.E.2d at 18-19).
114
Louk v. Cormier, 622 S.E.2d 788, 793-94 (W. Va. 2008) (citing Greene, 473 S.E.2d at 92627).
"15
Id.
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Should the West Virginia Supreme Court in Foster have decided to depart from its general rule, despite having adhered to the general rule in three
previous cases raising exactly the same issue? Certainly, the issues addressed in
Foster were of constitutional magnitude of substantial public interest which will
recur in the future. Just as certainly, however, the court in Foster was deprived
of useful factfinding; in fact, the court based its decision on the constitutional
issues solely on its determination that the Foster Foundation failed to introduce
sufficient evidence to prove that the process for hearing challenges to the assessed value of a taxpayer's property was unconstitutional. Given the court's
demand for evidence of specific unfairness, the Foster case was hardly one that
"lends itself to satisfactory resolution on the existing record without further development of the facts." By the criteria established in State v. Greene and specifically adopted by the court in Cormier, the Foster case was not one in which
the court should have departed from its general rule.
Ironically, in In re: Charleston Gazette FOIA Request,'17 decided less
than a month after Bayer MaterialScience and Foster, the West Virginia Supreme Court again agreed to consider a question the lower court has not addressed. There, however, it did so specifically because:
Given the specific facts of this case [including "the enormous
amount of time that has passed since the July 6, 2007, FOIA request"], we find the Gazette's argument compelling and believe
that sending this case back to the circuit court without guidance
on the issue of public employee payroll records would create
substantial prejudice, would cause further delay, and would
more than likely result in the case returning to this Court again
18
under the same set of facts.'
The West Virginia Supreme Court's decision in In Re: Charleston Gazette FOIA Request, then, seems consistent with the Court's admonition in Louk,
that it would depart from the general rule only in "extraordinary circumstances."
Neither these nor any other extraordinary circumstances justified the Court's
departure from that rule in Foster.
E.

If the Facts Were Dispositive of the Impartial TribunalIssue in Foster,
Shouldn't They Have Been Consideredin Bayer MaterialScience?

Of course, it would have been immaterial to the Foster Foundation
whether the West Virginia Supreme Court ruled that it could not consider the
issue of whether the tribunal was impartial for the time on appeal or ruled that
Id. at 794 (citing Whitlow, 438 S.E.2d at 18-19). Justice Davis also wrote the opinion in
Cormier.
1" 671 S.E.2d 776 (W. Va. 2008).
118
Id. at 783.
116
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the Foster Foundation simply didn't prove its case-it would have lost either
way. But the rationale upon which Foster was based mattered very much to
Bayer. Unlike the Foster Foundation, Bayer raised this due process issue at
every step of the appeal process, and all three circuit court decisions in Bayer's
appeals acknowledged that Bayer raised the issue and explicitly ruled against
Bayer on this issue. Had the court wanted to seriously consider whether the
property tax appeals process violates due process, it could have addressed those
issues first in the Bayer MaterialScience case pending before it, where a rich
factual record existed and where those issues had been raised and ruled upon by
the circuit court. Since the court concluded in Fosterthat
because the Foundation has not presented evidence to prove that
it was denied due process when the Commission sat as the
Board of Equalization and Review to hear and decide its appeal
of the Woodlands property's tax assessment, the Foundation has
not sustained its burden of proving that W. Va.Code § 11-3-24
is unconstitutional, 19
one would expect that a review of the evidence presented by Bayer would have
been required in the Bayer cases, as well. Such a review, however, would have
been inconvenient for the court, because in the Bayer case, the facts in the
record clearly established the bias of the Board.
First, Bayer asserted that its appraisals for its personal property for the
two tax years in question were excessive by more than $75,000,000.120 Had the
Board granted Bayer's appeals, the amount of money available to the county
(including the county commission, the Board of Education, and several other
levying bodies) would have been reduced by approximately $1,100,000,121 More
than five times the amount at issue in Foster.
Secondly, the transcripts of the hearings before the Board were peppered with comments from the bench that indicated that the Board was more
119
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 160 (W.
Va. 2008).
120
Bayer MaterialScience argued that its personal property was overvalued by $10,220,326 for
tax year 2006. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 48, Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax
Commissioner, 672 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 2008). Bayer CropScience argued that its real property
was overvalued by $5,919,100 and its personal property was overvalued by $27,382,687 for tax
year 2006. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 46, Id. Bayer MaterialScience argued that its
personal property was overvalued by $2,263,782 for tax year 2007, and Bayer CropScience argued that its personal property was overvalued by $30,138,619 for that tax year. See Brief of
Petitioner-Appellant at 42, Id. The total appraised value at issue was $75,924,514.
121
The amount of tax due on the appraised value for Bayer MaterialScience at issue for tax
year 2006 was $150,000. See Brief of Petitioner Appellant at 17, Id. For Bayer CropScience for
tax year the amount was $480,000. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 26, Id. For both Bayer
CropScience and Bayer MaterialScience together for tax year 2007 the amount of tax was
$470,000. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 42, Id. The total tax at issue was $1,100,000.
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concerned with its responsibility to protect the public fisc than it was to fairly
consider the taxpayers' claims. For example, during hearings addressing Bayer's claims, the president of the commission repeatedly allowed his concern for
Kanawha County's finances to enter his deliberations as a purportedly neutral
jurist, stating "[o]f course, when you are a big multi-national corporation, you
say it's only a million here, only two million apart. I thought that was interesting. These decisions have a real impact on the tax base of this State and Coun,"122

He also felt compelled to protect the interests of the Kanawha County
Board of Education, despite the fact that no representatives of that body appeared at any of Bayer's hearings, observing
[s]o, if the Board of Education -- They participated in the last
matter. You are talking arguably $350,000.00 loss to the Board
of Education . . .. That's just off my head. And, again, the loss
of income isn't germane except it's germane in the respect that
this is a serious matter and does have ramifications outside of
this piece of property. 12 3
The commission president didn't try to hide the fact that his primary
concern was the effect a favorable ruling for Bayer could be applicable to other
taxpayers, asking "[i]f we would do this, shouldn't we then go to every other
chemical plant and industrial plant in Kanawha County and immediately reduce
their taxes or the Tax Commissioner should do it this exact same amount because doesn't this apply to the other chemical plants as well?"l 2 4 Later, he
asked "I mean, is everybody going to be entitled to this?" 25 Finally, he was
concerned that the effect the Board's decision, had it been favorable to Bayer,
would have on individual taxpayers:
So, on the catch side of that, if that is really the case, the Tax
Commissioner should look at all that property, and it shouldn't
apply just to Kanawha County. And, if indeed, a reviewing
court would overturn this, they ought to apply it to every industrial property in the State. I will say this. If this keeps up, the
average taxpayer won't be able to afford a carport, much less a
car like that gentleman had in here ... 1 26

Transcript of Hearing at 21, Id.
Id. at 24.
124
Transcript of Hearing at 83, Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Commissioner, 672
S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 2008).
125
Transcript of Hearing at 156, Bayer MaterialScience,672 S.E.2d 174.
126
Transcript of Hearing at 21, Bayer MaterialScience,672 S.E.2d 174.
122
123
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It is also relevant to note that, for every taxpayer that appeared the same
day Bayer did for its hearing for tax year 2007, the Commission consistently
asked each for the exact amount of the reduction in tax revenue that would ocThe records in the
cur were the Tax Commissioner's appraisal reversed. 12 7
Bayer appeals make any inference of bias unnecessary; any rational person
would recognize the obvious bias arising from the apparent conflict between the
Commission's budgeting and executive capacities,128 on the one hand, and its
quasi-adjudicative function in reviewing assessments, on the other. Incredibly,
in one of the Bayer cases, the Tax Commissioner admitted that he applied a
"fairly arbitrary" methodology to value Bayer's property,129 and that he had "no
idea" whether it accounted for the company's true and actual value as the West
Virginia Constitution requires.130 Nevertheless and inevitably, the County
Commission adopted the Tax Commissioner's value of Bayer's property.
In contrast to the purely legal arguments advanced by the Foster Foundation in its briefs, then, the records in the Bayer cases presented the court with
a fully developed factual record upon which to base its decision-but the Bayer
MaterialScience decision is completely devoid of any mention or analysis of
any of the facts cited by Bayer. Rather, a single paragraph contains the cursory
analysis of the due process claim in the Bayer decision:
With respect to the constitutionality of the statute at issue herein, W. Va.Code § 11-3-24, Bayer contends that permitting
county commissions to sit as boards of equalization and review
to hear and decide taxpayers' challenges of allegedly erroneous
See Transcript of Hearing at 27, 43-44, 52, 55-56, 60, and 76, Bayer MaterialScience, 672
S.E.2d 174.
128
The Kanawha County Commission admits that its "primary function" is to oversee the county's "budget development and management," including the "management of county assets," explaining that "[t]he primary function of the County Commission is budget development and management, overseeing purchasing for the county, management of county assets, and management of
technology resources - overseeing the governing, management and protection of Kanawha County
127

and

its

citizens."

KANAWHA

COUNTY

COMMISSION,

MISSION

STATEMENT,

http://www.kanawha.us/commission/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
According to the West Virginia State Auditor's Office, for the 2005-2006 fiscal year, Kanawha
County's Revised General Revenue Fund Budget called for income from current year property
taxes in the amount of $27,135,970 and $1,866,000 for previous years, for a total of $29,001,970.
The total revenue budgeted was $39,930,771. Property taxes, therefore, make up more than
72.6% of Kanawha County's budget, far in excess of the 42% of the village income came from the
at:
available
document
(Budget
Ward.
in
court
mayor's
http://www.wvauditor.com/services/levyestimates/forms/county_05-06/CountyBudgMonit.xls.
(Last visited June 6, 2006). Note: Does not include the Kanawha County Commission's excess
levy or the levies for Kanawha County Schools).
129
See Transcript of Hearing at 321-22, Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Commissioner, 672 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 2008).. (Tax Commissioner's witness also admitting that his method of apportionment "does not" "relate back to the profitability of a particular plant").
00
Id

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/7

30

Broadwater: The Illusion of Due Process in West Virginia's Property Tax Appea

2011 ]DUE PROCESS IN WEST VIRGINIA'S PROPERTY TAX APPEALS SYSTEM 821
tax assessments unconstitutionally deprives such taxpayers of a
hearing before an impartial tribunal. We recently considered
and resolved this same constitutional inquiry in the companion
case to this consolidated appeal, In re Tax Assessment of Foster
Foundation's Woodlands Retirement Community[.] In Foster,
after conducting the requisite statutory construction and constitutional analyses, we determined that the procedure for hearing
and deciding taxpayers' appeals adopted by the Legislature in
W. Va.Code § 11-3-24 is constitutional: "W. Va.Code § 11-324 which establishes the procedure by which a county commission sits as a board of equalization and review and decides taxpayers' challenges to their property tax assessments, is facially
constitutional." Applying this holding to the decisions of the
circuit court, which found that the subject statute had not deprived Bayer of due process, we find that Bayer is not entitled
to relief on this issue because the statute of which it complains,
W. Va.Code § 11-3-24, is constitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's rulings. 131
Having deprived the Foster Foundation of its opportunity to prove discrimination at the circuit court level, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals deprived Bayer of a fair hearing of its claims by simply ignoring them.
F.

A County Commission Simply Cannot Function as an ImpartialTribunal

When sitting as a board of equalization and review, county commissioners are charged with the power to determine whether property taxes imposed
on a taxpayer are excessive, a determination that could undermine their ability
to perform their executive responsibilities. Given the financial responsibilities
of the county commissioners, any taxpayer who appears before the commission
in its role as a board of equalization and review immediately understands that
his request to lower the value of his property below its appraised value is likely
to be greeted with great skepticism. Similar to the officials at issue in Tumey
and Ward, county commissioners, therefore, "occup[y] two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial." Moreover,
the commissioners' executive interests offer precisely the sort of "possible
temptation to the average man as a judge" that would cause him to view the
taxpayer's case with partiality and bias.132 Requiring individuals who are ac-

131
Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Commissioner, 672 S.E.2d 174, 184-85 (W. Va.
2008) (internal citations omitted).
132
See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Williams v. Brannen, 178 S.E. 67 (W. Va. 1935).
See also Killen v. Logan Cnty. Comm'n, 295 S.E.2d 689, 712 (1982) (Neely, J., dissenting) ("The
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countable to county residents to deliver government services to also adjudicate
whether the funds available to perform those services should be returned to entities challenging their tax assessments creates both an inherent conflict of interest as well as the appearance of such a conflict in violation of the requirements
of due process.
The commissioners' duty to oversee the fiscal affairs of the county and
accompanying executive interest in maximizing the county's revenue cannot be
squared with the requirement that they impartially assess the taxpayer's valuation challenges which would deprive the county commission of revenue, regardless of how sincerely the commissioners assert their ability to act fairly. As
such, the Commission's proceedings violated Bayer's right to due process, and
the circuit court decisions in Bayer and Foster should have been reversed. Yet
the Supreme Court of Appeals selected the Foster case as the case in which to
address the constitutional issues before it, despite the fact that by its own precedents, the constitutional issues should not even have been addressed because
they were not raised and developed in the circuit court below. In Foster, the
court misconstrued the applicable decisions of the United States Supreme Court
and ignored the bias of a county commission rendered obvious by the commission's constitutional and statutory duties, even absent the inflammatory statements of the county commissioners in the Bayer MaterialSciencecase. It found
the appeal process to be constitutional because the Foster Foundation did not
present sufficient evidence of bias, but then refused to examine the fully developed factual record in Bayer MaterialScience.
Cases DecidedAfter Bayer MaterialScience and Foster

G.

The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its holdings in
Tumey and Ward in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.,"' a case that was of
particular interest in West Virginia. In the context of when a judge must be
disqualified, the court again stated that "[i]t is axiomatic that '[a] fair trial in a
fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process."" 34 It cautioned, however,
that "most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level."' 3 5 Nevertheless, it recognized Tumey as "[t]he early and leading
case on the subject,"1 36 and explained that it articulated "the common-law rule
that a judge must recuse himself when he has 'a direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary interest' in a case."' 3 7 At the same time, the Court in Caperton empressures on the county commissions are probably such that they will quickly use all money available to them,").
13
129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009).
'
Id. (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
'
Id (quoting FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948)).
136

Id.

13

Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523).
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phasized that Tumey was not limited to that narrow holding. Citing it as an example of one of two instances that have emerged that were not discussed at
common law but which, as an objective matter, require recusal,' 38 the Court
characterized Tumey as an example of a case in which a judge of a local tribunal
"had a financial interest in the outcome of a case, although the interest was less
than what would have been considered personal or direct at common law,"139
because "experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the
judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable."l 40
The Court reiterated that, in Tumey, "the Due Process Clause required
disqualification 'both because of [the mayor-judge's] direct pecuniary interest in
the outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the
fine to help the financial needs of the village," 1 4' and restated the controlling
principle to be:
Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the
average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused,
denies the latter due process of law.14 2
Emphasizing that in Tumey, it was concerned "with more than the traditional common-law prohibition on direct pecuniary interest" but "was also concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality," 4 3 the Court described Ward, as another case that turned on the
"'possible temptation' the mayor might face" and recalled that the "mayor's
'executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution [to those finances] from the mayor's
court."' 1 The Court also cited Gibson v. Berryhill as a case in which "the
[judge's] financial stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to be in
Tumey."l 45

Caperton directly contradicts the West Virginia Supreme Court's portrayal in Fosterthat
138
139

14
141
142

Id.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259-60.

Id. at 2259 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1974)).
Id. at 2260 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927)).
Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).

Id
'"
Id. (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972)).
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2260 (describing the situation in Gib145
son v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), as "an administrative board composed of optometrists had a
pecuniary interest of 'sufficient substance' so that it could not preside over a hearing against competing optometrists")
143
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[w]hen faced with cases questioning the impartiality of a hearing tribunal, the United States Supreme Court generally has
found a hearing tribunal to be partial when there exists a direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation... . However, when no such pecuniary interest is present, the United States
Supreme Court typically has found the tribunal to satisfy the requirements of due process.146
Rather, as the taxpayers in Bayer and Foster urged, the obvious partisanship of
the members of a county commission to maintain a high level of contribution to
the county's finances predisposes them to rule against taxpayers, and due
process demands they should be disqualified from acting as the tribunal to determine tax appeals.
1.

Institutional Bias

Following the decision in Caperton, in Mountain America, LLC v.
Huffinan,147 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had an opportunity to
review its decisions in Foster and Bayer in light of the decision in Caperton.
There, taxpayers again asserted the institutional bias of the commission resulted
in an inherent conflict of interest, again citing, inter alia, Tumey and Ward.
However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals made short work of the
claims of inherent bias, citing only its decision in Foster:
We recently had opportunity to visit the issue of whether West
Virginia Code § 11-3-24 is constitutional insofar as it requires
county commissions to sit as boards of equalization and review,
and we found that this statute is facially constitutional. In Foster, we also determined that the County Commission's overarching interest, as the governmental body charged with superintendence of the fiscal affairs of the county, in the outcome of
every challenge to its tax base, was not a sufficient conflict of
interest to support a taxpayer's due process violation claim in
deciding the outcome of such challenges.148
Without even mentioning the holding in Caperton decided almost six
months earlier (a decision with which it no doubt was quite familiar), the court
concluded:

In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 159-60 (W.
Va. 2008).
147
687 S.E.2d 768 (W. Va. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct. 2377 (2010).
146

148

Id. at 781 (internal citations omitted).
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Because this Court, in our existing precedent, has resolved the
issue of the facial constitutionality of West Virginia Code § 113-24 as it pertains to the issues of whether the county commission may impartially sit as the board of equalization and review
.... we need not here analyze these particular arguments any

further. 14 9

However, the court did address additional aspects of the current property tax appeals system that, according to the taxpayers, render it inherently unfair. First, the Appellants asserted that the fact that the County Commission
filed an answer to the taxpayers' Petition for Appeal in the Circuit Court was yet
another indication that the County Commission was not impartial. Any casual
observer might well conclude that the fact that the County Commission (which
was not named as a party by Mountain America when it filed its appeal in circuit court) sought to intervene was evidence that the County Commission had a
partisan interest to protect the county's fisc and was actually biased. However,
the court rejected this claim, observing that "[c]ounty commissions have often
been made parties to these types of appeals. Indeed, County Commissions have
made numerous appearances in these types of appeals before this Court."5 o The
court reasoned that:
By filing a response to the Appellants' Petition for Appeal, the
County Commission urged the circuit court to affirm its ruling
that the assessments were proper. The County Commission's
response was necessarily due to the fact that in making a ruling
upholding the Assessor's valuation of Mountain America's residual property, the County Commission, sitting as the Board of
Equalization and Review, was not statutorily required to issue a
written opinion. Thus, by virtue of requiring a response to a petition for appeal from a County Commission decision, the circuit court was able to obtain information regarding the County
Commission's reasoning in upholding the Assessor's valuations. When balancing the circuit court's interest in acquiring
necessary information from the County Commission regarding
its review of tax appeals, with the general due process interests
of the taxpayers to be provided an avenue of appeal from a
property tax assessment, we do not believe that this procedure
necessarily demonstrates a level of bias constituting a deprivation of the Appellant's due process. 51

149

Id. at 782.

150

Id.

'1

Id. at 782-83.
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This reasoning ignores two important points. First, the legislature requires that the circuit court limit its review to the record made before a board of
equalization and review. 15 2 That restriction alone prevents the circuit court from
"obtain[ing] information regarding the county commission's reasoning in
upholding the Assessor's valuations" from a pleading filed for the first time
before the circuit court.153 The West Virginia Supreme Court itself reiterated
this limitation in In Re Tax Assessment Against American Bituminous Power
Partners,L.P., in which it discussed the standard by which a circuit court reviews the decision of a board of equalization and review and said that
[t]he statute provides little in the way of guidance as to the
scope of judicial review, although it does expressly limit review
to the record made before the county commission . . . judicial
review of a decision of a board of equalization and review regarding a challenged tax-assessment valuation is limited to
roughly the same scope permitted under the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act.s 4
Secondly, if the fact that a county commission sitting as a board of
equalization and review is not required to issue a written opinion creates a problem, there's a much more straightforward solution to that problem. In Citizens
Bank of Weirton v. West Virginia Board of Banking and Financial Institutions,'5 5 the Supreme Court of Appeals recognized that under the Administrative
Procedures Act, administrative agencies are required to include findings of fact
and conclusions of law in their final order. In MonongahelaPower Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia,i56 the court held that "[w]hile Citizens
Bank, dealt with a review under the administrative procedure act, W.Va.Code,
29A-1-1, et seq., which excludes the Public Service Commission from its ambit
... the case principles are clearly applicable to any administrative review.',157
The rationale stated by the court in Syllabus Point 3 of Citizens Bank and reiterated in Monongahela Power is just as applicable to hearings before a board of
equalization and review reviewing complex appraisal issues:
In administrative appeals where there is a record involving
complex economic or scientific data which a court cannot evaluate properly without expert knowledge in areas beyond the
152

W. VA. CODE § 11-3-25 (2010).

Mountain Am., LLC v. Huffman, 687 S.E.2d 768, 783 (W. Va. 2009).
In re Tax Assessment Against Am. Bituminous Power Partners, L.P.,539 S.E.2d 757, 76162 (W. Va. 2000); see also Part V for a discussion of the scope of review.
5
233 S.E.2d 719 (W. Va. 1977).
156 276 S.E.2d 179 (W. Va. 1981).
157
Id. at 182 n.4 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
1

15

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/7

36

Broadwater: The Illusion of Due Process in West Virginia's Property Tax Appea
2011 ]DUE PROCESS IN WEST VIRGINIA'S PROPERTY TAX APPEALS SYSTEM 827

peculiar competence of courts, neither this Court nor the trial
courts will attempt to determine whether the agency decision
was contrary to the law and the evidence until such time as the
agency presents a proper order making appropriate findings of
fact and conclusions of law.' 5 8
In fact, the West Virginia Supreme Court subsequently imposed the requirement for written findings of fact and conclusions of law on a circuit court
when it hears an appeal from a county commission sitting as a board of equalization and review. In Stone Brooke Ltd. v. Sisinni'59 , the Supreme Court of Appeals directed that
to ensure that this Court has a complete record from which to
review future appeals of ad valorem tax assessments of commercial real property, we hold that when a circuit court reviews
an appraisal of commercial real property made for ad valorem
taxation purposes, the court shall, in its final order, make findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the assessing officer's consideration of the required appraisal factors set forth in
W. Va.C.S.R. §§ 110-P-2.1.1 to 2.1.4 (1991)160.
In Mountain America then, the court had a tool at its disposal that it has
willingly used in similar circumstances. The court could have simply required a
county commission sitting as a board of equalization and review to henceforth
issue written orders containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Instead,
it permitted the circuit court to consider material that the Appellants viewed as
extending the Commission's order and as asserting new defenses developed
after the fact, well after the Board ended its deliberations and adjourned sine die.
There was no justification for permitting the County Commission to file a brief
supplementing what was in the record, in direct violation of the statutory requirement that the circuit court consider only what was contained in the record
before the Board found at W. Va. Code § 11-3-25, and the County Commission's willingness to do so was, in fact, evidence of its determination to protect
its fisc.
2.

Direct Pecuniary Interest

Mountain America also pointed out that the statutory scheme for the
compensation of county commissioners in West Virginia gives them a direct

158

Id. at 181-82.

159

688 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 2009).

'60

Id. at 315.
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pecuniary interest in the outcome of property tax appeals.' 6 1 For the tax year in
question, the total gross assessed value of all property in Monroe County increased by more than $30 million, and 20% of that increase was attributable to
the increases in value on the Appellants' property. As a result of that increase,
Monroe County moved from compensation classification IX to VII; thus, in
significant measure due to their actions upholding Assessor's values, each of the
members of the County Commission of Monroe County was entitled to an annual increase of $660 in their compensation for their part-time positions.16 2
The Supreme Court also made short work of Mountain America's claim
that each commissioner's pay increase of $660 annually constituted a direct
pecuniary interest that disqualified him from acting as an unbiased judge:
Moreover, we seriously question whether a pay increase of
$660.00 would in fact constitute a substantial pecuniary interest
prohibiting the County Commission from adjudicating this dispute. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct.
1689, 1698, 36 L.Ed.2d 488, 500 (1973) (reiterating that "[i]t is
sufficiently clear from our cases that those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not adjudicate these

disputes.")163
The suggestion that a salary increase of $660 is not a "substantial pecuniary interest" flatly contrary to decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
In Tumey, the Court decided that the sum of twelve dollars from each criminal
defendant before the local judge, which he would not have received if the defendant had been acquitted,'" was not a "minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest."' 6 5 Consequently, the Court held that it was "certainly not fair to
each defendant brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a prospective loss by the
mayor should weigh against his acquittal." 66 Moreover, the Court's cite to Gibson is disturbing given the treatment given that case by the United States Supreme Court in Caperton, in which it referred to Gibson as a case in which "the
[judge's] financial stake need not be as direct or positive as it appeared to be in
Tumey."' 6 1 Certainly, the pecuniary interest in Gibson was far more tenuous
161 Brief of Appellant at 29, Mountain Am., LLC v. Huffman, 687 S.E.2d 768 (W. Va. 2009)
(No. 34426).
162
Id.; see W. VA. CODE §§ 7-7-3 and 7-7-4(e)(5) (2010).
163 Mountain Am., 687 S.E.2d at 783 (W. Va. 2009).

16

Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).

165

Id. at 532.

16

Id.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2260 (2009) (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973)) (alteration in original).
167
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than the $660 (or nearly a three percent raise in their annual salary) that the
commissioners received as a result of their decision here.
Equally baseless is the suggestion by the court in Mountain America
that it could avoid the due process challenge altogether:
Furthermore, as to Mountain America's second argument regarding the direct pecuniary interest of the County Commission
members in this case, to the extent that we have made the determination, as further discussed below, that the Assessor's valuation of Mountain America's residual property was not excessive, we need not address Appellant's argument that the members of the County Commission received increased salaries as a
result of the assessment. 168
That suggestion directly conflicts with the Court's holdings in Ward and
Tumey. In Tumey, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that
"the evidence shows clearly that the defendant was guilty and that he was only
fined ... the minimum amount, and therefore that he cannot complain of a lack
of due process." 169 Chief Justice Taft explained, "[n]o matter what the evidence
was ... he had the right to have an impartial judge . . . and was entitled to halt
the trial because of the disqualification of the judge." 170 Likewise, in Ward, the
Court rejected the suggestion that "unfairness at the trial level can be corrected
on appeal and trial de novo" because a litigant is "entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance."171
3.

The Cumulative Effect of Other Prejudicial Aspects of the Appeals Process

Finally, in Mountain America, the Appellants argued that the cumulative effect of multiple prejudicial aspects of West Virginia's property tax appeals system weighs heavily against the "appearance of justice" required under
the Due Process Clause. 172 Among these prejudicial aspects were the practical
difficulty of obtaining the basic information required by the taxpayer to prepare
his appeal and the extremely short timeframe during which the taxpayer must

prepare the appeal. 17 3
As to the former, information necessary for the appeal includes (a) the
Assessor's proposed taxable values for the ensuing tax year for the taxpayer's
168

169

Mountain Am., LLC v. Huffman, 687 S.E.2d 768, 783 (W. Va. 2009).
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535.

170

Id.

171

Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61--62 (1972).
Brief of Appellant at 34-35, Mountain Am., 687 S.E.2d 768 (W. Va. 2009) (No. 34426).

172

173

Id. at 35.
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property, (b) the Assessor's proposed taxable values for the ensuing tax year for
comparable properties (required if the taxpayer asserts that the value of his
property is not properly equalized with that of other properties), and (c) the
price of comparable properties in the area that recently sold (required to permit
the taxpayer's appraiser form an opinion as to the market value of the subject
property). As Mountain America noted, since the property books don't have to
be completed by the Assessor until February 1, obtaining the Assessor's proposed taxable values typically requires the filing of a request under the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA). The cost of doing so, and the cost of obtaining the
services of a licensed, professional appraiser may simply be out of reach for the
typical property owner in West Virginia.' 74
Even more damaging than the difficulty and cost of obtaining the required information, however, is the extremely short timeframe during which the
taxpayer must prepare the appeal. Even under the most favorable circumstances, a taxpayer who receives a notice of increase has significantly less than
one month to decide whether to appeal, retain counsel, find an appraiser, and
prepare his case until the county commission hears the appeal. Mountain America asserted that "[t]he practical effect of such constricted time frames ... is to
inherently limit the effectiveness of any such challenge - particularly one based
on a claim of unequalized or discriminatory treatment involving proof of the
proposed taxable values of numerous other comparable properties."' 75
The court did not directly address the taxpayers' claim that the cumulative effect of the prejudicial aspects amounts to a denial of due process. Rather,
in a breathtaking display of circular logic, the court held that, because Mountain
America didn't introduce several specific pieces of information (including an
appraisal of Mountain America's property) that the court thought were relevant,
Mountain America has not met its burden to prove by clear and
cogent evidence the requisite facts establishing that the time
frame for a tax assessment appeal under West Virginia Code §
11-3-24 is so unreasonable or arbitrary as to amount to a denial
of due process of law in this case. 176
In other words, because the taxpayer's appraiser didn't have time to prepare
both the evidence that he did present at the hearing before the Board as to the
value of surrounding properties and the missing evidence that the court thought
was essential, the taxpayer couldn't prove that it was prejudiced by not having
enough time to prepare.
Mountain America sought review of the Court's decision on several
grounds, including the lack of an impartial tribunal, but the United States Su174

Id. at 31-32 and n.14.

175

Id. at 32.
Mountain Am., LLC v. Huffman, 687 S.E.2d 768, 784 (W. Va. 2009).

176
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preme Court denied certiorari.177 Notwithstanding the lack of judicial relief, the
Legislature recently made changes to the property tax appeals system. While
the more glaring due process issues remain, some of the prejudicial aspects existing system have been lessened, at least to a degree.
H.

Changes to the Property Tax Appeal Process in SB 401

In the 2010 Regular Session, the Legislature enacted SB 401 (Chapter
185, Acts, Regular Session, 2010), which made significant changes to the property tax appeals process. While this legislation makes some incremental improvements to the process, it unfortunately does nothing to correct the glaring
due process violations. The county commission remains as the tribunal designated to hear first level appeals, and, as discussed below, the "clear and convincing" standard of proof remains impermissibly high.
1.

Incremental Improvement is SB 401

SB 401 eliminates some of the aspects of the property tax appeals system that inhibit a taxpayer's ability to mount an effective appeal and undoubtedly makes the overall process less unfair to taxpayers generally. Beginning with
tax year 2012 (assessment date July 1, 2011), taxpayers will be required to file
returns earlier in the year.'7 8 The penalties for failure to file remain in place; in
addition, it is now a misdemeanor for "[a]ny owner, operator or producer,
whether a natural person, limited liability company, corporation, partnership,
joint venture or other enterprise" to "willfully fail[] to make a return within thirty days from the day it is herein required." Upon conviction, the business may
be fined $100 for each month the failure continues. 179
The most stringent penalty, however, has been somewhat relaxed. Under the prior version of West Virginia Code section 11-3-10, a taxpayer that
failed to file a return, refused to answer or falsely answered a question posed by
an assessor or the Tax Commissioner, or that failed to deliver any statement
required by law was denied all remedy provided by law for the correction of any
Mountain Am., LLC v. Huffman, 130 S.Ct. 2377 (April 26, 2010).
1'
West Virginia Code section 11-3-12 (2010) now requires corporations and banking institutions to file returns of the value of their tangible personal property and real property by September
1. West Virginia Code section 11-3-15 (2010) now requires individuals or unincorporated firms
engaged in any trade or business taxable by law to file returns of the value of their tangible personal property, all goods and property kept for sale and remaining unsold, and real property used
in connection with this business by September 1. For property appraised by the Tax Commissioner, West Virginia Code § 1l-6K-1(b) (2010) now requires all owners or operators of natural resources property, except oil-producing property, natural gas-producing property, and managed
timberland, to file a return on or before May 1 preceding the July 1 assessment date. Section I 16K-l(c) now requires all owners or operators of industrial property, oil-producing property and
natural gas-producing property, to file returns on or before August 1.
"7 W. VA. CODE § 1l-6K-3(d) (2010).
1'
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assessment. In other words, a taxpayer who fails to file a property tax return has
no way to protest the assessor or Tax Commissioner's assessed value, no matter
what it turns out to be. Under the new version of that statute, that harsh sanction
can still be enforced, but only after the assessor or the Tax Commissioner "notified such person, firm or corporation in writing that this penalty will be asserted
and the requested information is not provided within fifteen days of the date of
receipt of the notice." 80
If the assessor increases the value of a taxpayer's property, the taxpayer
will now receive a notice of the increase earlier in the year,'"8 ' which will provide slightly more time in which to decide whether to protest the assessment and
to prepare for the protest. Even before the required notice is issued, however,
the Code now explicitly provides that at any time after the required returns have
been filed, a taxpayer may "apply to the assessor of the county in which the
property was situated on the assessment date for information about the classification, taxability or valuation of the property for property tax purposes for the
tax year following the July I assessment date."l82 There was no similar provision under the previous Code; a taxpayer's only recourse was to file a FOIA
request to obtain the data prior to the date the property books were completed
and delivered to the county commission.
For valuation issues, a taxpayer whose property is appraised by the Assessor who applies to the Assessor for information, who is dissatisfied with the
Assessor's response, and who receives a notice of increase for real property or
business personal property may (but is not required) to use a new informal review process wherein the taxpayer files a Petition for Review by the Assessor.
For either type of property, the taxpayer must provide the taxpayer's opinion of
the true and actual value of the property and must support that value with "substantial information." For business personal property, the term "substantial information" is not defined; for real property, it means identifying which of the
three approaches to value (cost approach, income approach, or market data approach) the taxpayer used to value the property, together with specified informa-

Iso

Id. § 11-3-10(a).

For property appraised by the Assessor, notices of an increase in value of real property of
more than 10% over the value for the previous year must be mailed by January 15 if the increase
is also more than $1000. Id. § 11 -3-2a(a). Notices of an increase in value of the aggregate amount
of tangible personal property owned by an organization engaging in business activity of more than
10% over the value for the previous year must be mailed by January 15 if the increase is also more
than $100,000. Id. § 11-3-15b(a). For property appraised by the Tax Commissioner, no tentative
assessments need be transmitted to the taxpayer if the increase in value is less than 10% from the
value for the previous year and if the increase did not exceed $1000. Otherwise, the Tax Commissioner must issue tentative appraisals for all industrial property and natural resources property
except oil-producing property, natural gas-producing property, and managed timberland by October 15. Id. § I1 -6K-4(e) (2010). The Tax Commissioner must issue tentative appraisals for all oilproducing property, natural gas-producing property, and managed timberland by December 1. Id.
182
Id. § I -3-23a(a) (2010).
8

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/7

42

Broadwater: The Illusion of Due Process in West Virginia's Property Tax Appea
2011]DUE PROCESS IN WEST VIRGINIA'S PROPERTY TAXAPPEALS SYSTEM 833

tion for each approach.' 83 This Petition must be filed within five days of the
date the taxpayer receives the notice of increased assessment under West Virginia Code section 11-3-2a or section 11-3-15b or the notice of increased value
for real property was published as a Class 11-0 legal advertisement as provided
in that section. The Assessor must meet with the taxpayer if the taxpayer so
requests and must respond in writing by February 10.'8
If the Assessor grants the requested relief, the taxpayer may not further
appeal the Assessor's decision.' 8 5 If the taxpayer and the Assessor reach a negotiated settlement, neither may appeal.186 However, if the assessor denies the
taxpayer's petition in whole or in part, or if the assessor does not respond by
Feb. 10, or if the taxpayer elects to forgo the informal Petition for Review
process, the taxpayer may file a protest with the county commission. 8 7
There is a corresponding process by which a taxpayer who receives a
Notice of Tentative Assessment from the Tax Commissioner for property appraised by him' 88 can informally petition the Tax Commissioner requesting a
review of the tentative appraisal.' 89 In addition, the assessor where the property
is located also receives a copy of the tentative appraisal and can request this
informal review.190 The Tax Commissioner must meet with the taxpayer if the
taxpayer requests a meeting'9 1 and must rule on the request by January 15 .192 If
the Tax Commissioner agrees with the petition, the tentative appraisal is modified accordingly. However, whether or not the Tax Commissioner grants the
relief requested, the taxpayer may still appeal to the county commission.' 93
The process for protesting an assessment to a county commission has
been changed in several respects. While a board of equalization and review can
still adjourn sine die "anytime after February 15" but "not later than the last day
See Id. § 11-3-15c (2010) (real property); Id. § 11-3-15d (2010) (business personal property). Note that section 11-3-15e defines what information is required to support an income approach in a Petition for Review by the Assessor. That section indicates that an income approach
can be used to value business personal property as well as real property. See Id. § 11-3-15e(a)
(2010) ("A petition that is filed with the assessor under section fifteen-c orfifteen-d of this article
based on the income approach to value shall include .... ) (emphasis added).
19
Id. §§ l1-3-15d(b)to-15h(a)
as W. VA. CODE § 11-3-15i(a) (2010).
186
Id. § 11-3-15i(b).
187
Id. §§ 11-3-15fto -15i(c) (2010).
188
This informal process is not available to owners of oil-producing property, natural gasproducing property, and managed timberland, probably because such notice of tentative assessment isn't required until December 1, which doesn't leave enough time to pursue the informal
process with the Tax Commissioner.
189
W. VA. CODE § 11 -6K-5(a) (2010).
190
Id.
18

192

Id. § 11-6K-5(b).
Id. § 11-6K-5(c).

193

Id

19'
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of February of the tax year," 9 4 a taxpayer who desires to file a protest with the
Board can do so on or before February 20, even if the Board has already adjourned sine die prior to that date.19 5 The protest must be filed in writing and
must identify "the amount of the assessed value the taxpayer believes to be in
controversy and state[] generally the taxpayer's reason or reasons for filing the
protest."' 96
In perhaps the most significant change to the property tax appeals
process, the taxpayer can elect to have its protest heard by the county commission sitting as a board of assessment appeals in October, rather than by the county commission sitting as a board of equalization and review in February. This
election may be made either when the written protest is filed or in writing filed
on or before the day on which the appeal is to be heard by the board of equalization and review.' 9 7 Moreover, upon request of any party, the board of assessment appeals may, on or before October 1, "develop a discovery schedule for
the exchange of information between the taxpayer and the assessor and, in matters involving industrial property or natural resources property, the Tax Commissioner."' 98 This eight month delay and the opportunity for discovery will
give the taxpayer a much better opportunity to prepare the appeal. The board of
assessment appeals adjourns sine die by October 31 unless "the board, by majority vote, agrees to extend the term if necessary to afford the parties due process
and to complete its work. . . ."'99
The board of assessment appeals may assign the appeal to a hearing examiner for the taking of evidence if the hearing examiner is mutually agreed to
by the parties to the appeal. 2 00 Theoretically, this provision means the parties
could agree to appoint someone knowledgeable in both appraisal techniques as
well as the law to hear property tax appeals.
Whether the protest is heard by the county commission sitting as a
board of equalization and review in February or as a board of assessment appeals in October, the taxpayer may appeal either board's decision to the circuit
court of the county in which the property books are made out. 2 0 1 If the protest
was heard by the board of equalization and review, the application for relief
must be filed "at any time up to thirty days after the adjournment of the board";
if the protest was heard by the board of assessment appeals, the application for
relief must be filed "at anytime up to thirty days after the order of the board of

194
195
196

197
19

'"
200
201

Id. § 11-3-24(a).
W. VA. CODE § 11-3-23a(d)(2) (2010).
Id.

Id.
Id. § 11-3-24b(c).
Id. § I l-3-24b(i).
Id. § ll-3-24b(d).
W. VA. CODE § 11-3-25(a) (2010).
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assessment appeals is served on the parties. ... " Either the taxpayer or the
State (represented by the Prosecuting Attorney or the Tax Commissioner) may
apply for relief to the circuit court.203
As was true in the old version of the Code, the applicant for relief is still
responsible for having a transcript prepared of the hearing before either board.
That transcript, together with the complete record, as certified by the Clerk of
the County Commission, containing "all papers, motions, documents, evidence
and records as were before the board," must be filed with the circuit court. 20
The time frame, however, for filing the record and the transcript has been enlarged. Under the old version, the record had to be filed within the same time as
the application had to be filed; that is, "at any time up to thirty days after the
adjournment of the board." Under the new version, the evidence shall be certified and transmitted within thirty days "after the petition for appeal is filed with
the court or judge, in vacation."2 05
As was true in the old version, if the taxpayer appeared before the
board, or received actual notice of the increase, then the circuit court determines
the appeal only from the evidence contained in the record made before the
board. However, in another significant change in the new version, if the circuit
court determines that the record made before the board is inadequate, either because (1) the parties had insufficient time to present evidence at the hearing before the board to make a proper record, (2) the parties received insufficient notice of changes in the assessed value of the property and the reason or reasons
for the changes to make a proper record at the hearing before the board, (3) of
irregularities in the procedures followed at the hearing before the board, or (4)
for any other reason not involving the negligence of the party alleging that the
record is inadequate,
the court may remand the appeal back to the county commission
of the county in which the property is located, even after the
county commission has adjourned sine die as a board of equalization and review or a board of assessment appeals for the tax
year in which the appeal arose, for the purpose of developing an
adequate record upon which the appeal can be decided.206
The county commission must conduct a hearing in the remanded matter within
ninety days of circuit court's order.207

202
203
204
205
206
207

Id
Id
Id. § 11-3-25(b).
Id. § 11-3-25(b).
Id. § 11-3-25(c).
W. VA. CODE § 11-3-25(c) (2010).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011

45

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 7

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

836

[Vol. 113

If the appeal is conducted on the record, it now must be briefed, argued,
and submitted to the court within eight months of having been filed, and the
court must issue its decision within ninety days after the last brief was filed.208
The new Code also confirms that this is a post-deprivation appeals process.
Taxpayers must pay disputed taxes and not let taxes fall delinquent; if they do,
the circuit court must dismiss the appeal unless taxes due are paid within twenty
days of second half taxes becoming delinquent.209 If the final result of the circuit court's decision is that the taxpayer overpaid his taxes, the county shall pay
interest at the rate established in West Virginia Code sections 11-10-17 and 1110-17a for overpayments of taxes collected by the Tax Commissioner. The interest is computed from the date the overpayment was received by the sheriff to
the date of the refund check or the date the credit is actually taken against taxes
that become due after the order of the court becomes final.210
2.

Major Constitutional Issue Remaining after SB 401

The most serious constitutional issue remaining after the enactment of
SB 401 is the fact that, whether it sits as a Board of Equalization and Review or
a Board of Assessment Appeals, the county commission still serves as the first
level adjudicative tribunal. Although the county commission sitting as a Board
of Assessment Appeals is now permitted to appoint an independent hearing examiner with relevant experience and expertise to hear and fairly determine the
outcome of appeals, a county commission that is determined to protect the county's fisc isn't going to agree to a hearing examiner if it has any doubt whatsoever as to the outcome of the appeal; rather, the county commission will simply
continue to hear and deny all appeals. All of the other changes made by the
Legislature aren't going to change the inevitable outcome of protests heard by a
county commission so motivated.
Taxpayers have every right to be frustrated by the requirement to have
their appeals heard by an obviously biased tribunal. That frustration can only be
more acute following the decision in Rissler v. Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals.2 11 There, the Supreme Court of Appeals repeatedly cited Caperton, Concrete Pipe, Ward, and Tumey, and demonstrated that it fully understood
that due process demands an unbiased tribunal. The court decided that two
members of the Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals should have been
disqualified from the Board's consideration of a dispute over an application by
Thornhill, LLC, a real estate developer, for a conditional use permit (CUP) that

209

Id. § 11-3-25(d).
Id. § 11-3-25a(a).

2lo

Id § 11-3-25a(b).

211

693 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 2010).

208

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol113/iss3/7

46

Broadwater: The Illusion of Due Process in West Virginia's Property Tax Appea

2011]DUE PROCESS IN WEST VIRGINIA'S PROPERTY TAX APPEALS SYSTEM 837

enable it to build a new subdivision in a rural portion of Jefferson Counwould
2 12
ty

One board member had a prior business relationship with one of the
owners of Thornhill several years before the hearing but stated that, at the time
of the hearing, had no financial interest in the matter pending before the
Board.213 Despite the fact that the court recognized that there was an "absence
of a current pecuniary interest" at the time the hearing was conducted, it nevertheless found that his previous business relationship was "problematic" and
gave "rise to an appearance of impropriety" because "it is plausible that [this
board member] could be inclined to rule favorably for Thornhill in its CUP application process simply because the prior relationship 'offer[s] a possible temptation to the average man as a judge . .. which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true."' 214 It also found "troubling" the fact that this
board member was also cofounder and president of a company which entered
into an "exclusive contract to perform construction inspection services for the
Jefferson County Public Service District after the conclusion of the underlying
proceedings" in this case.215 Presumably, this board member's company would
benefit from the construction inspections that would be needed if Thornhill's
CUP is approved and if the proposed subdivision was built. Together, the court
found that these two factors "raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow" as to whether
the petitioners actually received "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal." 216
Another board member's interest in the case was even more remote.
The Petitioners pointed to two reasons that this board member should have been
disqualified: First, he is an attorney and works for a firm that originally
represented Thornhill in conjunction with its initial incorporation. Second, he
performs title searches. Because the approval of Thornhill's subdivision would
result in numerous real estate closings corresponding with the subdivision's
numerous property lots, the Petitioners asserted that this board member stood to
benefit from additional work. The court agreed with Thornhill and the Board
that both the prior representation by the firm employing this board member in
conjunction with Thornhill's initial incorporation and any potential real estate
closings work were "too remote, unrelated, and speculative to constitute disqua-

lifying interests." 217
However, the court on its own initiative discovered an additional affiliation between the second board member and Thornhill: he had directly
represented Thornhill as its attorney on an adverse possession case. The court
Id. at 328-31.
Id. at 329.
214
Id. (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508
U.S. 602, 617 (1993)).
212
213

215

Id

216

Id. (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
Rissler v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 693 S.E.2d 321, 330 (W. Va. 2010).

217
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noted that the fact that this board member had previously represented Thornhill
"at the very least required the disclosure of this fact to the parties likely to be
adversely affected by this relationship"; 2 18 the record, however, reflected that
the board member had disclosed that fact in a meeting conducted on May 20,
2004. Given that Thornhill was the board member's former client with whom he
had a confidential relationship, the court expressed concern that his participation
in the proceedings gave rise to the "appearance of impropriety." 2 19
In an earlier case,220 the court ruled that Mr. Cassell, an assistant prosecuting attorney that represented the Board in the early stage of Thornhill's CUP
application, could not later represent Thornhill in connection with the same
conditional use permit application that he was involved with while serving as
the Board's attorney. That case seems to be a relatively straightforward application of Rule 1.11(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which
states, in part:
Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall
not represent a private client in connection with a matter in
which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a
public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government
agency consents after consultation.
In Rissler, the court also ruled that "the circuit court should have 'resolve[d] all doubts in favor of disqualification' and granted Ms. Rissler's motion" to disqualify Mr. Cassell, since it was likely that he was simultaneously
negotiating the terms of his new employment with the firm that was
representing Thornhill. 221 This holding flows from Rule 1.11(c)(2) of the West
Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, which states, in part, that a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not: "negotiate for private employment
with any person who is involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a matter
in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially."
However, nothing in the Rules of Professional Conduct would have
prevented the second board member from serving as the Board's attorney in the
matter of Thornhill's CUP application, even had he represented Thornhill in a
previous matter. Rule 1.9 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct
requires only that "a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter
shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or substantiallyrelated
matter, if the person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the
former client, and unless the former client does not consent after consultation."
Since the CUP application is not the same or substantially related to the adverse
218
219
220
221

Id
Id
State ex rel. Jefferson Cty Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Wilkes, 655 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 2007).
Rissler, 693 S.E.2d at 332 (citing Wilkes, 655 S.E.2d at 180).
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possession case in which the second board member represented Thornhill, he
could later have represented the Board as its attorney in the CUP application. 222
Nevertheless, the court, even though it recognized that the second board member was not serving as an attorney but as a private citizen as a member of the
Board, ruled that he should have been disqualified from serving on the Board
reviewing the CUP application, emphasizing again that "'even the probability of
unfairness' should be avoided to ensure that the hearing before an impartial tribunal guaranteed by due process has been afforded." 2 23
By insisting that even the appearance of an impropriety be avoided,
Rissler undoubtedly is consistent with the letter and spirit of the holdings of the
United States Supreme Court, and commendably recognizes that justice demands that litigants feel that they have received a fair trial before a fair tribunal,
regardless of the outcome of their case. How, then, is it possible to square the
holding in Rissler with the holdings in Foster, Bayer MaterialScience, and

Mountain America? When a county commissioner makes it clear during a hearing on a taxpayer's protest that he is concerned with the county's fisc and the
potential effect on the Board of Education if the taxpayer's appeal is successful,
and then votes to deny the appeal, despite the taxing authority's witness admitting that he applied a "fairly arbitrary" methodology to value the taxpayer's
property and that he had "no idea" whether that methodology accounted for its
true and actual value, does the court really believe that the taxpayer feels that it
received a fair trial before a fair tribunal? When the levying bodies and the
county commissioners both directly profit from the rulings of the county commission adverse to the taxpayer, does the court really believe that the taxpayer
feels that it received a fair trial before a fair tribunal? Does the court really believe that these tribunals are fair?
IV. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING STANDARD OF
PROOF BEFORE A BOARD OF EQUALIZATION AND REVIEW VIOLATES DUE
PROCESS

While both Bayer and the Foster Foundation objected to the standard of
proof applicable in their hearings before their respective boards of equalization
and review, their arguments were significantly different. Bayer pointed out that
there were divergent lines of cases from the West Virginia Supreme Court of
In fact, while the Court observed that the interests of Thornhill and the Board "may coincide
in connection with specific issues that arise in the CUP application process," it also observed that
"the interests of the two are not generally aligned" and speculated that their interests "on any
given issue be in sharp conflict" because Thornhill "wants to get a permit; whereas the BZA wants
to follow the law and serve the best interests of the people of Jefferson County-whether Thorn Hill
gets a permit or not." Since the Court failed to identify any issue on which the interests of Thornhill and the Board were definitely adverse, it's not even clear that Rockwell couldn't have
represented the Board in the CUP application process had he represented Thornhill earlier in the
same process, as long as Thornhill didn't object. See Rissler, 693 S.E.2d at 331.
223
Rissler, 693 S.E.2d at 331 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1995)).
222
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Appeals. In some cases, the court has held that the standard of proof that a taxpayer must meet before a board of equalization and review is a simple preponderance of the evidence, while in others, that court has held that the higher clear
and convincing evidence standard is applicable. Bayer argued both that the
court's earlier cases holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof before a board of equalization and review were well reasoned and that the
divergence in the case law occurred only in later cases where the court was not
careful to distinguish between the standard of proof before a board of equalization and review and the standard of judicial review on appeal to a circuit court.
Bayer also argued that the clear and convincing standard of proof per se before
a board of equalization and review was a denial of due process in that it denied
to taxpayers their right to a fair and unbiased hearing at the first adjudicative
level.
The Foster Foundation did not assert that the clear and convincing standard of proofper se constituted a denial of due process; rather, it asserted that it
is inherently unfair to require a taxpayer to meet that standard of proof by bearing the expense of hiring a licensed, professional appraiser with the requisite
training and experience to appraise a complex property such as the Woodlands,
while permitting the Assessor to use unlicensed personnel to appraise such
property. In addition, in Foster, the Foundation objected to the fact that the
Assessor was not required to, and in fact did not, provide any written evidence
as to what information it had obtained and considered in reaching its valuation
and as to the methodology used, or to otherwise show how he determined the
fair market value of the property. In that case, the Board didn't accept either the
Assessor's or the taxpayers' value; rather, it set the value of the property at a
value in between those extremes. The Foster Foundation also objected to the
fact that there was no evidence introduced that supported the value arrived at by
the Board or that explained how it was derived.
In its decision in Foster, the court both addressed its own inconsistent
case law, holding that the clear and convincing standard of proof is applicable
before a board of equalization and review, and found that standard of proof did
not violate due process. In fact, the court had no reason to address these issues
since none of the parties raised them in the Foster case, but by doing so, it was
again able to avoid having to refute any of the support Bayer offered for its arguments.
A.

The Court had No Reason to Reach the Question of the ProperStandardof Proofin Foster

One of the Foundation's complaints was that it never "received any
written report (nor has any written report ever been submitted into evidence)
detailing how either the Assessor or the County Commission arrived at their
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respective valuations of Woodlands."224 As the County Conmission itself recognized, "[t]he West Virginia Tax Commissioner has adopted regulations which
Assessors must follow in order to determine the market value of real property."225 These technical rules require the use of generally accepted appraisal
practices.226 It would therefore be impossible for anyone to objectively determine whether the Assessor's appraisal conformed to the Tax Commissioner's
rules without seeing how it was performed, and the Foundation's objection to
the lack of evidence was well taken.
1.

The Assessor in Foster Did Not Meet His Burden of Proof

At one point in its history, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
might well have found, under these circumstances, that the Assessor in Foster
did not meet his standard of proof, no matter what the applicable standard. In In
re Tax Assessments Against PocahontasLand Co.,227 the court restated the general rule that "valuations for taxation purposes fixed by an assessing officer are
presumed to be correct," affirmed that the burden to prove an assessment is erroneous is "of course, upon the taxpayer," and imposed a heightened standard of
proof on the taxpayer, stating that "and proof of such fact must be clear." 2 28
Even under those onerous standards, however, the court held that the taxing
authority also has a corresponding burden:
It is obvious that where a taxpayer protests his assessment before a board, he bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence that his assessment is erroneous. Once this
is done, it is incumbent upon the taxing authority to place some
evidence in the recordto show why its assessment is correct.2 29
In PocahontasLand, the Board ignored the Assessor's appraised value
and arbitrarily substituted a higher value without explaining how they arrived at
that value. After noting that "it is apparent that no one was present to support or
protect the Board's increase in assessment values," 230 the court affirmed the

Brief of Appellant at 7, In re Tax Assessment of the Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty.,
672 S.E.2d 150, 152 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 07-C-214).
225
Brief of Appellee at 1, In re Tax Assessment of the Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty.,
672 S.E.2d 150, 152 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 07-C-214) (citing W. VA. CODE R. 110. § 1P-1, et seq.).
226
W. VA. CODE R. 110 § 1P-2-2.
227
303 S.E.2d 691 (W. Va. 1983).
228
Id. at 699 (quoting In re Tax Assessment Against the Nat'l Bank of W. Va., 73 S.E.2d 655,
664 (W. Va. 1952)).
229
Id. (emphasis added).
230
Id.
224
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circuit court's decision to vacate the Board's values and to use the values for the
preceding year instead.23 1
In Fosterthen, it was not necessary to even reach the constitutional issue as to the standard of proof. Rather, on February 22, 2007, the County
Commission entered an Order reducing the appraised value of the Woodlands to
$29,759,000 for tax year 2007 without explanation. This value was far in
excess of the appraised value of $14,900,000 arrived at by the Foster Foundation's appraiser and far less than the Assessor's initial valuation of
$38,137,300.00.232 Just as in Pocahontas Land, there was no support for the
value arrived at by the Board 2 33 and absolutely no indication of what "generally
accepted appraisal practice" (if any) the Board or the Assessor employed to
reach its conclusion of value.234 On the basis that the Assessor and Board failed
to meet their burden of production, PocahontasLand should have mandated that
the court in Fosterreverse the decision of the circuit court to uphold the Board's
value. Indeed, in a subsequent case, Stone Brooke Limited v. Sisinni,2 35 the
court established a new syllabus point236 mandating that
[w]hen a circuit court reviews an appraisal of commercial real
property made for ad valorem taxation purposes, the court shall,
in its final order, make findings of fact and conclusions of law
addressing the assessing officer's consideration of the required
Id. at 694 (noting that "the circuit court concluded that the procedures before the Board were
so inadequate as to require vacating the Board's new appraisal figure of $300 an acre and the
court directed that the preceding year's figures be used").
232
It was uncontroverted that on January 2, 2007, the Cabell County Assessor's Office notified
the Foster Foundation that for the tax year 2007 the assessed value of the Woodlands would be
based upon an appraised value of $38,137,300.00. See Brief of Appellee at 2, In re Tax Assessment of the Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 152 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 07-C214); Brief of Appellant at 2, In re Tax Assessment of the Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty.,
672 S.E.2d 150, 152 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 07-C-214).
233
In its brief, the Foster Foundation observed that "the record reveals that the value adopted
by the County Commission is approximately the amount of insurance that Foster Foundation
testified that it carried in response to a question from the County Commission." Brief of Appellant at 6, In re Tax Assessment of the Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 152
(W. Va. 2008) (No. 07-C-214).
234
In the Appellant's reply brief, the Foundation states: "To date, the Foster Foundation has not
received any written report (nor has any written report ever been submitted into evidence) detailing how either the Assessor or the County Commission arrived at their respective valuations of
Woodlands. In their Brief, the only "evidence" from the entire record that the County Commission
could point to was an oral statement made by Mr. Daniels at the February 9, 2007 hearing wherein
he stated that he had compared the Woodlands to the Courtyard Apartments in Cabell County,
West Virginia and the Maplewood facility in Harrison County, West Virginia. These two comparables are discussed in greater detail in Section II herein." Brief of Appellant at 7, In re Tax Assessment of the Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 152 (W. Va. 2008) (No.
07-C-214).
235
688 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 2009).
236
Id. at Syl. pt. 7.
231
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appraisal factors set forth in W. Va. C.S.R. §§ 110-lP-2.1.1 to
2.1.4 (1991).
Had this syllabus point been in effect when Foster was decided, the case would
at least have to have been remanded to the circuit court for more detailed fact
finding, and the Assessor and County Commission would have been required to
fully support their appraised value.
2.

The Issue as to Whether the Clear and Convincing Standard of
Proof Per Se Violates Due Process Should Have Been Addressed In Bayer MaterialScience,Not Foster

In its Petition for Appeal in the Circuit Court, the Foster Foundation included this assignment of error:
The Foster Foundation assigns as error that an employee of the
county, who is not a licensed real estate appraiser as required by
West Virginia law, can assess the value of a taxpayers' real
property and then place the burden on the taxpayer to rebut the
assessed value by hiring a duly licensed real estate appraiser
under West Virginia law. The presumption of validity given to
an unlicensed real estate appraiser's assessed value breaches the
due process safeguards afforded the taxpayers of the State of
West Virginia and improperly frustrates the purpose of West
Virginia Code section 11-3-1 of appraising real property at its
fair market value.237
This argument is significantly different from Bayer's assertion in its Petitions for Appeal for the 2007 tax year that "the imposition of a clear and convincing standard of proof upon the taxpayer also constitutes a denial to the taxpayer of due process of law." 23 8 Since, unlike Bayer, the Foster Foundation
didn't argue that the clear and convincing standard of proof per se was unconstitutional in the circuit court, the circuit court, not surprisingly, didn't address that
issue in a meaningful fashion in its final decision. Rather, the court simply concluded as a matter of law:
The West Virginia Supreme Court on several different occasions has stated that the law presumes the Assessor's valuations
to be correct and places the burden of proving an incorrect assessment before the Board of Equalization and Review on the
taxpayer. These decisions hold that the taxpayer must prove by
See Foster,672 S.E.2d at 156 n.12.
See Petition for Appeal 52, Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Commissioner, 672
S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 07-MISC-105).
237
238
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competent evidence that the Assessor or the Tax Commissioner
arrived at an incorrect value.239
The circuit court's conclusion that the taxpayer must prove that the Assessor's value by competent evidence seems to have been carefully chosen to
avoid specifying a specific standard, since the court then cited three cases, each
of which defines a different standard of proof: "by a preponderance of the evi,4
dence, 11240 ,proof must be clear,"244 1 and "by clear and convincing evidence."242
Indeed, the Foster court correctly observed that "the [circuit] court did not specifically rule upon the constitutionality of the clear and convincing burden of
proof imposed upon taxpayers appealing allegedly erroneous tax assessments. 11243
By the Louk v. Cormier rule discussed in the previous section, this issue
should not even have been addressed by the court in Foster,because at the very
least it was deprived of the "wisdom of the Circuit Court." 244 Moreover, since
the Foster Foundation didn't argue the issue at any stage, the court was also
deprived of any analysis by the parties. By contrast, the issue of whether the
imposition of a clear and convincing standard of proof constitutes a denial of
due process of law was fully briefed in Bayer MaterialScience by the parties,
both before the circuit court and in the West Virginia Supreme Court, and the
circuit judge specifically addressed that issue in his final decision in the appeals
for tax year 2007.245
It seems clear, then, that the court would decline to address the issue of
whether the clear and convincing standard per se constitutes a denial of due
process in Foster and to have taken up that issue in Bayer MaterialScience.
Instead, the court did exactly the opposite, and it did so without specifically

Final Order at 3, In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Comty., 672
S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 07-C-214).
240
id
239

241

Id

W. Pocahontas Prop. v. Cnty. Comm'n, 431 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1993).
243 In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 161 (W.
Va. 2008).
244
See Whitlow v. Bd. of Educ., 438 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1993).
245
See Final Order Finding of Fact No. 33, Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Commissioner, 672 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 07-MISC-106) ("Petitioners assert that the Board is an
inherently biased tribunal and that imposing a 'clear and convincing' standard of proof upon a
taxpayer before that tribunal amounts to a denial of due process of law in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article III, Section 10 of the
Constitution of West Virginia"); see also Final Order Conclusion of Law No. 3, BayerMaterialScience, 672 S.E.2d 174 ("The Court concludes that there is no merit to Petitioners' allegations that
they were denied due process. The legislatively mandated system to equalize and review the assessments is set forth in West Virginia Code § 11-3-24, and the Board properly followed the statutes and properly applied the burden of proof to Petitioners' case.").
242
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addressing Bayer's support for its arguments. Then, it rendered a per curium
decision in the Bayer case, thereby avoiding Bayer's arguments entirely.
ExistingLaw on PermissibleStandards of Proof

B.

Even if it elected to strike out on its own without the benefit of input
from the court below or from the parties, the West Virginia Supreme Court
should have discovered that there was no shortage of case law from the Supreme
Court of the United States, other jurisdictions, and its own prior cases to guide
its deliberations. Since any such analysis is entirely missing from the decision
in Foster, however, this article will attempt to provide the basis for a meaningful
evaluation of the issue.
1.

Supreme Court of the United States Cases on the Standard of
Proof

2 46
The Supreme Court of the United States held in Mathews v. Eldridge
that "Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions
which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' interests within the meaning
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment." 24 7
Because the exaction of a tax constitutes a deprivation of property, the
State must provide procedural safeguards against unlawful exactions in order to
satisfy the commands of the Due Process Clause.24 8 As that Court's cases reveal, the appropriate standard of proof is an essential element of due process
analysis.
The Court explained in Addington v. Texas2 4 9 that the function of a
standard of proof is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions
for a particular type of adjudication." 25 0 The standard of proof serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance
society attaches to the ultimate decision.2 51
The Court recognized that

the evolution of this area of the law has produced across a continuum three standards or levels of proof for different types of
246

424 U.S. 319 (1976).

247

Id. at 332.

McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages 496 U.S. 18, 36-37 n.17 (1990) (citing
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347-48) ("This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is
required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest"); Cent. of Ga. R. Co. v.
Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907); Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104-105 (1878).
249
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
250
Id. at 423 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
248

251

Id
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cases. At one end of the spectrum is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties. Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private
suits, plaintiffs burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the
evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly
equal fashion.
In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by
standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the
likelihood of an erroneous judgment. In the administration of
criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by requiring under the
Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused
beyond a reasonable doubt.252
The Court also recognized that the intermediate standard between those
two extremes, although less commonly used, "is no stranger to the civil law."253
As an example of the typical use of the intermediate standard, it cited civil cases
involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the
defendant. In those cases, the Court recognized that "[t]he interests at stake in
those cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money and
some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant of having his
reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiffs burden of

proof."2 54
In Santosky v. Kramer,255 the Court explained that it
has mandated an intermediate standard of proof-"clear and
convincing evidence"-when the individual interests at stake in
a state proceeding are both "particularly important" and "more
substantial than mere loss of money." Notwithstanding "the
state's 'civil labels and good intentions,"' the Court has deemed
this level of certainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that
threaten the individual involved with "a significant deprivation
of liberty" or "stigma." 2 56

252
253

Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 424 (citing Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966)).

254

Id.

255

455 U.S. 745 (1982).
Id. at 756 (citations omitted).

256
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There, the Court ruled that the fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child; their vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life; and a natural parent's
"desire for and right to 'the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his or her children' requires a more stringent standard of proof to terminate
these rights.257 Other cases in which the individual's liberty interest requires a
standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence include those
involving involuntarily civil commitment for an indefinite period of time, due
in part to adverse social consequences; 258 and actions to determine juvenile delinquency, 259 deportation, 26 0 and denaturalization. 26 1 Also, the Court has ruled
that a person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment; nevertheless, requiring a third party who seeks to
terminate life-sustaining treatment to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent person receiving such treatment would wish that step
to be taken is permissible.262
2.

Prior West Virginia Cases on the Standard of Proof

The West Virginia Supreme Court in Fosterpurported to "look to analogous decisions and bodies of law for further counsel" 263 and observed that
"[i]n this Court's jurisprudence, we have repeatedly applied and upheld the clear
,,264
citing no fewer than
and convincing burden of proof in a variety of contexts,
eleven cases in which it has sanctioned the use of that standardof proof. Had
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals more closely examined these cases, it would have discovered that it has often engaged in the same type of analysis as has the Supreme Court of the United States, and its cases have yielded
similar results.
While under West Virginia law, "the preponderance standard applies
across the board in civil cases," 265 the heightened clear and convincing standard
is applicable only "in certain classes of cases, such as those involving either
charges of fraud or undue influence, or of mistake sufficient to justify reforma257

Id. at 758.

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S 418, 427 (1979).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
260
Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
261
Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118
(1943).
262
Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
263
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 166 (W.
Va. 2008).
264
Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
265
Brown v. Gobble, 474 S.E.2d 489, 494 (W. Va. 1996); see, e.g., McClure v. McClure, 403
S.E.2d 197, 201 (W. Va. 1991) ("A preponderance, of course, is our traditional burden of proof in
a civil case.").
258
259
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tion of a contract or written instrument," 266 and only in cases "where fairness
and equity require more persuasive proof."2 67
The cases cited by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Foster fall
clearly into one of those two categories. Those involving unique fairness and
equity concerns that the West Virginia Supreme Court has found "require more
persuasive proof' include:
* At a hearing on a petition to remove a child from parental custody based upon allegations of child abuse and neglect and to
establish infant guardianship with grandparents, "allegations of
child abuse and neglect [against the parent(s)] must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence."26 8
* Under Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedure, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel is required to prove
formal allegations of lawyer misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.26 9
* In an action for libel and defamation, plaintiffs who are public
officials or public figures (including limited purpose public figures) must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants made their defamatory statement with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not; by contrast, private figures need only show that the defendants were negligent in publishing the false and defamatory
statement.2 70
* When there is a failure on the part of an insurer to settle within policy limits where there exists the opportunity to so settle
and where such settlement within policy limits would release
the insured from any and all personal liability, that the insurer
has primafacie failed to act in its insured's best interest and that
such failure to so settle primafacie constitutes bad faith towards
its insured. It is "the insurer's burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that it attempted in good faith to negotiate
Lutz v. Orinick, 401 S.E.2d 464, 467 (W. Va. 1990).
Brown, 474 S.E.2d at 494 (citing 2 MCCORMICK ON Evto. § 340 (Strong ed., 1992)).
268
See, e.g., In re Abbigail Faye B., 665 S.E.2d 300, 310 (W. Va. 2008); see also In re S.C.,
284 S.E.2d 867, 871 (W. Va. 1981) ("In a child abuse or neglect case the burden of proof under
West Virginia Code § 49-6-2 [2010] , is upon the State Department of Welfare [now the Department of Health and Human Resources] to show by clear and convincing proof that conditions
existing at the time of the filing of the petition constituted neglect or abuse.").
269
See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 1995).
270
See State ex rel. Suriano v. Gaughan, 480 S.E.2d 548 (W. Va. 1996).
266
267
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a settlement, that any failure to enter into a settlement where the
opportunity to do so existed was based on reasonable and substantial grounds, and that it accorded the interests and rights of
the insured at least as great a respect as its own." 27 1
Note that in the first two cases in this category in which the action is
government-initiated, the heightened burden is imposed on the state, not the
individual. This is consistent with the decision in Santosky v. Kramer.2 72 In the
other two cases in this category, the heightened burden of proof is imposed on
the public figure or insurance company, not on the individual opposing them.
Only in those cases that involve "fraud or undue influence, or of mistake sufficient to justify reformation of a contract or written instrument" has the
West Virginia Supreme Court sanctioned imposing a heightened burden on an
individual:
* "The burden of proving an easement rests upon the party
claiming such right and must be established by clear and con-

vincing proof."2 73
* A party seeking to challenge a settlement agreement reached
in a proceeding to partition real property "must allege and prove
by clear and convincing evidence that an accident, mistake or
fraud occurred" in making the settlement agreement.274
* "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a
third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is
enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice

can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be limited as justice requires."2 75 The
court should consider "the extent to which the action or forbearance corroborates evidence of the making and terms of the
promise, or the making and terms are otherwise established by
clear and convincing evidence."276

Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va. 1990).
455 U.S. 745 (1982).
273
Syl. pt. 1, Berkeley Dev. Corp. v. Hutzler, 229 S.E.2d 732, 733 (W. Va. 1976), overruled by
O'Dell v. Stegall, 703 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 2010).
274
McConaha v. Rust, 632 S.E.2d 52, 59 (W. Va. 2006).
275
Syl. pt. 1, Everett v. Brown, 321 S.E.2d 685 (W. Va. 1984).
271

272

276

Syl. pt. 3, Everett, 321 S.E.2d at 685 (emphasis added).
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* To justify the reformation of a clear and unambiguous deed
for mistake, the mistake must be mutual and common to both
parties to the deed, the unambiguous deed must fail to express
the obvious intention of the parties, and the mutual mistake
must be proved by strong, clear and convincing evidence.277
* The question is whether or not a juror has been subjected to
improper influence affecting the verdict is a fact primarily to be
determined by the trial judge from the circumstances, which
must be clear and convincing to require a new trial; proof of
mere opportunity to influence the jury being insufficient.278
These outcomes are also consistent with the United States Supreme
Court's observation that the clear and convincing "level of proof, 'or an even
higher one, has traditionally been imposed in cases involving allegations of civil
fraud, and in a variety of other kinds of civil cases involving such issues as ...
lost wills, oral contracts to make bequests, and the like."' 27 9
Since only property and not liberty interests are at stake in a valuation
appeal, there is likely no constitutional requirement to impose a heightened
standard of proof on the state in those cases. Just as clearly, however, the West
Virginia Supreme Court failed to identify in the Foster or Bayer MaterialScience cases any societal interest similar to that in its other cases involving fraud
or undue interest that would justify imposing the clear and convincing standard
of proof on the taxpayer in a valuation appeal. This is especially true considering that the taxpayer is required to pay the contested tax and then to institute
action to recover the disputed amount. Since the taxing authority already has
the amount in controversy in its possession, it is difficult to identify a societal
interest that would justify applying a heightened standard of proof on the individual.
3.

The Heightened Standard of Proof in Tax Cases

The Supreme Court of the United States has, however, sanctioned the
imposition of a heightened standard of proof on taxpayers in a narrow class of
cases. In the first of these cases addressing the heightened standard, the Court
in Norfolk & Western Railway. Co. v. North Carolinaex rel. Maxwell(Norfolk v.
North Carolina)280 stated that it has consistently held that an apportionment
"formula not arbitrary on its face or in its general application may be unworkaSee Smith v. Smith, 639 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 2006).
See State v. Johnson, 164 S.E. 31 (W. Va. 1932).
279
Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. at 282-83, (citing Woodby v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. at 285, n.18).
280
297 U.S. 682 (1936).
277
278
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ble or unfair when applied . . . in particular conditions." 28 1 It defined when a
heightened standard was permissible:
A finding that the statute, though fair upon its face, is oppressive toward the railway in its practical operation cannot rest
upon so fragmentary and partial a showing of facts. We must
bear in mind steadily that the burden is on the taxpayer to make
oppression manifest by clear and cogent evidence. 28 2
The "clear and cogent evidence" standard has been used by the Court in
cases since Norfolk v. North Carolina was decided. Each of those cases involves a constitutional challenge, under the Commerce Clause and Due Process
Clause, to a state's apportionment of sales or income tax (specifically, the "external consistency," or second component of fairness, of an apportionment formula). Each case holds that the party challenging the constitutionality of a duly
enacted statutory apportionment tax must meet a higher burden, that the income
attributed to the state is out of proportion to the business transacted in that state,
or has led to a grossly distorted result. 28 3
According to the Court, a constitutional challenge to a state's tax apportionment statute faces a higher standard of proof because every state has "wide
latitude in the selection of apportionment formulas,"284 and "[t]he difficulty of
making an exact apportionment is apparent . . . hence, when the state has
adopted a method not intrinsically arbitrary, it will be sustained until proof is
offered of an unreasonable and arbitrary application in particular cases." 285 The
Court has explained that
[T]his Court has long realized the practical impossibility of a
state's achieving a perfect apportionment of expansive, complex
business activities such as those of appellant, and has declared
that rough approximation rather than precision is sufficient. Unless a palpably disproportionate result comes from an apportionment, a result which makes it patent that the tax is levied
upon interstate commerce rather than upon an intrastate privi281

Id. at 685.
Id. at 688 (emphasis added) (citing Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 168 S.E. 397 (1933),
aff'd 291 U.S. 642 (1934); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd., v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271,
280, 283 (1924); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920)). Interestingly, none of these cases refer to a "clear and cogent" standard of proof.
283
See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 195-96 (1995); Trinova
Corp. v. Mich. Dep't. of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 379-80 (1991); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1983); Exxon Corp. v. Wisc. Dept. of Revenue, 447 U.S.
207, 221-22 (1980); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 453-54 (1980).
284
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 274 (1978).
285
Hans Rees' Sons v. N.C. ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123, 133 (1931).
282
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lege, this Court has not been willing to nullify honest state efforts to make apportionments. 2 86
4.

West Virginia Decisions Have Been Consistent with These Apportionment Cases

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals first cited Norfolk &
Western Railway Co. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell2 87 (Norfolk v. North
Carolina)in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Field88 (Norfolk v. Field). This
case involved a challenge under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses by a
railroad operating in West Virginia and several contiguous states to a West Virginia privilege tax. The taxpayer claimed, inter alia, that the amount of the tax
imposed constituted a direct burden on interstate commerce, since the amount of
the tax imposed was several times greater than the gross income from its West
Virginia business, which necessitated the payment of the tax from earnings from
its interstate business.2 89 Since this was a challenge to an apportionment formula, it was entirely reasonable for the West Virginia Supreme Court to cite it for
the proposition that "[a] formula not arbitrary on its face or in its general operation may be unworkable or unfair when applied to a particular railway in particular conditions" 2 90 and that
[a] finding that the statute, though fair upon its face, is oppressive toward the railway in its practical operation cannot rest
upon so fragmentary and partial a showing of facts. We must
bear in mind steadily that the burden is on the taxpayer to make
oppression manifest by clear and cogent evidence.
Likewise, the West Virginia Supreme Court cited Norfolk v. North Carolinafor
the proposition that "'[a] statute valid as to one set of facts may be invalid as to
another. A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the
conditions to which it is applied"' 2 92 seems entirely justified. In Norfolk v.
Field,the taxpayer's challenge fell short because he didn't prove sufficient facts
to prove his case.
Likewise, Western MarylandRailway. Co. v. Goodwin 293 also involved
a constitutional challenge under the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the
286
287

288
289
290
291
292
293

Int'l. Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422-23 (1947) (citations omitted).
297 U.S. 682 (1936).
100 S.E.2d 796 (W. Va. 1957).
Id at 801.
Id at 803.
Id at 805.
Id at 807.
282 S.E.2d 240 (W. Va. 1981).
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United States Constitution on the power of the state to tax interstate commerce.
Here, when analyzing whether the tax was properly apportioned, the West Virginia Supreme Court cited Norfolk v. North Carolina for the proposition that
"most of the time that a tax related to cargo or passenger miles traveled in state
or to the miles of the line in state will be valid." 2 94 There, the West Virginia
Supreme Court reiterated that
for a taxpayer "to avoid a state tax under the Commerce Clause
it is necessary to demonstrate sufficient duplication of taxation
that there is an actual discrimination against interstate commerce." The same burden was enunciated concerning apportionment and relation to services. But there, too, there was no
serious effort factually to substantiate the constitutional claims.
So here, too, we are left exasperated because "there is no development in this record of this particular question other than
naked allegations."295
In other West Virginia cases involving constitutional interstate commerce challenges under the Commerce and Due Process Clauses, the rule from Norfolk v.
North Carolinaseems also to have been appropriately employed.2 96
5.

Two West Virginia Tax Cases Misapplied the Rule from Norfolk v. North Carolina

However, in two West Virginia cases, this apportionment rule seems to
have been taken out of context and misapplied. In State ex rel. Haden v. Calco
Awning & Window Corp.2 97 and Schmehl v. Helton,29 8 the West Virginia Supreme Court relied in part on this rule to justify placing a heightened standard of
proof on a taxpayer to prove that the application of a statute requiring corporate
officers to be personally responsible for unpaid corporate Consumer Sales and
Service Taxes is, as to them, unreasonable and arbitrary. Perhaps the imprecise
wording of Syllabus Point 4 in Norfolk v. Fieldis partly to blame:

Id. at 244.
Id. at 254-55.
296
See Chesapeake & Potomac Co. v. State Tax Dept, 239 S.E.2d 918, 926 (W. Va. 1977);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Battle, 167 S.E.2d 890, 899-902 (W. Va. 1969); State ex rel. Battle v.
Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 143 S.E.2d 331, 338-40 (W. Va. 1965); State ex rel. Battle v. B. D.
Bailey & Sons, Inc., 146 S.E.2d 686, 701-04 (W. Va. 1965) (Haymond, J., dissenting) (citing
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682 (1936); Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co. v. Field, 100 S.E.2d 796 (W. Va. 1957).).
297
170 S.E.2d 362 (W. Va. 1969).
298
662 S.E.2d 697 (W. Va. 2008).
294
295
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To establish that a taxing statute, valid on its face, is so unreasonable or arbitrary as to amount to a denial of due process of
law when applied in a particular case, the taxpayer must prove
by clear and cogent evidence facts establishing unreasonableness or arbitrariness.
Since this rule arose only in the context of challenges to apportionment
mechanisms and was justified by the difficulty in making an exact apportionment, it should be apparent that the rule was never intended to apply to all "taxing statutes." Moreover, since State ex rel. Haden v. Calco Awning & Window
Corp. was decided before most of the Supreme Court of the United State's cases
concerning permissible standards of proof discussed above, it is understandable
that the West Virginia Supreme Court was at least acting without that guidance.
By the time Schmehl v. Helton was decided, however, it should have been apparent that, while it is permissible to place the burden of proof on the taxpayer,
the imposition of a clear and convincing standard of proof may well be constitutionally impermissible. If one party must bear a heightened standard of proof in
a proceeding where the state seeks to impose liability for corporate sales taxes
on an individual, surely it is the state, not the individual, that should be required
to bear that burden. And in valuation appeals, where the taxes have already
been paid and the taxpayer is forced to being an appeal to recover any excess
paid, the State has even less justification for imposing a heightened standard.
6.

ConcretePipe Addresses the Issues in Fosterand Bayer MaterialScience

In Concrete Pipe,299 the Supreme Court of the United States addressed
several issues that should have enlightened the deliberations of the West Virginia Supreme Court in Foster. There, the United States Supreme Court considered
the constitutional concerns implicated by the selection of which party bears the
burden of proof, as well as the constitutional limitations on the standard of
proof.
a.

The Issue of Who Bears the Burden of Proof

In Concrete Pipe, the federal statute at issue provided that "any determination made by a plan sponsor . . . is presumed correct unless the party contesting the determination shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the
determination was unreasonable or clearly erroneous."oo
The Court stated that

Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal, 508 U.S.
602 (1993).
299
30

Id. at 611.
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although we have observed that "[w]here the burden of proof
lies on a given issue is, of course, rarely without consequence
and frequently may be dispositive to the outcome of the litigation or application,

. .

. [o]utside the criminal law area, where

special concerns attend, the locus of the burden of persuasion is
normally not an issue of federal constitutional moment."o30
It explained that
It is indeed entirely sensible to burden the party more likely to
have information relevant to the facts about its withdrawal from
the Plan with the obligation to demonstrate that facts treated by
the Plan as amounting to a withdrawal did not occur as alleged.
2
Such was the rule at common law. 30
By this logic, neither Bayer nor the Foster Foundation would have had
any reason to dispute the conclusion that, as a general rule, a taxpayer is more
likely to have information relevant to the value of its property. And, in fact,
neither complained that the fact that the taxpayer bears the burden of proof before a board of equalization and review.
b.

The Issue of the Permissible Standard of Proof

After deciding that requiring the employer in Concrete Pipe to bear the
burden of proof did not violate constitutional principles, the Court turned its
attention to the standard of proof the employer was required to meet. The Court
phrased the issue this way:
The hard question is what the employer must show under the
statute to rebut the plan sponsor's factual determinations, that
is, how and to what degree of probability the employer must
persuade the arbitrator that the sponsor was wrong. The question is hard because the statutory text refers to three different
concepts in identifying this burden: "preponderance," "clearly
erroneous," and "unreasonable." 3
The Court noted that a standard of proof "is customarily used to prescribe one possible burden or standard of proof before a trier of fact in the first
instance, as when the proponent of a proposition loses unless he proves a contested proposition by a preponderance of the evidence," while a standard of review is "customarily used to describe, not a degree of certainty that some fact
301
302

303

Id. at 626 (citing Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976) (footnote omitted)).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 621.
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has been proven in the first instance, but a degree of certainty that a factfinder in
the first instance made a mistake in concluding that a fact had been proven under the applicable standard of proof.",3 04
The Court observed that
[i]f the employer were required to show the trustees' findings to
be either 'unreasonable or clearly erroneous', there would be a
substantial question of procedural fairness under the Due
Process Clause. In essence, the arbitrator provided for by the
statute would be required to accept the plan sponsor's findings,
even if they were probably incorrect, absent a showing at least
sufficient to instill a definite or firm conviction that a mistake
had been made.30 5
This observation well defines the height of the hurdle imposed by a more stringent standard of proof: under the lesser standard, if the arbitrator found the plan
sponsor's findings to be probably incorrect, the arbitrator could reject them; under a more stringent standard, the arbitrator would nevertheless be required to
accept them absent a definite or firm conviction that a mistake had been made.
The Court made clear that where possible bias on the part of the tribunal
exists, applying a heightened standard of review would seem to deprive the
challenging party "of the impartial adjudication in the first instance to which it
is entitled under the Due Process Clause." 3 0 6 In ConcretePipe, the possible bias
resulted from the employer's claim that the Plan's trustees (which the employer
saw as being the first level adjudicative body) might be biased against it for
several reasons, including the trustee's potential financial liability from breach
of their fiduciary duty to the fund if they found in favor of an employer.307
In Concrete Pipe, the Court found that the employer had not been deprived of due process by the trustees, but only because they acted in an enforcement capacity, rather than an adjudicative capacity.30 s The trustees were
not required to hold a hearing, to examine witnesses, or to adjudicate the disputes of contending parties on matters of fact or law. 30 9 Therefore, the hearing
the employer received before the arbitrator constituted the first level adjudicative hearing, and to avoid the constitutional issue potentially raised by a heightened standard of proof at this level, the Court ruled that the statute's incoherent

Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S.
602, 622-23 (1993).
305
Id at 626 (emphasis added).
3

307

Id. at 615-16.

308

Id. at 619.
Id..

309
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language required only the lower preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof. 310
Perhaps the most important conclusion to be gleaned from Concrete
Pipe is that it is critically important to keep the distinctions between the "burden
of proof", the "standard of proof', and the "standard of review" firmly in mind.
Unfortunately, although it cited Concrete Pipe, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals failed to do so.
C.

Problems with the West Virginia Supreme Court's Decision in Foster as
to the Standardof Proof
1.

In Foster,the West Virginia Supreme Court Again Failed to
Distinguish Between the Taxpayer's Burden Before a Board of
Equalization and Review and On Appeal to a Circuit Court.

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals failed to properly distinguish between the applicable standards of proof and standards of review. In the
Foster decision, the West Virginia Supreme Court encountered this problem
when it examined its own prior decisions and erroneously concluded that they
were inconsistent with respect to the standard of proof applicable before a board
of equalization and review.
As discussed above, the Foster Foundation never argued that the proper
standard of proof before a county commission sitting as a board of equalization
and review in a valuation dispute was by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and convincing evidence, and the circuit court skirted the issue by finding only that "the taxpayer must prove by competent evidence that
the Assessor or the Tax Commissioner arrived at an incorrect value,"3 and
See id at 629 (citing Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961) ("Federal statutes
are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality. 'When the validity of an
act of Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is
a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided."'). A similar line of reasoning should have led
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to avoid the constitutional question by requiring
only the lower standard. Where, as here, "a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of
which is, and the other of which is not, violative of a constitutional provision, the statute will be
given that construction which sustains its constitutionality unless it is plain that the other construction is required." Farley v. Graney, 119 S.E.2d 833, 840 (W. Va. 1960) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); accord State ex rel. Cosner v. See, 42 S.E.2d 31, 43 (W. Va. 1947)
("[E]ffect must be given to the elementary rule that every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality."); Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc.
v. Holland, 176 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (S.D. W. Va. 2001) (quoting Immigration and Naturalization
Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001)) ("[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the
statute is 'fairly possible,' we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems.").
311
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va.
2008).
310
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cited cases in which has the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals specified
three different standards. 312
In Foster, the West Virginia Supreme Court justified its examination of
the issue of the correct standard of proof before the Board by noting the differences in the standards in the cases cited by the circuit court:
While much of the law governing the Foundation's appeal is
grounded in statutes, the burden of proof imposed upon the appealing taxpayer has not been established by the Legislature and
thus has been defined by this Court. However, from the cases
cited by the circuit court in its final order, it is apparent that a
conflict of authority has been created by our prior inconsistent
decisions: we have held both that the aggrieved taxpayer must
prove his/her claim for relief by clear and convincing evidence
and that the taxpayer must satisfy a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof.313
Observing that "[t]hese two burdens of proof differ vastly," 3 14 it thereupon proceeded to reconcile its prior inconsistent case law. It did so by explicitly
overruling, as was its prerogative, its prior cases holding that the preponderance
of the evidence standard was applicable before a county commission sitting as a
board of equalization and review and by issuing a new syllabus point adopting
the clear and convincing standard of proof at the first-level adjudicatory hear-

ing. 3 15
By way of analysis, the West Virginia Supreme Court did little more
than count the number of cases specifying which of the standards of proof was
applicable. In doing so, however, it completely ignored Bayer's assertion in its
briefs that the West Virginia Supreme Court's earliest cases do not, in fact, conflict with each other and are not inconsistent. In fact, the West Virginia Supreme Court has long recognized that a taxpayer who receives an adverse ruling
from a county commission must carry a heavy burden in convincing a circuit
court to overturn that determination.316 It was not until 1982, however, when
312

313
314

Id
Id. at 161 (internal citations omitted).

d

Id. at 163.
316
See, e.g., In re Nat'l Bank of W. Va. at Wheeling, 73 S.E.2d 655, 687 (W. Va. 1952) (holding that assessments by the county commissions "should stand, unless there appears in the record
some fact or facts which clearly establish the assessments to be erroneous") (emphasis added)),
overruled on other grounds, In re Kanawha Val. Bank, 109 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1959); Norfolk
W. Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Public Works, 21 S.E.2d 143, 147 (W. Va. 1942) ("In orderfor the courts
... to reverse or to interfere with the exercise of the taxing power, there must be a clearshowing
of the arbitrary abuse of that power that amounts to a mala fides purpose to disregard the principle
of uniformity, or of practical confiscation.") (emphasis added)).
315
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the West Virginia Supreme Court addressed the standard of proof applicable in
proceedings before a county commission sitting as a board of equalization and
review as the first adjudicatory and fact-finding tribunal.
In Killen v. Logan County Commission,3 17 the West Virginia Supreme
Court gave careful consideration to the burden of proof before a board of equalization and review. The West Virginia Supreme Court detailed the interaction
of the initial determinations made by the assessor, the burdens placed on a party
challenging an assessment before the Commission, and a court's subsequent
review of a Commission's determinations. The court held: "[a]n objection to
any assessment may be sustained only upon the presentation of competent evidence .

.

. [t]he objecting party .

.

. must show by a preponderance of the evi-

dence that the assessment is incorrect." 3 18
In Killen, the West Virginia Supreme Court recognized:
It is important to realize the difference in the burden of proof
required in a de novo [fact-finding] proceeding and the standard
of judicial review utilized by courts when considering appeals
of assessments. West Virginia Code § 11-3-25 allows taxpayers to contest the proposed assessment value before the Board
of Equalization and Review. The preponderance of the evidence standard would apply to that proceeding.

. .

. However,

when the taxpayer has appeared before the Board of Equalization and Review, judicial review by the circuit court and by this
Court will be limited.319
As Bayer explained, it is only cases decided after Killen that have given
rise to the inconsistency addressed by the West Virginia Supreme Court in Foster, and in these cases, the court has not focused carefully on the distinction
between the standardofproof before a board of equalization and review and the
heightened standardof review that has applied to appellate review of a board's
findings in circuit court.
The decision in In re Tax Assessments Against PocahontasLand Co. 3 20
is illustrative. There, the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed a circuit
court's decision vacating the Commission's tax appraisal decision on due
295 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1982), overruled by In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 150 (W. Va. 2008).
318
Syl. pt. 8, Killen v. Logan Cnty. Comm'n, 295 S.E.2d 689, 706 (W. Va. 1982); see id. at 709
(requiring "preponderance of competent evidence" shows that appraisal values are erroneous for
Board to reduce or increase the value).
"9 Id. at 706 n.27. See also Frymier-Halloran v. Paige, 458 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1995); In re
Tax Assessment Against Am. Bituminous Power Partners, L.P., 539 S.E.2d 757 (W. Va. 2000)
(confirming constitutional limits on a circuit court's standard of review under the Separation of
Powers provision of the West Virginia Constitution).
320
303 S.E.2d 691 (W. Va. 1983).
317
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process grounds because the taxpayers "were denied a meaningful hearing before a proper quorum."32 After doing so, the Court noted the "general rule that
valuations for taxation purposes fixed by an assessing officer are presumed to be
correct,"322 and "the burden of showing an assessment to be erroneous is, of
course, upon the taxpayer and proof of such fact must be clear."3 2 3 Even though
both of the cases quoted by the West Virginia Supreme Court address the standard of review applicable at the circuit court level, in the next sentence, stated in
dicta: "It is obvious that where a taxpayer protests his assessment before a
board, he bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence
that his assessment is erroneous." 324 That statement did not purport to distinguish or overrule, let alone acknowledge, the court's contrary holding and syllabus point in Killen.
Subsequent cases, including Western Pocahontas Properties, Ltd. v.
County Commission 325 and In re Maple Meadow Min. Co. for Relieffrom Real
Property Assessment 326 rely without further analysis on that obiter dictum in
PocahontasLand. In CSX Transportation,Inc. v. Board ofPublic Works, 32 7 the
district court recognized that the West Virginia Supreme Court had inconsistently applied the "preponderance evidence standard" from Killen and the "clear and
convincing standard" from Pocahontas Land, and elected to apply the latter,
citing Maple Meadow and Western Pocahontas. That decision, however, was
reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which
held that the district court erred by failing to recognize that "preponderance of
the evidence" standard of proof applied before a board of equalization and re328
view and a higher standard of review is required upon appeal.
In any event, in Foster,the West Virginia Supreme Court again failed to
distinguish the entirely separate concepts of the standard of proof before a firstlevel adjudicatory tribunal and the standard of review applicable before a circuit
court for an appeal, and, without acknowledging Bayer's explanation as to how
the inconsistency arose, the court expressly overruled Killen and EasternAmerican Energy Corp. v. Thorn3 29 and held that a taxpayer challenging an assessor's
tax assessment before a board of equalization and review must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the tax assessment is erroneous.
Id. at 698-99.
Id. at 699 (quoting Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. v. County Ct. of McDowell County, 62
S.E.2d 801, 804 (W. Va. 1950)).
323
Id. (quoting In re Tax Assessments Against the Nat'l Bank of W. Va., 73 S.E.2d 655, 664
(1952) overruled on other grounds, In re Assessment of Kanawha Valley Bank, 109 S.E.2d (W.
Va. 1959)).
324
Id. (emphasis added).
325
431 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1993).
326
446 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1994).
327
871 F. Supp. 897, 899 (S.D. W. Va. 1995).
328
95 F.3d 318, 322-23 (4th Cir. 1996).
329
428 S.E.2d 56 (W. Va. 1993) (per curiam).
321

322
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2.

The West Virginia Supreme Court's Use of Imprecise Language
Reflects Its Confusion of the Legal Issues

Having decided that the clear and convincing "burden" of proof was applicable before the Board, the West Virginia Supreme Court then turned its attention to the "parties' arguments regarding the constitutionality thereof."330
After accurately describing in detail the parties' assertions on that score, 3 the
court incorrectly summarized the Foster Foundations' position, stating that
On this point, the Foundation complains that the clear and convincing burden of proof it is required to sustain is unconstitutional. However, the Foundation's argument also challenges its
corresponding burden of persuasion insofar as it complains that
neither the Assessor nor the Commission was required to
present evidence of a specific type to prove the correctness of
their assessments.33 2
Since the West Virginia Supreme Court used the term "burden of proof'
as meaning the applicable "standard of proof' throughout its discussion of its
prior supposedly inconsistent case law, the court seems to assert here that the
Foster Foundation argued that the clear and convincing standardof proof is per
se unconstitutional, a claim that the Foster Foundation never argued or briefed.
It also seems to introduce a new term, the "burden of persuasion," to address the
only argument that the Foster Foundation actually made: that the disparate burdens of proof that the parties were required to make were unfair.
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the imprecise terminology
used by the West Virginia Supreme Court actually reflects its confusion of the
legal issues actually at issue. Because it failed to distinguish clearly between
the issue of which party bears the burden from that of the requisite degree of
confidence that the facts are true, it ends up citing many cases that actually stand
for the proposition that it is proper for the party that is most likely to be in possession of the relevant facts to justify its conclusion that the heightened clear
and convincing standard of proof is applicable. And because it failed to distinguish clearly between the concepts of which party bears the burden of persuasion from that of which bears the burden of production, it apparently believed
that addressed the Foster Foundation's claim of the parties' disparate burdens
being unfair, without actually having done so.

330

In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 164 (W.

Va. 2008).
3
Id. at 164-65.
332
Id. at 165.
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The West Virginia Supreme Court Failed to Distinguish
Between the Burden of Persuasion and the Burden of
Production

The West Virginia Supreme Court explained that the "burden of proof'
encompasses two separate and distinct concepts: the "burden of production" and
the "burden of persuasion";
The burden of persuasion requires the party upon whom it is
placed, to convince the trier of fact. . . on a given issue. When a
party has the burden of persuasion on an issue, that burden does
not shift. The burden of production merely requires a party to
present some evidence to rebut evidence proffered by the party
having the burden of persuasion.
Other authorities explain that the term "burden of production" instructs
a court which party must come forward with evidence to support a particular
proposition, whereas "burden of persuasion" determines which party must produce sufficient evidence to convince a judge that a fact has been established. 334
While the burden of production can shift (for example, after one party establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the opposite party to
disprove it), the burden of persuasion never leaves the party on whom it is originally cast.335
In PocahontasLand, the court stated that
[i]t is obvious that where a taxpayer protests his assessment before a board, he bears the burden of demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence that his assessment is erroneous. Once this
is done, it is incumbent upon the taxing authority to place some
evidence in the record to show why its assessment is correct.336
This statement is consistent with the idea that the taxpayer has the burden of
persuasion throughout the hearing before the board of equalization and review
and initially bears the burden of production to show that the taxing authority's
assessment is excessive. Once the taxpayer establishes that fact, however, the
burden of production shifts to the taxing authority to defend the accuracy of the
3
Id. at 165 (citing Mayhew v. Mayhew, 519 S.E.2d 188, 195 n.15 (W. Va. 1999) (internal
citations omitted)).
334
29 AM. JuR. 2D Evidence § 171 (2010); see also McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458
F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2006); El v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).
335
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 165 (W.
Va. 2008) (quoting Mayhew, 519 S.E,2d at 195 n. 15 (citations omitted); 29 AM. JuR. 2D Evidence
§ 171 (2010); Hurley v. Hurley, 754 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 2000).
336
In re Tax Assessments Against Pocahontas Land Co., 303 S.E.2d 691, 699 (W. Va. 1983).
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assessment. It is then for the factfinder to determine whether taxpayer ultimately met his burden of persuasion to show that the assessment was excessive.
As the West Virginia Supreme Court in Fostercorrectly explained in its
summary of the parties' positions, the Foster Foundation only objected to the
fact that the Assessor was not required to submit any specific evidence, is not
required to be licensed, and submitted only oral testimony during the Board's
hearing. Further, the Foundation objected to the fact that, during the circuit
court proceedings, the County Commission did not provide any evidence to
support the value that it adopted after the hearing before it, which was less that
that submitted by the Assessor and higher than that submitted by the taxpayer.3 37
Clearly then, the Foster court's statement that "the Foundation's argument also challenges its corresponding burden of persuasion insofar as it complains that neither the Assessor nor the Commission was required to present
evidence of a specific type to prove the correctness of their assessments,"33 is
incorrect. The Foster Foundation was actually complaining that after it met that
burden of production, neither the Assessor nor the County Commission was
required to meet their burdens of production as set forth in Pocahontas Land.
The court's conclusion that "[t]he burden of persuasion rests with the Foundation to prove that its tax assessment was erroneous; it does not lie with the Assessor or the Commission nor does it shift thereto," 3 is correct insofar as it
goes, but it fails to get to the meat of the Foster Foundation's claim-that the
Assessor failed to meet his burden ofproduction.34 0
It is utterly unclear what the West Virginia Supreme Court is attempting
to say here. Since neither the Foundation nor Bayer ever claimed that the burden of persuasion shifts to the taxing authority, this language seems to be completely unnecessary. If, on the other hand, the court believed it was addressing
the Foster Foundation's complaint of disparate burdens of production and/or to
overrule PocahontasLand's rule that the burden of production shifts to the taxing authority after the taxpayer prima facie establishes that the assessment is
excessive, its statement that the burden of persuasion doesn't shift is wholly
ineffective, especially after just having cited Mayhew v. Mayhew to explain
those terms, 34 1 and given that if it was going to overrule PocahontasLand, it
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 164 (W.
Va. 2008).
338
Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
337

339

Id.

The Foster Foundation isn't alone in its belief that the disparate burdens of production are
unfair. See, e.g., Newport Hous. Auth., Inc. v. Hartsell, 533 S.W.2d 317, 321-22 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1975) ("Something is wrong with our rules of evidence when a verdict can be predicated on the
opinion of a person completely ignorant of real estate values and the opinions of skilled, knowledgeable, professional experts ignored. It is likened to taking the opinion of a midwife over that of
an obstetrician.").
341
See Fischer v. Twp. of W. Bloomfield, MTT Nos. 187567, 210379, 1996 WL 479591
(Mich. Tax Trib. 1996) ("Taxpayer's burden of establishing true cash value of property, in property tax matter, encompasses two separate concepts: burden of persuasion, which does not shift
340
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would have done so explicitly, as it did for Killen and EasternAmerican Energy
Corp.
It should also be noted that there never was an issue in Foster as to
whether the taxpayer met its burden of persuasion, because the taxpayer met the
conditions set by the Board for submitting clear and convincing evidence and
provided an appraisal and the testimony of a licensed, professional appraiser in
the hearing before the Board. Regardless of the correct standard of proof in that
hearing, the taxpayer met it. What was at issue, however, was how much evidence the Assessor had to introduce to defend his appraisal. For the West Virginia Supreme Court to have provided no guidance at all on this question is not
helpful to either the taxing authorities or to the members of the Bar practicing in
this area. As noted earlier, the subsequent case of Stone Brooke Limited Partnership v. Sisinni may have shed some light on the amount of evidence that the
taxing authority is required to provide. Of even more concern, however, is the
fact that the court must have believed that it somehow did address this issue in
its analysis, because its discussion of the Foster Foundation's claim that the disparate burdens of proof were unfair ends abruptly at this point in the decision.
b.

The West Virginia Supreme Court Failed to Distinguish
Between Which Party Bears the Burden of Proof and
the Requisite Degree of Confidence That the Facts Are
True

Neither the Foster Foundation nor Bayer objected to the fact that the
taxpayer bears the burden of proof before the Board, given the United State Supreme Court's conclusions in Concrete Pipe. Nevertheless, having set up a
straw man in its statement that "the Foundation's argument also challenges its
corresponding burden of persuasion insofar as it complains that neither the Assessor nor the Commission was required to present evidence of a specific type to
prove the correctness of their assessments,"34 2 the West Virginia Supreme Court
easily knocked it down, stating that "[r]equiring the party bringing a claim for
relief to bear the burden of persuasion, however, is consistent with our jurisprudence."343
Some authorities assert that there are two components of the burden of
persuasion: the facts that the party must introduce, and the degree of certainty
that the factfinder must have that the facts are true. The degree of certainty is
normally expressed as "by a preponderance of the evidence," "by clear and convincing evidence," and "beyond a reasonable doubt." 3 " The latter component,
during course of hearing, and burden of going forward with evidence, which may shift to opposing party.").
342
Foster,672 S.E.2d at 165.
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 152 (W.
Va. 2008) (citing Boury v. Hamm, 190 S.E.2d 13, 18 (W. Va. 1972)).
34
29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 171, 173 (2010).
343
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then, is synonymous with the term "standard of proof' as used in this article. In
other cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court recognizes that the "burden of
persuasion" and "standard of proof' have the same meaning.34 5
In Foster, then, when the court turned to the question of "whether it is
constitutional to require an aggrieved taxpayer to prove his/her claim for relief
from an erroneous tax assessment by clear and convincing evidence,"34 6 it could
have addressed whether the clear and convincing standardof proof was proper,
but it did not. Rather, the Foster court first cited Concrete Pipe when it observed that the United States Supreme Court has approved placing the burden of
proof on the party who is or should be in possession of the relevant facts,347 and
observed that the designation of a particular party as bearing the burden of proof
does not generally raise constitutional issues.348
The West Virginia Supreme Court then cites three other cases that
"have addressed the constitutionality of a taxpayer's burden of proof in tax assessment cases."349 While two of the three cases cited by the court do, in fact,
address the issue of which party bears the burden of proof, they generally discuss constitutional aspects of that issue superficially, if at all.35 0 The remaining
case cited by the court deals almost entirely with the proper standardof review
See Mayhew v. Mayhew, 519 S.E.2d 188, 210 (W. Va. 1999) ("Our task now is to review
the circuit court's order by utilizing the active and passive appreciation framework heretofore
outlined. Application of this new burden ofpersuasion to the instant proceeding is not prejudicial,
because both parties had previously been given the burden of persuasion on each of the relevant
elements of the test.") (citing Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 387 n.3 (Minn. 1996)
(finding that a lower court's finding of an incorrect standardofproof must be reversed only if the
error prejudices the other party)); see also Brown v. Gobble, 474 S.E.2d 489 (W. Va. 1996) (using
terms interchangeably).
'4
Foster,672 S.E.2d at 165.
347
Id. (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 626 (1993) ("[i]n every case the onus probandi lies on the party who wishes to
support his case by a particular fact which lies more peculiarly within his knowledge, or of which
he is supposed to be cognizant.").
348
Id. (quoting Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976) ("[o]utside the criminal law area,
where special concerns attend, the locus of the burden of persuasion is normally not an issue of
federal constitutional moment.") (footnote omitted)).
349
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 166 (W.
Va. 2008) (citing Wilcox v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 848 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1988); City of
Troy v. Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co., 311 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. App. 1981); Lavine, 424 U.S. at
585).
350
Among other spurious claims, the taxpayer in Wilcox v. Comm'r of InternalRevenue., 848
F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1988), claimed that the imposition of the burden of proof upon him by the
United States Tax Court violated due process, a claim that the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit dismissed in less than one sentence, holding that "placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer
does not violate due process." Id. at 1008 (citing Rockwell v. Comm'r, 512 F.2d 882, 885 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015 (1975). Similarly, the only remotely relevant constitutional
issue in Troy v. Cleveland Pneumatic Tool Co., 311 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. App. 1981), was whether
the parties had sufficient notice of who bears the burden of proof; the identity of the party that
bears the burden was solely a matter of statutory construction.
345
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before a circuit court, 3 5 1 not who bears the burden of proof or the proper standard of proof.352 In citing the latter case, the court failed to properly distinguish
between the standard of review and the standard of proof, although it did at least
recognize that "the court did not specifically find the clear and convincing burden of proof to be constitutional."s 3
The West Virginia Supreme Court seemed to realize at this point that it
was on the wrong track, and concluded that "[flrom these authorities, it is apparent that there is no constitutional infirmity to requiring a taxpayer to bear the
burden of proof when challenging a tax assessment" and stated that "having
gleaned little guidance as to the constitutionality of the clear and convincing
burden of proof from these other jurisdictions, we must look to analogous decisions and bodies of law for further counsel." 3 54
As discussed above, the West Virginia Supreme Court then cited several
of its prior cases wherein it had sanctioned the use of a clear and convincing
standard of proof. Again, neither Bayer nor Foster Foundation claimed that a
clear and convincing burden of proof is never appropriate, and the prior West
Virginia cases, with a couple of exceptions, are largely consistent with cases
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.355 The simple fact that the
clear and convincing standard is appropriate in some cases, however, does not
mean that it is always appropriate. Absent meaningful analysis as outlined by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Mathews356 , the cited cases have no
bearing on whether that standard is appropriate to impose on a taxpayer in valuation appeals before a board of equalization and review.
The West Virginia Supreme Court in Foster then asserted that
In LaGrange, taxpayers sought administrative review in the Circuit Court of Cook County
from a decision of the State Property Tax Appeal Board. LaGrange State Bank No. 1713 v. DuPage Cnty. Bd. of Review, 398 N.E.2d 992, (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1979). The circuit court affirmed
the Board's decision and found it "to be supported by the evidence and in accordance with law."
Id. at 995. The taxpayers then appealed to Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second District. The
circuit court in this case was clearly acting, as is also true for circuit courts here, as a court of
review. In that situation, "the findings of an administrative agency, such as the [Board] on questions of fact are held to be primafacie true and correct. In order to reverse the administrative
order, it is required that an opposite conclusion be clearly evident."Id at 997. Given that standard
of review before the circuit court, the appellate court found that "[b]ased upon the evidence presented in the record before us, we conclude that the decision of the PTAB was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence." Id. at 998.
352
The only mention of the standard of proof at the first adjudicative level in LaGrange, is a
mention in passing that "[t]he PTAB is required to make a decision concerning the correct assessment of the subject property based upon the weight of the evidence received by it during the
hearing." Id. at 998. This seems closer to supporting a preponderance of the evidence standard
than it does a clear and convincing standard.
3
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 166 (W.
Va. 2008).
34Id. at 166.
3ss
See supra Part IV.B.2.
356
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see infra Part IV.D.
351
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[p]erhaps most analogous to the taxpayer's burden of proof in
the case sub judice is the burden of proof borne by a plaintiff in
a case brought pursuant to the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (hereinafter "the MPLA"). Under the
MPLA, a court may require a plaintiff to provide evidence
through expert testimony in support of his/her claim for relief.3"'
In a medical malpractice tort action, "a plaintiffs burden of proof is to
show that a defendant's breach of a particular duty of care was a proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury."3 58 Under the MPLA, expert testimony is not
always required; rather,
[i]n medical malpractice cases where lack of care or want of
skill is so gross as to be apparent, or the alleged breach relates
to noncomplex matters of diagnosis and treatment within the
understanding of lay jurors by resort to common knowledge and
experience, failure to present expert testimony on the accepted
standard of care and degree of skill under such circumstances is
not fatal to a plaintiffs primafacie showing of negligence.
Even if expert testimony is required by the trial court, however, that does not
change the standard of proof that the plaintiff is required to meet; "[t]he burden
of proving 'that the nonexistence of the presumed fact [i.e., due care] is more
probable than its existence,' is the same as the burden of proving defendants'
negligence 'by a preponderanceof the evidence."' 360 The fact that the plaintiff

can be required to present expert testimony on an issue outside the everyday
experiences of the jury, then, does not imply that a heightened standard of proof
is applicable to the plaintiff, even in medical malpractice cases.
The West Virginia Supreme Court in Foster also stated that "plaintiffs
in medical malpractice cases bear the burden of proving their claims," 36 1 cited
five caseS362 to support that proposition, and then observed that "[r]equiring
3

35
35
360

Id. at 167 (citing W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-1, et seq).
Mays v. Chang, 579 S.E.2d 561, 565 (W. Va. 2003).
Farley v. Shook, 629 S.E.2d 739, 744 (W. Va. 2006).
Matheny v. Fairmont Gen. Hosp., Inc., 575 S.E.2d 350, 358 (W. Va. 2002) (emphasis add-

ed).
361 In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 167 (W.

Va. 2008).
362
Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E.2d 159, 168 (W. Va. 1967); Schroeder v. Adkins, 141 S.E.2d
352, 357 (W. Va. 1965); Syl. pt. 2, White v. Moore, 62 S.E.2d 122, 125-26 (W. Va. 1950); Syl.
pt. 2, Dye v. Corbin, 53 S.E. 147 (W. Va. 1906), overruled on other grounds, Pleasants v. Alliance Corp., 543 S.E.2d 320 (W. Va. 2000); Roberts v. Gale, 139 S.E.2d 272, 275-76 (W. Va.
1964). The latter case also states the general rule before the MPLA was enacted that "in medical
malpractice cases negligence or want of professional skill can be proved only by expert witnesses.
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plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases to bear the burden of proof is derived
from our more general negligence jurisprudence placing the burden of proof on
plaintiffs to prove their claims of negligence," 6 citing three additional cases.
Finally, the court again cited Concrete Pipe for the proposition that
[t]his placement of the burden of proof also is consistent with
the United States Supreme Court's recognition that "[i]n every
case the onus probandi lies on the party who wishes to support
his case by a particular fact which lies more peculiarly within
his knowledge, or of which he is supposed to be cognizant."365
After observing that the Foster Foundation "did not have notice of its
burden of proof or of the specific type of evidence required to satisfy this burden"366 and after again misstating the Foster Foundation's claim ("the Foundation argues simply that the clear and convincing burden of proof is unfair"), 3 67
the court then concluded that "[i]t is not unreasonable or unfair, however, to
require the party claiming to have superior knowledge of the value of its own
property to shoulder the burden of presenting such evidence to the decision
maker."368 Up to this point, the court is preaching to the choir, as nobody
claimed that the taxpayer should not bear the burden of proof.
Then, the West Virginia Supreme Court asserted that "[n]either is it a
denial of due process to impose more stringent standards upon a complaining
taxpayer in an attempt to prevent frivolous tax assessment challenges." 6
This
citation is especially perplexing, because there, the court specifically declined to
address the constitutionality of a statute which sets a "more stringent" requirement of proof by requiring a plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit to file a presuit notice of claim and screening certificate of merit. 370 Since the court declined to address the constitutional issue of whether the more stringent standard
was proper, Hinchman hardly supports the proposition for which it was cited in
FosterFoundation.
This rule has been qualified to permit negligence to be established by lay witnesses in cases where
negligence or want of professional skill is so obvious as to dispense with the need for expert testimony." Roberts, 139 S.E.2d at 276 (citations omitted).
363
Foster,672 S.E.2d at 168.
3
Syl. pt. 3, Keister v. Talbott, 391 S.E.2d 895 (W. Va. 1990); Syl. pt. 2, Walton v. Given,
215 S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 1975); Syl. pt. 2, Smith v. Edward M. Rude Carrier Corp., 151 S.E.2d
738 (W. Va. 1966).
365
Foster,672 S.E.2d at 168.
3

Id. at 168-69.

367

Id. at 169.

3

Id. (citing Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cat,

508 U.S. 602, 626 (1993)).
369
370

Id. (citing Hinchman v. Gillette, 618 S.E.2d 387, 389 (W. Va. 2005))
Id. at 393.
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Ironically, Justice Davis wrote a concurring opinion in Hinchman, in
which she opined that the pre-suit notice of claim and screening certificate of
merit requirement in the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act
(MPLA) violates the Certain Remedy Clause of the West Virginia Constitution,371 a view apparently shared by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.372 Apparently, her opinion as to whether a "more stringent" standard should be applicable is different in tax cases than it is in medical malpractice cases. In any event,
her view in Hinchman was clearly not shared by the other members of the
court.373 Moreover, even had the court upheld the constitutionality of that provision in the MPLA in Hinchman, it is difficult to see how the question of
whether the MPLA violates the Certain Remedy Clause of the West Virginia
Constitution has any bearing on whether a heightened standard of proof violates
the Due Process Clause.
Then, having cited primarily cases which can only stand for the proposition that it is not a denial of due process to require the taxpayer to bear the burden of proof, the court in FosterFoundationconcluded that
Accordingly, we hold that requiring a taxpayer challenging a
property tax assessment in accordance with W. Va.Code § 11-324 (1979) (Repl.Vol.2008) to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the assessor's assessment is erroneous does not
violate the constitutional due process protections provided by
section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution or by section ten of Article III of the West Virginia
Constitution.37 4
This conclusion is entirely unwarranted by the authorities cited. It is
especially inexcusable, given the court's repeated citations of Concrete Pipe, in
which the Supreme Court of the United States clearly established that, while
requiring a particular party to bear the burden of proof is constitutionally unremarkable, the required standard of proof can implicate constitutional concerns.

3
See also Blankenship v. Ethicon, Inc., 656 S.E.2d 451, 454 n.2 (W. Va. 2007) (where Justice Davis articulates her belief that the MPLA's pre-suit notice and a certificate of merit requirements are unconstitutional).
372
See Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 152 P.3d 861 (Okla. 2006).

Hinchman, 618 S.E.2d at 394 ("The requirement of a pre-suit notice of claim and screening
certificate of merit is not intended to restrict or deny citizens' access to the courts."); see also Id. at
408 (". . . I wish to make clear my firm conviction that W.Va.Code § 55-7B-6 is constitutional.")
(Maynard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
374
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 169 (W.
Va. 2008).
373
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What Should the Court Have Done in Foster?

The Supreme Court of the United States has considered which of the
three standards of proof is required to meet due process requirements in a variety of cases. In Mathews v. Eldridge,7 s the Court established a framework for its
analysis of the applicable standard of proof, holding that "resolution of the issue
whether the administrative procedures provided ... are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected" and requires consideration of three distinct factors:
1. the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
2. the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
3. the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Balancing these three factors is required to determine the appropriate

standard.3 7 6
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has adopted this framework. For example, in State ex rel. Jeanette H v. Pancake,37 it cited Mathews
when it defined the specific procedures necessary to insure due process requirements are met:
We have previously explained that in determining the specific
procedures necessary to protect a liberty interest, we should
consider three general factors:
The specific procedural protections accorded to a due process
liberty or property interest generally require[ ] consideration of
three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by state action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the protected interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any[,] of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and third, the government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
3
376
37

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 334.
529 S.E.2d 865 (W. Va. 2000).
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that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would
entail.
The court also observed that
We have also recognized that there are certain fundamental
principles to be applied when conducting a due process analysis, and due process requirements may need to be tailored to the
specific circumstances of the case under consideration:
Applicable standards for procedural due process, outside the
criminal area, may depend upon the particular circumstances of
a given case. However, there are certain fundamental principles
in regard to procedural due process embodied in Article III,
Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution , which are; First,
the more valuable the right sought to be deprived, the more safeguards will be interposed. Second, due process must generally
be given before the deprivation occurs unless a compelling public policy dictates otherwise. Third, a temporary deprivation of
rights may not require as large a measure of procedural due
process protection as a permanent deprivation.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has also recognized that
United States Supreme Court applies the Eldridge standards in the context of
due process analysis for the applicable standard of proof.380
It is clear, then, that once the court in FosterFoundationdecided to address the issue of whether the clear and convincing standard of proof violates
due process guarantees, it should have performed an analysis of the factors
enumerated in Eldridge,just as the United States Supreme Court has consistently "engaged in a straight-forward consideration of the factors identified in Eldridge to determine whether a particular standard of proof in a particular proceeding satisfies due process." 38 ' Had the court undertaken this analysis, it is
unlikely that the imposition of the clear and convincing standard of proof would
have been upheld.
378

Id. at 874.

Id. See also State ex rel. Hoover v. Smith, 482 S.E.2d 124, 128 n.5 (W. Va. 1997) (articulating the same standards "outside the criminal area").
380
See Markey v. Wachtel, 264 S.E.2d 437, 442 (W. Va. 1979) ("[W]e adopted under Article
III, Section 10, the standard set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47
L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), that once a liberty or property interest is implicated, the right to some procedural due process protection arises.... the [United States Supreme] Court determined that the
standard of proof necessary to sustain an involuntary commitment must be by clear and convincing evidence but need not be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.") (citing Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979)).
381
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982).
379
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The Private Interest That Will Be Affected By the Official Action

The United States Supreme Court has held that due process places a
heightened burden of proof on the State in civil proceedings in which the "individual interests at stake . .. are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss of money."' 382 Thus, if the state had initiated a proceeding to
collect unpaid taxes against a taxpayer, it is doubtful that the state would be
required to meet the clear and convincing standard of proof, since the taxpayer's
interest is neither 'particularly important' nor 'more substantial than mere loss
of money.'
2.

The Government's Interest, Including the Function Involved
and the Fiscal and Administrative Burdens That the Additional
or Substitute Procedural Requirement Would Entail

The Tax Commissioner's response brief in the Bayer MaterialScience
case, after recognizing that Eldridge requires a balancing test when determining
whether due process requirements have been met,383 defined the government's
interest as follows:
[T]he state - in this case Kanawha County - has a critical inter-

est in the ad valorem property tax process. Taxes are the life's
blood of government. If the government cannot determine and
collect adequate tax revenues, then the government cannot perform the very functions of government and cannot provide the
essential services demanded by the public. In the instant case, if
Kanawha County cannot collect adequate tax revenues from all
sources, then law enforcement efforts may be reduced, public
schools may be impaired, and the public welfare may suffer.384
In fact, that interest is important enough to justify reversing the normal
process for depriving one of his or her property, as explained by the United
States Supreme Court in Bull v UnitedStates,385
A tax is an exaction by the sovereign, and necessarily the sovereign has an enforceable claim against every one within the taxable class for the amount lawfully due from him. The statute
prescribes the rule of taxation. Some machinery must be pro382
383

384
385

Id. at 756.
See Tax Department'sBrief OpposingAppeal, Nos. 33378, 33880, and 33881, at 10.
Id.
295 U.S. 247 (1935).
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vided for applying the rule to the facts in each taxpayer's case,
in order to ascertain the amount due. The chosen instrumentality
for the purpose is an administrative agency whose action is
called an assessment . . .. Once the tax is assessed, the taxpay-

er will owe the sovereign the amount when the date fixed by
law for payment arrives. Default in meeting the obligation calls
for some procedure whereby payment can be enforced. The statute might remit the government to an action at law wherein the
taxpayer could offer such defense as he had. A judgment
against him might be collected by the levy of an execution. But
taxes are the lifeblood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need. Time out of mind, therefore,
the sovereign has resorted to more drastic means of collection.
The assessment is given the force of a judgment, and if the
amount assessed is not paid when due, administrative officials
may seize the debtor's property to satisfy the debt.
In recognition of the fact that erroneous determinations and assessments will inevitably occur, the statutes, in a spirit of fairness, invariably afford the taxpayer an opportunity at some
stage to have mistakes rectified. Often an administrative hearing
is afforded before the assessment becomes final; or administrative machinery is provided whereby an erroneous collection
may be refunded; in some instances both administrative relief
and redress by an action against the sovereign in one of its
courts are permitted methods of restitution of excessive or illegal exaction. Thus, the usual procedure for the recovery of debts
is reversed in the field of taxation. Payment precedes defense,
and the burden of proof normally on the claimant, is shifted to
the taxpayer. The assessment supersedes the pleading, proof,
and judgment necessary in an action at law, and has the force of
such a judgment. The ordinary defendant stands in judgment
only after a hearing. The taxpayer often is afforded his hearing
after judgment and after payment, and his only redress for unjust administrative action is the right to claim restitution. But
these reversals of the normal process of collecting a claim cannot obscure the fact that after all what is being accomplished is
the recovery of a just debt owed the sovereign. If that which the
sovereign retains was unjustly taken in violation of its own statute, the withholding is wrongful. Restitution is owed the taxpayer 86

386

Id. at 259-60.
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Thus, the interest of the government, although admittedly important, is
already protected since (1) the government serves as the tribunal in the predeprivation first level adjudicative hearing; (2) the burden of initiating the action
and the burden of proof are shifted to the taxpayer; and (3) most likely, the appeals to a circuit court and Supreme Court are post-deprivation appeals, because
the government's decision at the first level hearing governs the amount of taxes
due, and the due date will probably occur before the court appeals are heard.
Finally, the substitute procedural requirement here (requiring the taxpayer to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard in place of the clear
and convincing standard) would entail no additional fiscal or administrative
burdens on the taxing authority beyond that enunciated by the court in Pocahontas Land.
3.

The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation through the Procedures
Used, and the Probable Value, if Any, of Additional or Substitute Procedural Safeguards

The hearing transcripts in the Bayer MaterialSciencecases showed that
the Commission relied on the "clear and convincing" standard not as an indication of "to what degree of probability the [taxpayer] must persuade the [Board]
that the [Tax Commissioner] was wrong,"38 7 but as a nearly insurmountable
hurdle that allows the Commission to disregard the taxpayer's evidence even
where the Tax Commissioner acknowledged errors and unreliable methodology
in valuation. Thus, the transcript reflected that the heightened standard of proof
employed by the Commission virtually guaranteed that it will rule in favor of
the taxing authority regardless of the lack of competent evidence supporting the
Tax Commissioner's initial valuations, and that in doing so, the taxpayer was
denied its right to constitutionally meaningful review. The risk of an erroneous
deprivation through the existing procedures is therefore high. The probable value of reducing the standard of proof, of course, is unknowable, but at the very
least, the simple fact that the standard is lowered should indicate to the tribunals
that a more fair hearing is required.
Given the fact that the government's admittedly important interests are
at least adequately protected by the overall process for appeals of ad valorem
tax assessments, and given the very minimal at most additional fiscal or administrative burdens on the taxing authority, fairly balancing all of these factors
would almost certainly lead to the conclusion that there is no justification for the
court's requirement that the taxpayer meet the clear and convincing standard of
proof.

387

Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S.

601, 621 (1993).
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4.

The Significance of Rules from Other States

The Supreme Court of the United States has also characterized the relevant inquiry required to determine whether a particular standard passes muster is
whether it "'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"; 38 8 if so, "'the State's
power to regulate procedural burdens [is] subject to proscription under the Due
Process Clause."' 3 89 A near-uniform application of a given standard of proof in
a certain type of case can serve as a strong indication that its application is fundamentally fair; conversely, departure from that near-uniform practice may be
considered to violate due process.
Thus, in Cooper, the fact that most other states mandated a standard that
was more protective of the defendant's rights than Oklahoma's clear and convincing evidence rule was held to support the Court's conclusion that the heightened standard offends a principle of justice that is deeply "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people. . . .,,390 By the same token, in Rivera v.
Minnich,'9 1 the Court stated that "[a] legislative judgment that is not only consistent with the 'dominant opinion' throughout the country but is also in accord
with 'the traditions of our people and our law' is entitled to a powerful presumption of validity when it is challenged under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 392 In that case, the fact that most states imposed a simple
preponderance of the evidence standard in paternity cases supported the Court's
conclusion that the preponderance standard met the requirements of due process.
As the Court pointed out in Rivera, in Addington v. Texas, the Court's rejection
of the state's argument that a preponderance standard of proof was sufficient in
a civil proceeding to commit an individual to a state mental hospital involuntarily was supported by the fact that a majority of the states had chosen to apply
either a clear and convincing standard or the even more demanding criminal law
standard. And in Santosky v. Kramer, which presented the question whether
New York could extinguish a pre-existing parent-child relationship without requiring greater factual certainty than a fair preponderance of the evidence, the
Court began its analysis by noting that thirty-eight jurisdictions required a higher standard of proof in proceedings to terminate parental rights. 93
At the point in the decision in Foster Foundation where the court decided, after a cursory review of its own prior case law, to expressly overrule
Killen, and Eastern American Energy Corp., and held that the clear and conCooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355 (1996) (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437
(1992)).
389
Id. at 367.
390
Id. at 362 (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 445).
391
483 U.S. 574 (1987).
392
Id. at 578.
3

393

Id. at 579.
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vincing standard applied in a hearing before a board of equalization and review,
the court inserted a lengthy footnote citing cases purporting to show that the
majority of jurisdictions in the United States use a clear and convincing standard
in taxpayer appeals. 3 94 A review of the cases cited, however, reveals that the
cases cited are almost equally split between those which require the intermediate
standard and those that require only the lesser standard. Justice Benjamin, in his
dissent, also cited a list of cases and statutes from other jurisdictions that he
used as a basis to conclude that other jurisdictions were inconsistent in which
standard was applicable, and that legislatures were more likely than courts to
choose the lesser standard. Unfortunately, both lists are incomplete, and both
include irrelevant cases which have nothing to do with property tax appeals.
The majority cited seven states that purportedly use a clear and convincing standard. However, the legislatures in two of those seven states (Illinois and
Oregon) have since lowered the standard for valuation appeals to the lower preponderance of the evidence standard since the cases cited by the majority were
decided. 9 In his dissent, Justice Benjamin correctly identified Oregon as one
of the states using the lower standard.39 6 Washington has also legislatively
changed its standard since the case cited by the majority was decided. The new
standard in that state is a mixed bag:
An assessor's valuation of property for tax purposes is presumed correct. This presumption may be overcome, however, if
the taxpayer presents clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
that the property was overvalued. Once the taxpayer overcomes
the presumption that an assessor's overall valuation technique is
correct, the standard of proof shifts to a preponderance of the
evidence for all issues.397

In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 163 n.20
(W. Va. 2008).
39s
See Winnebago Cnty. Bd. Of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 728 N.E.2d 1256, 1259-60
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Precision Powder Coating, Inc. v. Clackamas Cnty. Assessor, No. TC-MD
070690D, 2008 WL 1159327, at *1 (Or. T.C. 2008).
396
In his dissent, Justice Benjamin also identified Illinois as a state that uses the clear and convincing standard in valuation disputes, citing Leadertreks, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 895 N.E.2d
683 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). That case, however, was a dispute over whether a taxpayer qualified for
an exemption, which in Illinois does require the higher standard of proof. A similar rule exists in
West Virginia. The general rule is that taxing statutes will be strictly construed against the State
and in favor of the taxpayer; however, an exception to this general rule applies where the taxpayer
is claiming an exemption from taxation. See Ballard's Farm Sausage, Inc. v. Dailey, 246 S.E.2d
265 (W. Va. 1978). Although later in his opinion, Justice Benjamin recognized that a State may
apply a "lesser burden for one issue, such as assessments, and a more stringent burden for another
issue," he failed to recognize that Leadertreks applies only to the issue of whether an exemption
applies, but not to the issue of value.
3
See Washington Beef, Inc. v. Cnty. of Yakima, 177 P.3d 162, 174-75 (Wash. Ct. App.
2008).
394
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Justice Benjamin also specified Washington as a state that uses the clear
and convincing standard, but that is clearly an oversimplification. For example,
in Washington Beef Inc. v. County of Yakima 398 because the taxpayer proved by
clear and convincing evidence that the cost approach used by the County Assessor did not recognize economic obsolescence, he had only to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard to prove the amount of economic obsolescence
present. It was simply inaccurate, then, for the majority to list Illinois, Oregon,
and Washington as states applying the higher standard in valuation cases.
The majority also includes New Jersey as a state using the higher standard, but the cited case doesn't deal with property taxes or even with taxes at all.
Rather, that case deals with special assessments levied by a municipality to
reimburse it for the costs of paving streets and installing curbs. Like New Jersey, many states make a distinction between fees and taxes; the distinction is
based on the following definition: "[t]he primary purpose of a tax is to obtain
revenue for the government, while the primary purpose of a fee is to cover the
expense of providing a service or of regulation and supervision of certain activities." 39 9 The level of scrutiny that a court will bring to bear often depends into
which category the challenged assessment falls.400 Since the challenged assessment in New Jersey was treated as a fee, the standard of proof there has no bearing on the issue before West Virginia's Court. And in fact, the proper standard
in New Jersey is much closer to the preponderance of the evidence standard.401
Thus, only three (Nebraska, Nevada, and Tennessee) of the seven states
identified by the majority as requiring a taxpayer to meet the clear and convincing standard actually do so. In another three, the Legislature has changed the
standard since the cases cited by the majority were decided, and in one state, the
case cited had nothing to do with property tax valuation appeals. Justice Benjamin identified Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, and Maine as states that use
the clear and convincing standard. In fact, none of the cases he cited were di398

Id.
River Falls v. St. Bridget's Catholic Church, 513 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
400
For example, West Virginia restricts a municipality's ability to impose either to situations
specifically authorized by the legislature. Generally speaking, the courts are less likely to overturn fees, while taxes are subject to closer scrutiny. See City of Huntington v. Bacon, 473 S.E.2d
743 (W. Va. 1996). In West Virginia, ordinances enacted pursuant to a municipality's powers
granted by the legislature are presumptively valid and a court should not invalidate such an ordinance unless it is clearly unreasonable. The burden of proof lies with the appellant to prove that the
user fee is clearly unreasonable and that it clearly fails to reasonably serve the purpose for which
it was enacted. Cooper v. City of Charleston, 624 S.E.2d 716 (W. Va. 2005). The opposite rule
applies to taxes. See Ballard's,246 S.E.2d at 265.
401
See Cohn v. Livingston Twp., 18 N.J. Tax 429 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1999) ("There is a presumption
of correctness in favor of the [county board of taxation's] aforementioned 1996 judgment, which
can be 'overcome by sufficient competent evidence of true value of the property.' Similarly, there
is a presumption of validity that attaches to the 1997, 1998, and 1999 assessments [a city's assessments] which also may be overcome 'by offering evidence of the true value of the property
'based on sound theory and objective data, rather than on mere wishful thinking."' City of Atlantic City v. Ace Gaming, LLC, 23 N.J.Tax 70, 98 (2006) (citations omitted)).
3
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rectly on point; all of those states come much closer to using the preponderance
of the evidence standard.402
The majority opinion concluded that five states use the lower preponderance of the evidence standard (Colorado, Florida, Maine, Missouri, and Virginia),403 and one (New York) uses a "substantial evidence" standard that may
be even less demanding that the preponderance of the evidence standard.40 4 The
court's research wasn't better here either; Florida uses a mixed standard similar
to Washington' s,4 05 as does Virginia. 40 6 More complete research reveals that
only four states (including West Virginia) 407 mandate that a taxpayer meet the
clear and convincing standard at the first adjudicatory level, and one mandates a
standard that seems to be even less stringent than a preponderance of the evidence.40 8 Three other states use a mixed standard; that is, a heightened standard
in some circumstances and a relaxed standard in others. 40 9 On the other hand,
twenty-one states have adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard, 4 10
See ALA. CODE 1975 § 40-3-19; A.R.C.A. § 26-27-317; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Board of
Tax Review of W. Hartford, 699 A.2d 81 (Conn. 1997); Frank v. Assessors of Skowhegan, 329
A.2d 167, 172 (Me. 1974).
403
In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 163 n.20

402

(W. Va. 2008).
404

id
See FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (2009).
406
See Keswick Club, L.P. v. Cnty. of Albemarle, 639 S.E.2d 243, 250 (Va. 2007) ("[W]here
the taxing authority failed to consider and properly reject the other approaches, [it] is not entitled
to a presumption of validity. Therefore, the taxpayer was required only to show that the county's
assessment was erroneous, not that the county committed manifest error or disregarded controlling
evidence in making its assessment.") (citations omitted).
407 Nebraska (see Brenner v. Banner Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 753 N.W.2d 802, 813 (Neb.
2008)); Nevada (see Nevada ex rel. State Bd. of Equalization v. Bakst, 148 P.3d 717, 721 (Nev.
2006). Ironically though, the legal issue in Bakst was the same as one raised by Bayer: whether a
valid methodology was used to appraise the taxpayer's property. Unlike Bayer's case, however,
the court addressed that issue in Nevada-in fact, it ruled that the assessment was invalid because
the method used had been invented by the county and had not been promulgated by the Tax Department. Even though that method may have conformed to generally accepted appraisal practices
(as clearly was not true in Bayer MaterialScience), it could not have been applied uniformly
throughout the state since only one county used it. Tennessee (see Hilloak Realty Co. v. Chumley, 233 S.W.3d 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); and now, West Virginia.
408
North Carolina (see In re Owens, 547 S.E.2d 827, 829 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) ("the taxpayer
carries the burden to show that an illegal or arbitrary method of valuation was used, and that the
assessed value substantially exceeds the property's fair market value").
409
Virginia (see Keswick Club, L.P., 639 S.E.2d 243); Washington (see Washington Beef, Inc.
v. Yakima, 177 P.3d 162 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008)); and Florida (see FLA. STAT. § 194.301 (2009)).
410
California (see California Minerals v. Kern, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)) ("[Before the AAB, the taxpayer must prevail by] the production of a preponderance of competent
evidence of another value");
Colorado (see COLO. REv. STAT. § 39-8-107) (new statute passed pursuant to article X, section 20
of the Colorado Constitution, called the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, or "TABOR," which eliminates
the presumption in favor of any pending valuation); see also Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Samp405
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son, 105 P.3d 198, 204 (Colo. 2005) ("A taxpayer who protests a residential property tax assessment in a Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA) proceeding has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property assessment is incorrect");
Georgia (see OCGA § 48-5-311 (e)4) ("The determination by the county board of tax assessors of
questions of factual characteristics of the property under appeal, as opposed to questions of value,
shall be prima-facie correct in any appeal to the county board of equalization. However, the board
of tax assessors shall have the burden of proving their opinions of value and the validity of their
proposed assessment by a preponderance of evidence."); § 48-5-311 (g)(3) ("The appeal [to superior court] shall constitute a de novo action. The board of tax assessors shall have the burden of
proving their opinions of value and the validity of their proposed assessment by a preponderance
of evidence. Upon a failure of the board of tax assessors to meet such burden of proof, the court
may, upon motion or sua sponte, authorize the finding that the value asserted by the taxpayer is
unreasonable and authorize the determination of the final value of the property"). Note: not only
does Georgia use the lower standard of proof by statute, but the burden of proof is on the state, not
the taxpayer).
Idaho (see IDAHO CODE § 63-511(4)) ("In any appeal taken to the board of tax appeals or the
district court pursuant to this section, the burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking affirmative relief to establish that the valuation from which the appeal is taken is erroneous, or that the
board of equalization erred in its decision regarding a claim that certain property is exempt from
taxation, the value thereof, or any other relief sought before the board of equalization. A preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to sustain the burden of proof.");
Illinois (see Peacock v. Illinois Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 792 N.E.2d 367, 376 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)
("a plaintiffs claim of excessive assessment must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.");
Iowa (see Post Week Cable, Inc. v. Bd. of Review of Woodbuy Cnty., 497 N.W.2d 810, 813
(Iowa 1993); IOWA CODE § 441.21 ("[T]he complainant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the challenged valuation is excessive, inadequate, or capricious.");
Kansas (see Saline Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'r v. Jensen, 88 P.3d 242 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004);
K.S.A. 79-2005(i) ("[l]t shall be the duty of the county appraiser to initiate the production of
evidence to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, the validity and correctness of such
determination.");
Kentucky (see Ky. Rev. Stat. § 13B.090 (1996)). The ultimate burden of persuasion in all administrative hearings is met by a preponderance of evidence in the record. Note: The KBTA is an
"administrative review agency" endowed with exclusive jurisdiction over certain appeals from
rulings and orders affecting revenue and taxation.
Maryland (see A.S. Abell Co. v. State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation, 1965 WL 118 (Md.
Tax, 1965) ("With respect to the weight of evidence, it is true, of course, that a mere surmise or
conjecture that it was sufficient would not be enough. The comparative degree of proof by which
a case must be established is the same in an administrative as in a civil judicial proceeding, i.e. a
preponderance of the evidence is necessary.") (quoting Bernstein v. Real Estate Comm'n, 221
Md. 221, 230 (1959) (citations omitted));
Michigan (see Prof 1Plaza, LLC v. Detroit, 647 N.W.2d 529 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Matthews v.
Grand Ledge, MTT No. 190382, 1996 WL 172549 (1996) (while conclusive presumption of validity of assessment cannot be made, burden of proof in property tax valuation proceeding is on
taxpayer to establish, with preponderance of evidence, true cash value of property (before Tax
Tribunal));
Minnesota (see U Haul Real Estate Co. v. Cnty. Of Dakota, 2008 WL 650290 (Minn. Tax. Ct.
2008) (taxpayer has burden to overcome by the introduction of credible evidence as to the subject
property's market value));
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Mississippi (see Miss. State Tax Comm'n v. ANR Pipeline Co., 806 So. 2d 1081 (Miss. 2001);
McArdle's Estate v. Jackson, 61 So. 2d 400 (Miss. 1952); MIss. CODE § 27-77-7(4) (2006)) (taxpayer had burden of proving excessiveness of tax assessment by preponderance of evidence (same
as in all civil cases));
Missouri (see Mo. REV. STAT. § 138.060 (eliminating presumption that Assessor's value is correct); Indus. Dev. Auth. of Kan. City v. State Tax Comm'n of Mo., 804 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991) ("The taxpayer in a Commission tax appeal still bears the burden of proof and must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was improperly classified or valued.");
New Hampshire (see Porter v. Sanbomton, 840 A.2d 778, 783 (N.H. 2003) ("To succeed on their
tax abatement claim, the plaintiffs have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that they are paying more than their proportional share of taxes.");
New York (see NYCO Minerals, Inc. v. Lewis, 745 N.Y.S.2d 268, 268 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
("In a proceeding to reduce tax assessment, a real property owner who hurdles the low substantial
evidence threshold, where weight and credibility of evidence are not considered, extinguishes the
assessor's presumption of validity, but still maintains the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the assessment is excessive.");
North Dakota (see Mills v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'n of Burleigh Cnty., 305 N.W.2d 832, 833-34
(N.D. 1981) ("Pursuant to the pertinent provisions of Section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C., we must affirm
the decision of the administrative agency unless we find: . . ."'5. The findings of fact made by the
agency are not supported by the preponderance of the evidence."');
Oregon (see OR. REv. STAT. §305.427 (2005); Precision Powder Coating, Inc. v. Clackamas Cnty.
Assessor, 2008 WL 1159327 (Or. Tax Magistrate Div., 2008) ("In all proceedings before the
judge or a magistrate of the tax court and upon appeal therefrom, a preponderance of the evidence
shall suffice to sustain the burden of proof. The burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking
affirmative relief and the burden of going forward with the evidence shall shift as in other civil
litigation. Taxpayers must provide competent evidence of the RMV of their property.") (citations
omitted));
Rhode Island (see R.I. Gen. Laws §8-8-28 (1984) ("In all tax cases before the court, and upon
appeal therefrom, a preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to sustain the burden of proof The
burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking affirmative relief and the burden of going forward with the evidence shall shift as in other civil litigation. In any proceedings in which the
division of taxation alleges fraud or an exception to the normal statute of limitations on assessment, the burden of proof in respect of that issue shall be upon the division of taxation. To be
sustained on the issue of fraud, the division of taxation must sustain a burden of clear and convincing proof."));
Texas (see TEX. TAX CODE § 41.43(a) ("[T]he appraisal district has the burden of establishing the
value of the property by a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing. If the appraisal
district fails to meet that standard, the protest shall be determined in favor of the property
. If in the protest relating to a property with a market or appraised value of $1 million or
owner...
less and the property owner delivers to the chief appraiser a copy of an appraisal of the property
that supports the appraised or market value of the property asserted by the property owner, the
appraisal district has the burden of establishing the value of the property by clear and convincing
evidence presented at the hearing.");
Utah (see UTAH CODE § 59-1-604 (1992) ("In [de novo] proceedings of the district court under this
part and on appeal therefrom, a preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to sustain the burden
of proof."); see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 590 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979)
("[W]here the taxpayer claims error, it has an obligation not only to show substantial error or
impropriety in the assessment, but also to provide a sound evidentiary basis upon which the
Commission could adopt a lower valuation."));
Wyoming (see BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Wyo. Dep't of Revenue, 112 P.3d 596, 598 (Wyo. 2005)
("The petitioner, however, by challenging the valuation, bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to
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and fifteen others use a similarly relaxed standard. 4 1' The fact that most states
imposed a simple preponderance of the evidence standard for tax appeals, then,
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the valuation was not derived in accordance with
the required constitutional and statutory requirements for valuing state-assessed property").
411
Alabama (see ALA. CODE § 40-3-25) (taxpayer must present competent evidence);
Alaska (see ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.210(b)) (proof of unequal, excessive, improper, or under
valuation based on the facts that are stated in a valid, written appeal or proven at the appeal hearing; the burden then shifts to the taxing authority to introduce credible evidence which substantiates its assessment);
Arizona (see Suncor Dev. Co. v. Maricopa Cnty., 788 P.2d 136 (Ariz. 1990)) ("evidence satisfactory to the court"; evidence expressing an opinion of value must, at the least, be by testimony
presented by an expert qualified by the Court. Furthermore, the taxpayer must introduce documentary evidence in support of any opinion on valuation offered);
Arkansas (see ARK. CODE § 26-27-317; Doniphan Lumber Co. v. Cleburne Cnty., 212 S.W. 308
(Ark. 1919) ("[T]he burden is on the petitioner to show by proof that the valuations placed upon
the several tracts were unfair and inequitable when compared with the valuations placed upon
other lands of the same kind and character similarly situated.");
Connecticut (see Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Bd. of Tax Review of W. Hartford, 699 A.2d 81, 85
(Conn. 1997) ("Mere overvaluation is sufficient to justify redress under [§ 12-117a], and the court
is not limited to a review of whether an assessment has been unreasonable or discriminatory or has
resulted in substantial overvaluation."));
Maine (see Frank v. Assessors of Skowhegan, 329 A.2d 167 (Me. 1974) ("Unless it was error of
law for the assessors to employ the appraisal approach which they used, it was the burden of the
taxpayer in the Court below to establish by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that (a) The
conclusion as to value reached by the assessors was so unreasonable in the light of circumstances
that the property was substantially overvalued and injustice resulted, or (b) that the assessment
was in some way fraudulent, dishonest or illegal."));
Massachusetts (see Donlon v. Bd of Assessors of Holliston, 453 N.E.2d 395, 401 (Mass. 1983)
("where the taxpayer introduces persuasive evidence of overvaluation, a decision of the board in
favor of the assessors must be supported by substantial evidence.... The taxpayer may present
persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method
of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors'
valuation") (citations omitted));
New Jersey (see Cohn v. Livingston Township, 18 N.J. Tax 429 (1999) ("There is a presumption
of correctness in favor of the [county board of taxation's] aforementioned 1996 judgment, which
can be "overcome by sufficient competent evidence of true value of the property."). Similarly,
there is a presumption of validity that attaches to the 1997, 1998, and 1999 assessments which
also may be overcome "by offering evidence of the true value of the property 'based on sound
theory and objective data, rather than on mere wishful thinking."' Id. (citing Atlantic City v. Ace
Gaming, LLC, 23 N.J.Tax 70 (2006) (citations omitted)). "The Tax Court may consider reliable
evidence from a pro se litigant, even though such evidence is not derived from expert opinion."

Id.
New Mexico (see Hannahs v. Anderson, 966 P.2d 168, 174 (N.M. 1998) ("Taxpayers challenging
their assessments have burden of rebutting presumption that assessor's valuation is correct by
showing that assessor did not follow statutory provisions or by presenting evidence tending to
dispute factual correctness of valuation."); see also Protest of Plaza Del Sol Ltd. P'ship v. Assessor for Bernalillo, 717 P.2d 1123 (N.M. Ct. App.1986) ("A review board hearing a taxpayer's
protest sits in a quasi-judicial capacity, and in arriving at a change of valuation, its decision must
be based upon competent evidence."));
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is a powerful indication that fundamental fairness leads toward the conclusion
that the imposition of a heightened clear and convincing standard by West Virginia is improper and unfair.
E.

In Bayer MaterialScience, the Court Failedto Address Bayer's Arguments and Evidence

The first striking aspect of the court's decision in Bayer MaterialScience is that the court significantly misstated Bayer's arguments as to the proper standard of proof. The court incorrectly stated that "Bayer asserts that requiring taxpayers to prove by clear and convincing evidence the erroneousness of
their tax assessments is unconstitutional because the Tax Commissioner is not

Ohio (see Springfield Local Bd. of Educ. v. Summit Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 628 N.E.2d 1365
(Ohio 1994) ("Neither a property valuation of a county auditor nor that of a board of revision is
entitled to a presumption of validity. A taxpayer has the initial burden to establish the right to a
reduction when challenging a county auditor's property valuation."); see also Amsdell v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bd. of Revision, 574, 635 N.E.2d 11 (Ohio 1994) ("The auditor's duty to defend his
valuation is triggered once the taxpayer does present competent, probative evidence to support a
right to a reduction"));
Oklahoma (see Park East Ltd. Co. v. Gordon, 82 P.3d 1031 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003) ("[B]y statute,
a taxpayer can appeal a decision of a county BOE to a district court de novo, which has been
interpreted as eliminating the presumption that the assessment is correct when the taxpayer appeals (but not when the assessor appeals). The burden is on the taxpayer appellant to produce
competent evidence to justify a change in value.");
Pennsylvania (see Jackson v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Cumberland Cnty, 950 A.2d 1081
(Pa. Commnw. Ct. 2008); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5020-518.1 ("[T]he taxing authority first presents
its assessment record into evidence, establishing the presumed validity of the assessment; the
burden then shifts to the taxpayer to present sufficient competent, credible and relevant evidence
of the fair market value of the property to overcome the taxing authority's assessment records, and
if the taxpayer does so, the tax assessment record loses the weight previously afforded to it and the
taxing authority can no longer rely solely on the assessment record unless it is willing to run the
risk of having the trial court believe the taxpayer's proof."));
South Dakota (see Burke v. Butte Cnty., 640 N.W.2d 473 (S.D. 2002); S.D.CODIED LAWS 10-633, 10-6-33.1. ("There is a presumption that tax officials act in accordance with the law and not
arbitrarily or unfairly when assessing property, and the taxpayer bears the burden to overcome this
presumption; to do so, taxpayer must produce sufficient evidence to show the assessed valuation
was in excess of true and full value, lacked uniformity in the same class, or was discriminatory."));
Vermont (see 32 VT. STAT. §§ 4461, 4467; Jeffer v. Chester,417 A.2d 937 (Vt. 1980) ("Once
town introduces appraisal of taxpayer's property into evidence in tax appeals, burden is on taxpayer to overcome presumption and burden can be satisfied by introduction of credible evidence
fairly and reasonably tending to show that property is assessed at more than fair market value or
that assessment is at higher percentage of fair market value than comparable properties."))
Wisconsin (see WIS. STAT. § 70.47(8)(i); ABKA Ltd. v. Bd. of Review of Vill. of Fontana-OnGeneva Lake, 603 N.W.2d 217 (Wis. 1999) ("The board shall presume that the assessor's valuation is correct. That presumption may be rebutted by a sufficient showing by the objector that the
valuation is incorrect.")).
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held to a correspondingstandard"412 and again when it noted that "Bayer's assignment of error on this point challenges both its burden of proof, i.e., by clear
and convincing evidence, and its burden of persuasion insofar as neither the
Tax Commissioner nor the Assessor are requiredto prove the correctness of
their assessments."A13
As was discussed previously, Bayer asserted that the clear and convincing standard of proof per se results in a denial of due process. By contrast, the
Foster Foundation argued that the relative burdens of production were unfair;
that is, that it was unfair to require the taxpayer to introduce a written appraisal
by a licensed professional real estate appraiser and present that appraiser's testimony, while requiring the Assessor to present only oral testimony of an unlicensed person and while requiring the County Commission to produce no evidence to support the value that it ultimately selected, apparently out of thin air.
Since Bayer didn't object to the disparate burdens of production, there
was no reason for the court to address this issue in Bayer MaterialScience. Yet
the court did exactly that, and in the process introduced confusing new terminology-the burden of persuasion:
We have repeatedly recognized, though, that it is customary to
require the party seeking relief to carry the burden of persuasion: "[i]t is a well-established rule of law that in civil actions
the party seeking relief must prove his right thereto." Boury v.
Hamm, 156 W.Va. 44, 52, 190 S.E.2d 13, 18 (1972). Accordingly,
when a plaintiff comes into court in a civil action he must, to
justify a verdict in his favor, establish his case .... The burden
of proof, meaning the duty to establish the truth of the
claim .

. . ,

rests upon him from the beginning, and does not

shift, as does the duty of presenting all the evidence bearing on
the issue as the case progresses.
Burk v. Huntington Dev. & Gas Co., 133 W.Va. 817, 830, 58
S.E.2d 574, 581 (1950), modified on other grounds, Foster v.
City of Keyser, 202 W.Va. 1, 501 S.E.2d 165 (1997). See also
Mayhew v. Mayhew, 205 W.Va. 490, 497 n. 15, 519 S.E.2d 188,
195 n. 15 (1999) (explaining differences between burden of
proof and burden of persuasion).4 14

412

Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Comm'r, 672 S.E. 2d 174, 185 (W. Va. 2008)

(emphasis added).
413
Id (emphasis added).
414 Id.
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Mayhew v. Mayhew explained the difference between the burden of persuasion and the burden of production, a distinction that the court failed to grasp.
Neither Bayer nor the Foster Foundation objected to the fact that the taxpayer
bears the burden of proof/burden of persuasion, nor did either object to the fact
that the taxpayer bears the initial burden of production to establish that the Assessor or Tax Commissioner's value is excessive. Finally, neither suggested
that that burden of proof/burden of persuasion ever shifted to the taxing authority. As explained above, however, according to PocahontasLand, the burden of
production does shift to the taxing authority once the taxpayer meets its burden
of production to show that the assessment is excessive. Just as the conclusion
that the burden of proof/burden of persuasion doesn't shift to the taxing authority failed to address the Foster Foundation's claim that the disparate burdens of
production were unfair, that conclusion sheds no light on Bayer's claim that the
standard of proof violates due process.
Unlike the taxpayer in Foster Foundation, in Bayer MaterialScience
Bayer did assert, at every step in the process, that the clear and convincing standard of proof violates due process. It argued that a careful reading of the West
Virginia Supreme Court's earlier case law showed that the court distinguished
between the standard of proof before a board of equalization and review and the
standard of review before a circuit court, and that it was only in the court's later
cases where that distinction became much less clear. Therefore, it urged the
Supreme Court to reaffirm its syllabus point in Killen holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard is applicable before a board of equalization and
review. In Foster, the court ignored this argument and simply found that its
prior case law was inconsistent and overruled Killen and Eastern American
Energy.
Bayer also asserted that, under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Concrete Pipe that there is "a substantial question of procedural fairness
under the Due Process Clause" where, as here, a challenging party is required to
show the "findings to be either 'unreasonable or clearly erroneous"' at the first
level of adjudication, 415 and that, as where "possible bias" exists, applying a
heightened standard of proof "deprive[s] [the challenging party] of the impartial
adjudication in the first instance to which it is entitled under the Due Process
Clause."416 Bayer clearly demonstrated the bias of the Kanawha County Commission, both with references to a county commission's constitutional and statutory fiscal responsibilities, and with quotes to the transcript showing at least one
county commissioner's overriding focus on those responsibilities. 4 17 In Foster,
the court correctly observed that Concrete Pipe justified a conclusion that there
was nothing unconstitutional about requiring the taxpayer to bear the burden of
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S.
602, 626 (1993) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
416
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
417
See Brief of Appellants at 22-25, Bayer MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Commissioner,
415

672 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 2008) (No. 33881).
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proof, but then overlooked the section in Concrete Pipe dealing with the standardof proof.
In contrast to the Foster case, then, Bayer presented the West Virginia
Supreme Court with a filly developed record in which the issue of the constitutionality of the heightened standard of proof had been raised and argued at every
level. The court had before it the arguments of counsel and the opinion of the
circuit court on this issue specifically. In the end, however, the court addressed
none of the arguments or evidence adduced by Bayer that had not been advanced in Foster. Instead, in its per curium decision, the court simply recited
that in Fosterit "determined . .. that the burden of proof a taxpayer challenging
an erroneous tax assessment must sustain is by clear and convincing evidence,
It then observed that
not by a preponderance of the evidence. ...
[w]e also considered, in Foster, a constitutional challenge that
is identical to that raised by Bayer in the case sub judice, i.e.,
whether requiring an appealing taxpayer to prove his/her claim
for relief by clear and convincing evidence denies him/her due
process. In Foster,we found no denial of due process and concluded that requiring an appealing taxpayer to prove his/her entitlement to relief by clear and convincing evidence was constitutional:
Requiring a taxpayer challenging a [generally accepted appraisal practice] property tax assessment in accordance with W.
Va.Code § 11-3-24 (1979) (Repl.Vol.2008) to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the assessor's assessment is erroneous does not violate the constitutional due process protections
provided by section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution or by section ten of Article III of the
West Virginia Constitution.4 19
Finally, the court held that
Applying this holding to the case sub judice, we likewise find
no constitutional infirmity with the clear and convincing burden
of proof required to be borne by Bayer in challenging its tax assessments. Because it was proper to require Bayer to prove that
its tax assessments were erroneous by clear and convincing evidence and because it was not denied due process by requiring it
to satisfy this burden of proof, we affirm the circuit court's rulings insofar as they determined that Bayer was not denied due
Bayer MaterialScience,672 S.E.2d at 185 (citing Syl. pt. 5, In re Tax Assessment of Foster
Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 2008)).
419
Id. at 186 (citing Syl. pt. 6, Foster,672 S.E.2d 150).
418
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process of law in the underlying proceedings challenging the
correctness of its tax assessments.4 20
In summary, the court in Foster had no reason to address whether the
imposition of the heightened clear and convincing standard of proof per se constitutes a denial of due process, because the Foster Foundation did not raise or
argue that issue. Rather, the court in Foster should have ruled that neither the
Assessor nor the County Commission adequately supported their values and
should have reversed the decision of the circuit court on that basis alone. It
should have left the issue of the unfairness of the disparate standards of proof
that actually was raised by the Foster Foundation to a later day-although, it
has, in effect, done so by the sheer incomprehensibility of its decision in that
regard.
In Bayer MaterialScience, where the issue of whether the imposition of
the heightened clear and convincing standard of proofper se constitutes a denial
of due process was raised, argued, and fully briefed, the court should have balanced the factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in Eldridge
and concluded that there is no reason to impose a higher standard of proof on
either party, and that the taxpayer has the burden or proving by a simple preponderance of the evidence that the taxing authority's assessment is excessive.
Such an outcome would have been consistent with the rule in the vast majority
of jurisdictions in the United States. More careful legal research and precise
usage of the terms "burden of proof," "standard of proof," and "standard of review" and a coherent discussion of how these terms are related would have been
desirable as well.
Recent Cases Affirming the Holding in Bayer MaterialScience and Foster

F.

On several occasions since the decisions in Bayer MaterialScience and
Foster were released, the court has reaffirmed that the clear and convincing
standard of proof is applicable in hearings before a county commission sitting as
a board of equalization and review in valuation appeals. 421 Also, in Bayer
420

id.

See, e.g., Tax Assessment Against Purple Turtle, LLC v. Gooden, 679 S.E.2d 587, 594 n.8
(W. Va. 2009) (("If subsequent litigation of the tax assessment on the subject property is undertaken, the trial court should remain cognizant of the evidentiary principles announced by this Court
in the recent opinions of In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 223
W.Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (2008), and Bayer MaterialScience,LLC v. State Tax Comm'r, 223
W.Va. 38, 672 S.E.2d 174 (2008), requiring that a taxpayer challenging an assessment must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the assessment is erroneous."); Stone Brook Ltd. v. Sisinni,
688 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 2009) ("The burden is on the taxpayer challenging the assessment to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the tax assessment is erroneous." Syl. pt. 2, in
part, Western PocahontasProps., Ltd. v. County Comm'n of Wetzel County, 189 W.Va. 322, 431
S.E.2d 661. Accord Syl. pt. 7, In re Tax Assessments Against PocahontasLand Co., 172 W.Va.
53, 303 S.E.2d 691 ("It is a general rule that valuations for taxation purposes fixed by an assessing
421
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Corp., the court held that "a taxpayer seeking relief from an erroneous tax assessment under W. Va.Code § 11-3-27 (2000) (Repl.Vol.2008) (commonly
known as an exoneration), must establish entitlement to relief by clear and convincing evidence."422
In each of those cases, however, Justice Benjamin reaffirmed his belief
that there is no justification for applying a higher standard of proof on the taxpayer than applies to the taxing authorities. For example, in a concurring opinion in Tax Assessment Against Purple Turtle, LLC v. Gooden, supra, he ex-

plained:
I write separately, however, to again underscore my disagreement with the continuing disparity which currently exists regarding the proof burdens of the State and of its citizens in
property tax assessment cases in West Virginia.FN1 Absent reliance on some vague statist doctrine of a superceding governmental entitlement to the fruits of one's labors, there is no compelling or even rational basis to permit the State a lesser burden
of proof in the taking of a citizen's property (in the form of tax
payments) than there is for the citizen in keeping his or her
property.
officer are presumed to be correct. The burden of showing an assessment to be erroneous is, of
course, upon the taxpayer, and proof of such fact must be clear."); Mountain Am., LLC v. Huffman, 687 S.E.2d 768, 783 (W. Va. 2009). Syllabus point 6 of Mountain America quotes Syllabus
point 6 of Foster("Requiring a taxpayer challenging a property tax assessment in accordance with
W. Va.Code § 11-3-24 (1979)(Repl. Vo. 2008) to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
assessor's assessment is erroneous does not violate the constitutional due process protections
provided by section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or by
section ten of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution."). Syllabus point 9 of Mountain America quotes syllabus point 8 of Bayer MaterialScience('As a general rule, there is a presumption
that valuations for taxation purposes fixed by an assessor are correct . . . . The burden is on the
taxpayer challenging the assessments to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the tax
assessment is erroneous.' Syllabus point 2, in part, W. PocahontasProp. Ltd. v. C'nty. Commission of Wetzel County, 189 W.Va. 322, 431 S.E.2d 661 (1993)."). Finally, syllabus point 10 of
Mountain America, quotes syllabus point 5 in Foster.
422
State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha Cnty. v. Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d 282, 291
(W. Va. 2008). Note that Bayer Corp. and Foster were decided on the same day. Consequently,
the issue of the proper standard of proof didn't get a lot of attention in the exoneration case:
We have recently held that a party challenging a tax assessment under W.
Va.Code § 11-3-24 (1979) (Repl.Vol.2008) must show by clear and convincing evidence that he/she is entitled to relief. See Syl. pts. 5 & 6, In Re: Tax
Assessment of Foster Foundation's Woodlands Retirement Community, 223
W.Va. 14, 672 S.E.2d 150 (2008). We can discern no justification for applying separate burdens of proof for assessment issues raised under W. Va.Code
§ 11-3-24 and assessment issues brought under W. Va.Code § 11-3-27. Consequently we hold that a taxpayer seeking relief from an erroneous tax assessment under W. Va.Code § 11-3-27 (2000) (Repl.Vol.2008), must establish
entitlement to relief by clear and convincing evidence.
Id.
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FN1. Pursuant to this Court's decision in In re Tax Assessment
of Foster Foundation's Woodlands Retirement, 223 W.Va. 14,
672 S.E.2d 150 (2008), the State need only meet a preponderancy burden of proof in tax assessment cases, whereas a citizen
seeking to keep his property (in the form of tax payments) must
meet a higher clear and convincing burden of proof. Foster
Foundation's Woodlands, at Syl. Pt. 5. As set forth in my dissenting opinion therein, I believe such a disparity is constitutionally impermissible. In re Tax Assessment of FosterFoundation's Woodlands Retirement, supra (J. Benjamin, dissenting).423
And in Mountain America, Justice Benjamin, writing for the majority,
adhered to the majority rule, although he did add a note stating that "while the
author of this opinion may personally disagree with the clear and convincing
burden of proof standard imposed upon taxpayers appealing ad valorem property tax assessments, it is observed that the instant case is governed by the principles of stare decisis.A 2 4 So far, however, he has been unable to persuade any
other justices to adopt his view on this point.
G.

Changes to the Standardof Proofin SB 401

West Virginia Code section 11-3-25(e) now provides that "[a]ll persons
applying for relief to the circuit court under this section shall be governed by the
same presumptions, burdens and standards of proof as established by law for
taxpayers applying for such relief." In other words, the Legislature explicitly
assured county officials that their unfair advantage in the applicable presumptions and standards of proof will continue unchanged.
V. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW BEFORE A CIRCUIT COURT IN CERTIORARI
In In re Tax Assessment Against American Bituminous Power Partners,
L.P., the court specified in detail the procedure for obtaining judicial review of
an adverse ruling by a board of equalization and review in a valuation appeal:
Gooden, 679 S.E.2d at 594; see also Stone Brook Ltd. v. Sisinni, 688 S.E.2d 300, 316 (W.
Va. 2009) (Benjamin, J., concurring) ("I again write separately to underscore my belief that the
disparity regarding the proof burdens of the State and of its citizens in property tax assessment
cases in West Virginia is constitutionally impermissible."); Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d at 297 ("For
the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in In re Tax Assessment of Foster Foundation's
Woodlands Retirement, No. 33891, 1 respectfully concur and dissent in this case. I believe that the
proper burden of proof for a taxpayer in a case such as this is that the taxpayer meet a 'preponderancy of the evidence' burden").
424
Mountain Am., LLC v. Huffman, 687 S.E.2d 768, 782 n.18, citing In re Tax Assessment of
Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 672 S.E.2d 150, 152 (W. Va. 2008) (Benjamin, J. dissenting)).

423
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Upon receiving an adverse determination before the county
commission, a taxpayer has a statutory right to judicial review
before the circuit court. W. Va.Code § 11-3-25 (1967). The statute provides little in the way of guidance as to the scope of
judicial review, although it does expressly limit review to the
record made before the county commission. Given this limitation, we have previously indicated that review before the circuit
court is confined to determining whether the challenged property valuation is supported by substantial evidence, see Killen v.
Logan County Comm'n, 170 W.Va. 602, 295 S.E.2d 689 (1982),
or otherwise in contravention of any regulation, statute, or constitutional provision, see In re Tax Assessments Against the
Southern Land Co., 143 W.Va. 152, 100 S.E.2d 555 (1957),
overruled on other grounds, In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 144
W.Va. 346, 109 S.E.2d 649 (1959). As this Court's previous
cases suggest, and as we have recognized in other contexts involving taxation, e.g., Frymier-Halloranv. Paige, 193 W.Va.
687, 695, 458 S.E.2d 780, 788 (1995), judicial review of a decision of a board of equalization and review regarding a challenged tax-assessment valuation is limited to roughly the same
scope permitted under the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act, W. Va.Code ch. 29A. 5
By contrast, the Court in Bayer Corp. ruled that "[u]nless otherwise
provided by law, the standard of review by a circuit court in a writ of certiorari
In re Tax Assessment Against Am. Bituminous Power Partners, L.P., 539 S.E.2d 757, 76162 (W. Va. 2000) (footnotes omitted). W. VA. CODE § 29A-5-4 provides:
(f) The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be
upon the record made before the agency, except that in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, testimony
thereon may be taken before the court. The court may hear oral arguments and
require written briefs.
(g) The court may affirm the order or decision of the agency or remand the
case for further proceedings. It shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the agency if the substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners
have been prejudiced because of the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, decision or order are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or

425

(3) Made upon unlawful procedures; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence
on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
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proceeding under W. Va. Code § 53-3-3 (1923) (Repl. Vol. 2000) is de novo.'A 26
To reach that result, the court relied on the fact that the Legislature neglected to
explicitly provide for an appeal to the circuit court in exoneration cases. In that
situation, the circuit court hears the matter in certiorari-and ruled that, in certiorari, instead of a limited review only of the record made before the commission, the court is free to disregard the findings and conclusions made by the
county commission and can conduct (at great expense to the taxpayer) an entirely new trial, and then is free to reach its own decision on the merits of the request for exoneration without paying any deference whatsoever to the decision
of the tribunal charged by the Legislature with this issue.
Considering that the court in Bayer Corp. was able to "discern no justification for applying separate burdens of proof for assessment issues raised under W. Va. Code § 11-3-24 and assessment issues brought under W. Va. Code §
11- 3 -2 7 ,,A27 it is surprising that the court was able to discern a justification for
entirely different standards of review for valuation and exoneration cases. This
is particularly true given that in the 120 years since the Legislature first enacted
statutes governing certiorari, the Supreme Court interpreted their purpose as
being to diminish or eliminate the differences between appeals and proceedings
in certiorari.
A.

The Meaning of the Term "DeNovo"

In Bayer Corp., the court explained that '[d/e novo refers to a plenary
form of review that affords no deference to the previous decisionmaker. "428
This definition is incomplete. The West Virginia case quoted by the
Court more completely explained all of the aspects of a de novo review:
The term "de novo" means "'[a]new; afresh; a second time."'
Frymier-Halloranv. Paige, 193 W.Va. 687, 693, 458 S.E.2d
780, 786 (1995) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 435 (6th ed.
1990)). The term "hearing de novo" means " [g]enerally, a new
hearing or a hearing for the second time, contemplating an entire trial in same manner in which matter was originally heard
and a review ofprevious hearing. Trying matter anew the same
as if it had not been heard before and as if no decision had been
previously rendered. On hearing 'de novo' court hears matter as
court of original and not appellate jurisdiction." Black's Law

Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha Cnty. v. Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d
282, 284 (W. Va. 2008).
427
Id. at 291.
428
Id. at 289 n.10 (quoting W. Va. Div. of Envtl. Prot. v. Kingwood Coal Co., 490 S.E.2d 823,
834 (W. Va. 1997)).
426
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Dictionary 721 (6th ed. 1990). (citations omitted and emphasis
added).
As stated above, at a de novo hearing before the Board, it not
only considers the complete record which was before the DEP,
but it is also authorized to "take such additional evidence as it
considers necessary[.]" 429
Under this more complete definition of the term, the result of the decision in Bayer Corp. is that a circuit court reviewing a decision of a county
commission in certiorari has the authority to review the record made before the
county commission, to take new evidence as it sees fit on the merits of the case,
and to make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law without any deference to the findings and conclusions of the county commission. This interpretation of the scope of review in a proceeding in certiorari, however, is in direct
conflict with the court's earlier case law indicating that a circuit court should
defer to the findings of fact and conclusions of law and cannot conduct a trial de
novo. Moreover, it conflicts with the court's earlier case law indicating that,
when reviewing a decision rendered in a quasi-judicial proceeding conducted by
one of the other branches of government, such deference is mandated by the
separation of powers provision of the West Virginia Constitution.
B.

Early Case Law in West Virginia on the Scope ofReview

West Virginia Code section 53-3-3 (2010) describes the scope of review
in proceedings in certiorari in somewhat cryptic language:
Upon the hearing, such circuit court shall, in addition to determining such questions as might have been determined upon a
certiorari as the law heretofore was, review such judgment, order or proceeding, of the county court, council, justice or other
inferior tribunal upon the merits, determine all questions arising
on the law and evidence, and render such judgment or make
such order upon the whole matter as law and justice may require.
This statutory language was first enacted in 1882, and this section was
amended into its current form in 1889. The Supreme Court has had no shortage
of opportunities to explain what this cryptic language means.

429

W. Va. Div. ofEnvt. Prot., 490 S.E.2d at 834 (emphasis added).
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The Effect of the Certiorari Statutes

At common law, there were significant differences between appeals,
writs of error, and writs of certiorari. Relatively speaking, proceedings in certiorari were "cumbersome" and required bills of exceptions or certificates in lieu
thereof.430 In 1889, the West Virginia Supreme Court, in Alderson v. Commissioners431, explained how the writ had been used earlier under common law, and
the effect of the certiorari statutes:
As expressing the law elsewhere, and I think in this state, too, I
quote section 4, tit. "Certiorari," 3 Amer. and Eng. Cyclop.
Law, 62, sustained by authorities of many states: "When its
scope is not enlarged by statute, certiorarilies only to correct
errors in law, and not to review the evidence. According to the
better view, however, it is proper to inquire whether there was
any evidence to establish some essential fact, and also as to the
rulings below upon the admission of alleged incompetent evidence, where no other and competent evidence was introduced
tending to prove a necessary finding. But the record of an inferior court or other tribunal of matters in its jurisdictioncannot
be disputed by other evidence, nor its finding of facts, when
supportedby any competent evidence.
Thus stood the law up to the passage of chapter 153, Acts 1882;
Code 1887, p. 742. Certiorari was not wide enough in its efficacy as a remedial writ; certainly, at least, it can be said there
was doubt as to its scope. It was to cover a field for the correction of errors not covered by the writ of error or appeal. Why
should it not afford, in its field of operation, the same relief

againsterroneousfinding on the evidence as would be afforded
by a writ of error on a motion for a new trial, on the ground
that the finding was without sufficient evidence or contrary to
the evidence? To give it such efficiency, to remove all doubt as
to its reach, that act was passed.432

See Richmond v. Henderson, 37 S.E. 653, 657 (W. Va. 1900). Although West Virginia
Code section 53-3-3 still requires bills of exception or certificates in lieu thereof, the requirement
for both has been superseded by Rules 80 and 81 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Louk v.
Cormier, 622 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 2005); State ex rel. Withers v. Bd. of Educ. of Mason Cnty.,
172 S.E.2d 796 (W. Va. 1970).
431
9 S.E. 863 (W. Va. 1889).
432
Id. at 865. (emphasis added).

430
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43 3
In Bayer Corp. the court cited the 1982 case of Harrisonv. Ginsberg,
which described the history of the statute in similar fashion:

Originally the writ of certiorari existed as a limited remedy and
served primarily as a means of reviewing the actions of inferior
tribunals to determine if they had exceeded their jurisdiction. In
1882, however, the Legislature substantially broadened the application of the writ, and the extent of review it affords, with the
enactment of the language we now find in W. Va.Code § 53-3-3
.

. .

. Although this statutory language caused some confusion

in the early years after its enactment, it was generally recognized that the statute substantially expanded the scope of review
of the circuit court, giving it the power to rehear the issues on
the evidence certifiedfrom the inferior tribunal.434
These cases demonstrate that for about 100 years, the court has consistently interpreted the statutory language as giving the circuit court jurisdictionwhich it lacked under common law-to review the evidence as well as the law
in proceedings in certiorari.
There is also a line of cases in which the court has held that the purpose
of the statute was to diminish the differences between the writ of error and the
writ of certiorari. In these, it has described the writ of certiorari as "an appellate
writ, the counterpart of the writ of error"4 35 and as "an appellate process, de436 The court has also declared that
signed to effect the ends of justice ....
"[t]rue, the certiorari is tried by the record but it is only another name for appeal
... ."4
In at least one case, in fact, the court has permitted a proceeding improperly filed as a proceeding in certiorari to be treated as an appeal by the circuit court.438
If, as these cases indicate, a proceeding in certiorari is an appellate proceeding, it follows that it cannot be conducted de novo, since a de novo proceeding is an exercise of the circuit court's original, not appellate, jurisdiction.4 39 In
exercising its appellate jurisdiction, the circuit court must defer to the findings
of the inferior tribunal, at least if the inferior tribunal is in another branch of
government. For example, in a case involving a statutory provision authorizing
286 S.E.2d 276, 282 (W. Va. 1982) (internal citations omitted).
State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha Cnty. v. Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d 282, 289
n. I1 (W. Va. 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Harrison, 286 S.E.2d at 282).
435
Morgan v. Ohio River R. Co., 19 S.E. 588, 589-90 (W. Va. 1894).
436
Syl. pt. 1, Michaelson v. Cautley, 32 S.E. 170 (W. Va. 1898).
437
McClure-Mabie Lumber Co. v. Brooks, 34 S.E. 921, 921-22 (W. Va. 1899).
438
See Harbert v. Monongahela River R. Co., 40 S.E. 377 (W. Va. 1901).
439
West Virginia Div. of Envtl. Prot. v. Kingwood Coal Co., 490 S.E.2d 823, 834 (W. Va.
1997).
433

434
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circuit court review of the State Water Commission's determinations, the West
Virginia Supreme Court recognized that "[w]hether the proceeding before the
court be regardedas certiorarior appeal, the court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the commission lawfully exercised."" 0 Instead,
it was the duty of the circuit court under [the statute], as it
would have to do in the event there had been no statutory review and certiorarihad been invoked to ascertain whether the
commission's finding . .. was based upon an abuse of its pow-

er, or that the commission exceeded its power, or exercised it in
an arbitrary manner; and whether [the statute] . . .is constitu-

tional. . If the finding of the commission is clearly wrong or
against the preponderance of the evidence, the circuit court in
the first instance must... set aside the finding .

...
.4

Taken together, these cases clearly indicate that the effect of the certiorari statutes has been to eliminate any differences in the scope of review in proceedings
in certiorari and statutory appeals.
2.

Cases Were to be Remanded, Not Retained and Tried De Novo

In Alderson v. Commissioners the court also ruled that "[t]he circuit
court, where such further proceedings outside the record before it are necessary,
cannot retain and try the cause, but must remand to the inferior tribunal for such
proceedings." 2 It based this ruling on the fact that the statute
says the circuit court shall 'review' the judgment, not retry the
case; the word 'review' seeming to mean that the circuit court
should go over again just what the lower court had considered.
It does not say that new evidence may be heard. To give the
construction to the statute, that in every case where a judgment
or order of an inferior tribunal is reversed the circuit court must
retain and try the case de novo, would be productive of great inconvenience.
In Alderson, the inferior tribunal was the County Court of Kanawha
County. This point is important. The 1889 amendment added a clause to what
is now West Virginia Code section 53-3-3:

40
44
442

4

Danielley v. Princeton, 167 S.E. 620, 622 (W. Va. 1933) (emphasis added).
Huntington v. State Water Comm'n, 64 S.E.2d 225, 230 (W. Va. 1951) (emphasis added).
Syl. pt. 2, Alderson v. Comm'r, 9 S.E. 863 (W. Va. 1889).

Id. at 866.
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[b]ut all such cases removed as aforesaid from before a justice
to the circuit court, wherein the amount in controversy is more
than fifteen dollars, and in which the judgment of the justice is
set aside, shall be retained in such court and disposed of as if
originally brought therein.M4
Under the revised statute, then, whether a cause can be tried de novo in circuit
court in proceedings in certiorari depends on whether it arose from within the
judicial branch (from a justice of the peace) or from another branch of government. This interpretation is consistent with the separation of powers provision
discussed below. In Morgan v. Ohio River R. Co.,"5 the court confirmed that
[t]he statute has not changed the law as to retaining the cause in
the circuit court, except as to certiorarifrom a justice's judgment. The disposal of the whole case spoken of in the statute
only refers to the case as made by the record as brought upon
certiorari, and does not authorize a trial de novo on other evidence, except in cases ofjudgment ofjustices.446
Alderson stood as good law from the date that it was issued in 1889 until it was overruled in Bayer Corp. There, the court observed that
As indicated in Harrison, some of our early cases misconstrued
the expansive reach of the statute. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2, Alderson
v. Commissioners, 32 W.Va. 454, 9 S.E. 863 (1889) ( "The circuit court, where such further proceedings outside the record
before it are necessary, cannot retain and try the cause, but must
remand to the inferior tribunal for such proceedings.")." 7
That observation would lead the reader to suppose that Alderson had
long since been overturned, and that the Harrisoncourt was acknowledging that
fact, but that's simply not the case.
It is true that in Harrison,the court did observe that the language in section 53-3-3 "caused some confusion in the early years after its enactment," 4 48
but it didn't cite Alderson for that proposition. Rather, the Harrisoncourt cited
McClure-Mabie Lumber Co. v. Brooks449 in which the court, after quoting the

4s

W. VA. CODE § 53-3-3 (2010) (emphasis added).
19 S.E. 588 (W. Va. 1894).

44

Id. at 590.

44

State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha Cnty. v. Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d 282, 289
n. 11 (W. Va. 2008).
48
Harrison v. Ginsberg, 286 S.E.2d 276, 282 (W. Va. 1982).
"4

44

34 S.E. 921 (W. Va. 1899).
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statutory language, said "[w]hat does this mean? I shall not say, it is hard to say
,450

As discussed above, the Court in McClure-Mabie overcame its confusion and affirmed the similarity between writs of appeal and certiorari, observing that "[t]rue, the certiorari is tried by the record but it is only another name
for appeal . . . ." It also cautioned that, while the statute "authorizes a liberality

to cure such a defect as a defective or untruthful return", it was also careful to
explicitly state that it did "not say it allows new pleadings or evidence, or that
the case must not be tried on the record . . . ."45 Nothing in that case casts any
doubt on the holding in Alderson that cases cannot be tried de novo by the circuit court. McClure-Mabie never mentioned, much less overruled, Alderson,
which was still in effect after Harrisonwas decided and remained so until it was
overruled in Bayer Corp., apparently because the court misread its own prior
case law.
3.

All Issues Fairly Raised by the Record Can Be Reviewed

The case of Davis v. Hix 4 5 2 also sheds light on the meaning of the language in West Virginia Code section § 53-3-3. There, the West Virginia Supreme Court, identified an issue that was raised by the record in the case but that
had not been addressed by the circuit court. The court remanded the case to the
circuit court, with instructions to address the additional issue. In doing so, it
quoted with approval the first point of the syllabus in Alderson:
Upon a writ of certiorari used as an appellate proceeding to
bring to the circuit court for review a judgment or order of an
inferior tribunal, the circuit court should decide all matters of
law and fact, including those on the merits fairly arising on the
record, either affirming such judgment or order, or reversing or
modifying it, and render such judgment as the inferior tribunal
should have rendered, to that tribunal where further proceedings are necessary, with distinct decision on the points involved
in the latter event.453
Syllabus point 2 of Hix makes it clear that the court interpreted the statutory language as requiring a reviewing court to review all issues fairly raised
in the record, but does not authorize the reviewing court to conduct a de novo
review:

450
451
452
453

Id. at 922.
Id. at 921-22.
90 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1955).
Id. at 361 (quoting Alderson v. Conn'rs, 9 S.E. 803 (W. Va. 1859)).
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This Court, on writ of certiorari, as required by Article 7, Sections 27 and 30, of the Unemployment Compensation Law, as
amended, will not dispose of questions which have not been decided by the trial court, but will remand the proceeding to such
Court with directions to dispose of all questions fairly raised on
the record.
4.

The Standard of Review in Proceedings in Certiorari Is Similar
to That in Appeals Under the APA

From the time they were enacted, then, the Supreme Court interpreted
the certiorari statutes as diminishing if not eliminating the differences between
proceedings in certiorari and appeals. The statute expanded the scope of the
review to include a deferential examination of whether the evidence supported
the result in the lower tribunal, but the Court specifically held that the statute did
not authorize the reviewing court to hear the matter de novo. As recently as
2001, in Adkins v. West Virginia Deptartment of Education,4 54 the court has observed that the standards of review in circuit court in appeals conducted under
the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") and in proceedings in certiorari are
virtually identical:
During oral argument before this Court, the circuit court's review of this case was discussed in terms of the State Administrative Procedures Act, W. Va. Code §§ 29A-5-1 to -5 (1964).
However, since this case was brought before the circuit court on
a writ of certiorari pursuant to W. Va. Code § 53-3-1, we need
not discuss the applicability of that Act. We note though that the
standardof review under both statutes is essentially the same.
See W.Va.Code § 29A-5-4(g) (1998).45 5
This statement in Adkins is not on some peripheral matter; rather, the
central holding in that case was that in that proceeding in certiorari, the inferior
tribunal's decision was not arbitrary and capricious, and therefore the circuit
court was not free to disregard it and substitute its own opinion for that of the
Board of Education. The court was unanimous on this point.
The court in Adkins also observed that:
This Court has advised that a circuit court may not reverse a decision of an administrative agency simply because it would
have decided the case differently. Berlow v. West Virginia Bd.
of Medicine, 193 W.Va. 666, 672, 458 S.E.2d 469, 475 (1995).
As we explained in Syllabus Point 3 of In re Queen, 196 W.Va.
454

556 S.E.2d 72 (W. Va. 2001).

455

Id. at 75 n.3 (emphasis added).
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442, 473 S.E.2d 483 (1996), "the 'clearly wrong' and the 'arbitrary and capricious' standards of review are deferential ones
which presume an agency's actions are valid as long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence or by a rational basis."
Thus, "[t]he scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard is narrow, and a court is not to substitute its judgment
for that of the hearing examiner." Martin v. Randolph County
Bd. of Educ., 195 W.Va. 297, 304, 465 S.E.2d 399, 406
(1995).456

In other cases arising from proceedings in certiorari, the court has applied a standard of review similar to that mandated by the APA. In Humphreys
v. County Court of Monroe County,4 5 7 decided in 1922, the court explained that,
upon writ of certiorari, deference is owed to a county commission's (formerly, a
county court's) fact-finding in property tax exoneration proceedings.458 In
Humphreys, the court considered a circuit court's judgment affirming, on writ of
certiorari, the county court's denial of a request for a tax exoneration. 4 59 The
court reviewed the evidence presented to the County Court and concluded that
"[t]he presumption in favor of correctness and regularity of the assessment was
clearly andfully rebutted and overthrown by the admissible evidence . . . ."460
In doing so, it overturned "the judgments of the circuit court and the county
court [because they] are clearly erroneous .. .. "461 Humphreys thus stands for
the proposition that a circuit court, and this court, review a county commission's
factfinding in a tax exoneration with deference, overturning that factfinding only
upon a showing that the facts found by the Commission be "clearly and fully
rebutted[,]" i.e., that they are "clearly erroneous."4 6 2
In Beverlin v. Board of Education of Lewis County,4 63 after holding that
the circuit court could hear, on certiorari review, a case first decided by the
County Board of Education, this court explained that the "the sole significant
issue" was whether the board "acted arbitrarilyand capriciously in suspending
and dismissing [plaintiff], considering the evidence placed in the record."4" On
456

Id. at 75.

110 S.E. 701 (W. Va. 1922).
Id.; see also W. VA. CODE § 53-3-2 (2010) (setting forth types of cases reviewable upon
certiorari); Humphreys, 110 S.E. 701 (recognizing that a county court acts judicially in deciding
questions of taxability and exoneration, and accordingly review in the circuit court is available by
writ of certiorari); cf Quesenberry v. State Rd. Comm'n,138 S.E. 362, 365 (W. Va. 1927) (holding that "[olnly judicial or quasi judicial action is reviewable" upon certiorari).
459
Humphreys, 110 S.E. at 702-03.
Id. at 703 (emphasis added).
4
461
Id. (emphasis added).
462
Id.
4
216 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1975).
4
Id. at 557 (emphasis added).

457
458
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several occasions, the Court has reaffirmed the holding in Beverlin that a circuit
court can only reverse a decision of an inferior tribunal if it is arbitrary and ca465
pricious. For example, in North v. West Virginia Board of Regents, the Court
affirmed that Beverlin "established that on a writ of certiorari the court may
review the action of the lower tribunal to determine if it acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner, and if it did, its actions will be reversed."466
Also, in Clarke v. West VirginiaBoard ofRegents,4 6 7 the court held that
the inferior tribunal must make sufficient findings to satisfy the reviewing circuit court that it "has fulfilled [its] obligations as a fact finder and has not acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in reaching his conclusions" ;468 explaining that if the
administrative record is deficient, the appeals courts are "powerless to review
the administrative action" because they "are thrust into the position of a trier of
fact and are asked to substitute [their] judgment for that of the hearing examiner," which "[they] cannot do."469
In addition, the West Virginia Supreme Court's review of decisions
from county zoning authorities reflects a deferential standard for reviewing the
factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies upon certiorari review. The court long
has recognized that zoning appeals boards-like the county commissions in a
property tax appeal-act in a quasi-judicial function.470 In Wolfe v. Forbes,471
the court held that in reviewing that quasi-judicial tribunal's findings, "on appeal there is a presumption that a board of zoning appeals acted correctly," and
that presumption may be overcome only "where the board has applied an erroneous principle of law, was plainly wrong in its factual findings, or acted

beyond its jurisdiction."4 7 2 The court cited two Virginia cases 47 3 for this proposition, but did not cite W. Va. Code § 8-24-64, in effect since 1959, which likewise provided that "no such review shall be by trial de novo." The court also
stated that "the decision [of the Board of Zoning Appeals] to entertain a second
application should not be disturbed by a reviewing court unless it is contrary to
233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).
Id. at 418-19; See also Adkins v. West Virginia Dep't of Educ., 556 S.E.2d at 74-75 (reiterating "this Court [has] established that on a writ of certiorari the court may review the action of
the lower tribunal to determine if it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner") (citing Beverlin,
216 S.E.2d at 557).
46

466

467

279 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1981).

468

Id. at 177.

4

Id. at 178.
See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 296 S.E.2d 887, 889
(W. Va. 1982) ("We recognize that the Legislature may create an administrative agency and give
it quasi-judicial powers to conduct hearings and make findings of fact without violating the separation of powers doctrine.").
471
217 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 1975).
472
Id. at 906 (emphasis added).
473
Azalea Corp. v. Richmond, 112 S.E.2d 862 (Va. 1960); C. & C., Inc. v. Semple, 150 S.E.2d
536 (Va. 1966).
470
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law or plainly wrong under the evidence,"474 again citing two Virginia cases.475
Also, in Lower Donnally Ass'n v. Charleston Municipal Planning Commission,4 76 the court stated that
the decision by the Legislature to make certiorari available for
persons challenging decisions by the board of zoning appeals as
well as to those persons challenging the decisions of planning
commissions demonstrates that the Legislature sought to assert
these powers in order to afford a remedy for the review of the
recorddeveloped by these bodies as a convenient means of assuring adherence to the requirements of the law without necessarily providing a means of attacking their proper exercise of
discretion.477
More recently, in Corliss v. Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals, 4 78 Jefferson Utilities, Inc. v. Jefferson County Boardof Zoning Appeals, 4 79
Maplewood Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Putnam County Planning Commission,4 80 and Far Away Farm, LLC v. Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals,4 8 1 the West Virginia Supreme Court confirmed the continuing vitality of
the Wolfe standard in analyzing a circuit court's review of zoning board decisions on writ of certiorari.482 In all four cases, the court quoted the Wolfe standard: "While on appeal there is a presumption that a board of zoning appeals
acted correctly, a reviewing court should reverse the administrative decision
where the board has applied an erroneous principle of law, was plainly wrong in
itsfactualfindings, or has acted beyond its jurisdiction.A4 3
Wolfe, 217 S.E.2d at 903.
47
Tidewater Util. Corp. v. Norfolk, 160 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1968); C. & C., Inc., 150 S.E.2d 536;
Joseph T. Bockrath, Annotation, Zoning Board's Grant of New Application for Zone Change,
Variance, or Special Exception After Previous Application Covering Same Property or Part Thereof 52 A.L.R.3d 494 (1973).
476
575 S.E.2d 233 (W. Va. 2002).
477
Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
478
591 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 2003).
479
624 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 2005).
480
629 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 2006) (per curiam).
481
664 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 2008) (per curiam).
482
These cases were reviewed by the circuit court under the authority granted by West Virginia
Code section 8-24-59, which provided that "[e]very decision or order of the board of zoning appeals shall be subject to review by certiorari." That provision has since been replaced by a substantially similar statute, West Virginia Code section 8A-9-1 (2010), which provides that "[elvery
decision or order of the planning commission, board of subdivision and land development appeals,
or board of zoning appeals is subject to review by certiorari."
483
Corliss, 591 S.E.2d at 97-98 (emphasis added); Jefferson Utils., 624 S.E.2d at 877; Maplewood Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Putnam Cnty. Planning Co., 629 S.E.2d 778, 782 (W. Va.
2006); Far Away Farms, 664 S.E.2d at 141.

474
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The court's decision in Corliss is particularly instructive. There, the
court held that the circuit court committed reversible error by failing to give the
County Board's decision sufficient deference. 484 The court concluded that by
"discarding the administrative determinations that the submitted [evidence] was
adequate, the lower court appears to have wrongly substituted its judgment for
that of the administrative entities charged with handling zoning matters.'
The court added that "[i]t is axiomatic that 'interpretations of statutes by bodies
charged with their administration are given great weight unless clearly erroneous."'486 In Maplewood Estates, the circuit court overturned a decision of the
Putnam County Planning Commission in favor of the appellants, who appealed
to the supreme court arguing that the findings of the Commission were not
plainly wrong because they were supported by substantial evidence and asserting that the circuit court erroneously substituted its judgment for that of the
Commission. The court agreed and reversed the circuit court, observing that
This Court has explained that "the plainly wrong standard of review is a deferential one, which presumes an administrative tribunal's actions are valid as long as the decision is supported by
substantial evidence." Conley v. Workers' Compensation Division, 199 W.Va. 196, 199, 483 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1997). See also
Syllabus Point 3, In re Queen, 196 W.Va. 442, 473 S.E.2d 483
(1996); Frymier-Halloranv. Paige, 193 W.Va. 687, 695, 458
S.E.2d 780, 788 (1995). Substantial evidence is "such relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." In re Queen, 196 W.Va. at 446, 473
S.E.2d at 487. A factual finding that is supported by substantial
evidence is conclusive. Id. Consequently, "[n]either this Court
nor the circuit court may supplant a factual finding of [the
Commission] merely by identifying an alternative conclusion
that could be supported by substantial evidence." Id.48 7
The court found that the appellants clearly satisfied the requirements for
a subdivision variance and that the circuit court improperly substituted its own
judgment for that of the Planning Commission.488 Accordingly, the court re484

591 S.E.2d at 98.

Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
486
Id. at 100-01 (ruling that "the lower court overlooked its duty to give the appropriate
amount of deference to the administrative decision and Zoning Board's affirmance of that decision") (internal citation omitted); see also id. Syl. pts. 3 & 4; Jefferson Utils., Inc. v. Jefferson
Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 624 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 2005) ("As in Corliss,we are hard pressed
not to conclude that the trial court wrongly refused to grant the appropriate amount of deference to
one of the administrative bodies charged with responsibility for enforcing the Ordinance.").
487
Maplewood Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Putnam Cnty. Planning Co., 629 S.E.2d 778, 782
(W. Va. 2006).
488
Id at 783.
485
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manded the case to the circuit court with directions to enter an order reinstating
the decision of the Putnam County Planning Commission that granted the requested subdivision variance. 4 89 These cases all stand for the proposition that
the standard of review in circuit court is a deferential one and is not de novo.
5.

Inconsistent Case Law

The West Virginia Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in
holding that a circuit court should defer to the findings of fact resulting from a
quasi-judicial proceeding conducted by another branch of government. In 1996,
in Lipscomb v. Tucker County Commission,4 90 one issue was whether the circuit
court had been correct to dismiss the claim since it had not been filed within 30
days as required by the APA. 49 1 The supreme court confirmed that when no
provision for an appeal was provided by statute, a circuit court hears an appeal
from a county commission in certiorari.492 However, since the certiorari statutes
do not limit the time during which a motion for a writ of certiorari can be filed,
the court looked to the statutes that provide for an appeal to a circuit court from
a decision of a circuit court in certain enumerated situations.4 93 By analogy to
West Virginia Code section 58-3-4 (2010), which provides that such appeal
must be filed within four months after such judgment was rendered by the county commission, the court ruled that a motion for a writ of certiorari was not
barred by the doctrine of laches if filed within four months of the county commission's decision.
The West Virginia Supreme Court remanded the case to the circuit
court:
with directions that the court grant a writ of certiorari, directed
to the County Commission, to bring the record of appellant's
grievance, with all related papers, to the circuit court. The court
may require appellant to file such additional pleadings, in the
nature of an amended and supplemental petition, as it deems
necessary to properly frame the issues. On consideration of the
record made on the grievance, the court may take such additional evidence as may be required or remand the matter to the
County Commission for that purpose.494

489

id

490

475 S.E.2d 84 (W. Va. 1996).
Id. at 88.

491
492

Id. at 89.

493

Id

494

Id. at 90.
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In other words, the court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to hold a de novo hearing or remand that case to the county commis495
sion; in fact, the circuit court conducted a jury trial on the merits of the case.
The court, however, didn't recognize that it had departed from the rule announced in Wolfe, nor did it cite Beverlin, or explain why it reached a completely contradictory result.
The 1996 Lipscomb decision, however, is in accord with the court's
tendency to minimize the difference between appeals and proceedings in certiorari. That naturally raises the question of what the standard of review is applicable in an appeal of a decision of a county commission to the circuit court under the appeal statutes found at West Virginia Code section 58-3-1 et seq. The
supreme court has not often addressed the proper standard of review in this context. However, in the 1903 case of Sistersville Ferry Co. v. Russell,496 the court
did say:
Russell makes the point that the circuit court upon the appeal
erred in not sustaining a motion by him to grant him a jury trial
of the merits, with right to produce additional evidence, and assess his damage .

. .

.

An appeal taken from the county to the

circuit court under Code, c. 39, §§ 47, 48 [now § 58-3-1 and 583-3], and chapter 112, § 14, is not an appeal in the ordinary
sense of that word, importing a process in the superior court by
which a new trial of fact is had upon evidence the same as used
in the county court or new evidence; but it is triable only on the
record as made in the county court. This is apparent from the
statute and by the opinion in Williamson v. Hays, 25 W. Va.

14.497
There is also evidence that the legislature itself believes that de novo review is not available in statutory appeals of a decision of a county commission
to a circuit court. In 1993, the legislature amended section 58-3-1 by adding a
4 98
Subsection (f)
new type of case that could be appealed to the circuit court.
now permits an appeal of "the disposition of disputes arising from the provisions of article three [Provisions Relating to Husband or Wife of Decedent],
chapter forty-two [Descent and Distribution] of this code, which appeal shall be
de novo."A99 Of the seven types of cases addressed by this section of the Code,
this is the only one for which the legislature directed review "shall be de no-

495
496

497
498
499

See Lipscomb v. Tucker Cnty. Comm'n, 527 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1999).
43 S.E. 107 (W. Va. 1903).
Sistersville Ferry Co., 43 S.E. at 108 (emphasis added).
See W. VA. CODE § 58-3-1 (2006).
See W. VA. CODE § 58-3-1(f) (2006).
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vo."o5 o Leaving aside the question of whether the grant of authority in section
58-3-1 violates the Separation of Powers provision of the West Virginia Constitution, it is clear that, absent a specific grant of authority to the contrary, the
Legislature does not contemplate that any of the other enumerated types of appeals to circuit court from a county commission can be tried de novo. By analogy, then, if the standard of review in appeals and proceedings in certiorari is
similar, neither is de novo.
ConstitutionalIssues: SeparationofPowers

C.

The court's prior holdings that de novo review is not permitted in proceedings in certiorari were not solely a matter of statutory interpretation. For
more than 100 years, the court also recognized that the separation of powers
provision in West Virginia Constitution article V, section I constrains the ability
of circuit courts to review rulings from inferior tribunals that are not in the judicial branch of government.
1.

Review of Decisions of Administrative Agencies

The de novo standard of review in circuit court of decisions of administrative agencies is inconsistent with separation of powers principles. In 1887, in
Poteet v. Cabell County Commissioners,5 0 the West Virginia Supreme Court
examined several sections of the Constitution of West Virginia and related statutes and observed that all of these, taken together, could be interpreted as granting the circuit court authority to review "every possible case of any description,
when the county court had made a final order[,] in any case or proceeding of
any sort." 502
The West Virginia Supreme Court then observed:
But broad and comprehensive as is the provision of the [1880]
constitution above quoted, as well as the laws intended to carry
it into effect, stated above, still there are cases of final orders of
a county court which cannot be reviewed by certiorari,or in
any other manner, by the circuit court, because such final orders, or the proceedings in which they were entered, are obviously not judicial in their character. It is true, by article 5 of
our constitution (see Warth's Amended Code, p. 11) it is provided that "the legislative, executive, and judicial departments

so

Id.

501

3 S.E. 97 (W. Va. 1887).

502

Id. at 105.
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shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the
powers properly belonging to either of the others."so3
In Poteet, the court decided the county court's power to investigate irregularities in voting and to rule on specific objections made that the county
court's rulings were judicial in nature, and therefore the court held that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear the case in certiorari.i
Then, in the 1946 case of State v. Huber,sos the court reviewed a statute
giving circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction with the beer commissioner to revoke licenses to sell nonintoxicating beer. Upon such a revocation by the Circuit Court of Fayette County, the licensees appealed. The West Virginia Supreme Court considered the meaning of the terms "legislative power," "executive power," and "judicial power" and explained that
(i) "[u]nquestionably, the power of regulation of public utilities,
the licensing of businesses of all kinds, the regulation of such
businesses, the general control thereof, including the power of
revoking licenses or permits issued in connection therewith, is a
legislative power;"
(ii) "executive power is more limited: it merely extends to the
detail of carrying into effect the laws enacted by the Legislature, as they may be interpreted by the courts;" and
(iii) "judicial power" included "the power which a regularly
constituted court exercises in matters which are brought before
it, in the manner prescribed by statute, or established rules of
practice of courts, and which matters do not come within the
powers granted to the executive, or vested in the legislative department of the Government." 506
The court then discussed the requirement that these powers be separated, observing that
[t]he separation of these powers; the independence of one from
the other; the requirement that one department shall not exercise
or encroach upon the powers of the other two, is fundamental in
our system of government, State and Federal. Each acts, and is
intended to act, as a check upon the others, and thus a balanced
503

Id. (emphasis added).

s0

See id. at Syl. pt. 1.

505

40 S.E.2d 11 (W. Va. 1946).

s'

Id. at 18.
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system is maintained. No theory of government has been more
loudly acclaimed.o 7
Applying these principles, this court highlighted the limited scope of judicial
review of rulings by administrative or quasi-judicial bodies.
The court recognized that strict separation was not practicable because
"there has grown up a proceeding, authorized by statute, and recognized by this
Court which, by the employment of what may be termed a legal fiction, administrative boards, commissions and officials are treated as possessing quasi judicial power."508 Nevertheless, the court both defined the ability of courts to review such determinations and the limitations inherent in that review:
Apparently the law is settled in favor of the use of the appeal
method, on the theory that duly constituted administrative
boards and commissions do sometimes exercise quasi judicial
power, and that, on that theory, there can be brought into play
what is called judicial power. If there is an abuse of power; or if
the power conferred by the Legislature be exceeded; or there is
arbitrary or fraudulent exercise thereof; or any provision of the
Constitution or the statute laws of the State is violated, a judicial question arises upon which the courts may pass judgment.
But unless these administrative agencies are at fault in the respects noted above, their power to perform their functions, delegated to them by the Legislature, cannot be controlled by the
courts; and, this being true, courts will not assume to exercise
administrative power, even though the Legislature may mistakenly authorize them to do so.50 9
Two cases illustrate these principles in practice. First, in Danielley v.
City of Princeton,510 the West Virginia Supreme Court interpreted a statute that
provided that "the circuit court shall review any order of the [state water] commission, and may hear and consider any pertinent evidence offered, etc., 'and
shall determine all questions arising on the law and evidence and render such
judgment or make such order upon the whole matter, as law and equity may
require."' 5 1' The court interpreted this language (which is quite similar to the
language in the certiorari statute) as requiring a decision on the merits of the
case. 5 12 Since a decision on the merits would require the exercise of executive
507

Id

508

State v. Huber, 40 S.E.2d 11, 24 (W. Va. 1946).

5

Id. (emphasis added).
167 S.E. 620 (W. Va. 1933).
Id. at 622.
Id. (citing Alderson v. Comm'rs, 9 S.E. 863 (W. Va. 1889).

510
"
512
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functions, the court held the entire act to be an unconstitutional violation of
West Virginia's separation of powers:
Whether the proceeding before the court be regardedas certiorarior appeal,the court cannot substitute its discretion for that
of the commission lawfully exercised. The legislative, executive, and judicial powers, under the Constitution (article 5), are
each in its own sphere of duty, independent of and exclusive of
the other; so that, whenever a subject is committed to the discretion of the legislative or executive department, the lawful exercise of that discretion cannot be controlled by the judiciary.
Second, after the legislature amended the statutes invalidated by Danielley, the Court reviewed the amendments in City of Huntington v. State Water

Commission.5 1 4 As amended, the statute limited the circuit court's review in
that the review was confined (i) to the record made below and (ii) to the question as to whether the act complained of constitutes pollution under the West
Virginia Code. 1 s The decision was to be certified back to the State Water
Commission, which was to modify its order to be consistent with that of the
circuit court. 1 This court held that the revised statute did not permit the circuit
court to hear new evidence or conduct a trial de novo because, if the circuit
court had that authority, it would violate the separation of powers principles
inherent in West Virginia law.517 To avoid that problem, this court limited the
circuit court's review of the Water Commission's ruling to one requiring defe-

rence. 518
The West Virginia Supreme Court has also applied separation of powers
principles in the context of tax appeals. For example, in Frymier-Halloranv.
Paige,519 the supreme court found that a statute that permitted a circuit court to
hear an appeal from a decision of the Tax Commissioner's Office of Hearings
and Appeals "anew" violated West Virginia's separation of powers requirement.520 Justice Cleckley's opinion explained that, once an administrative agency is created and is "assign[ed] adjudicatory decision making," courts "must
defer to its decisions and cannot review factual determinations de novo."5 21 The
Frymier-Hallorancourt directed lower courts to be mindful that it is "estab513
514

Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
64 S.E.2d 225 (W. Va. 1951).

5

Id. at 226-27.

516

Id. at 227.

51

Id. at 230.

518

Id. at 230-31.
458 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1995).

519
520

id.

521

Id. at 787 (citing Walter Butler Bldg. Co. v. Soto, 97 S.E.2d 275 (W. Va. 1957)).
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lished that administrative agencies are active players in the division of powers,
and, while always subject to properly enacted and valid laws and to constitutional constraints, their actions are entitled to respect from both the legislature
and the courts."S22 In short, to ensure that the separation of powers is not violated, it is "evident that courts will not override administrative agency decisions, of whatever kind, unless the decisions contradict some explicit constitutional provision or right, are the results of a flawed process, or are either fundamentally unfair or arbitrary." 5 23
2.

Review of Decisions by County Commissions for Appeals

Of course, a county commission is not an administrative agency. Nevertheless, the supreme court's holding in American Bituminous confirms that the
same limitations on a circuit court's scope of review are applicable to appeals to
the circuit court from a county commission in ad valorem property tax valuation
appeals. Before the enactment of SB 401, a taxpayer who believed that the assessed value of his property was excessive had to contest this valuation issue
under the provisions of West Virginia Code section 11-3-24, which required
taxpayers to apply for relief from a county commission sitting as a board of
equalization and review.5 24 If a taxpayer did so, under the provisions of section
11-3-25, he or she could then appeal an adverse decision from the board of
equalization and review to the circuit court.525
In American Bituminous, the court considered the standard of review
which may be exercised by a circuit court considering a valuation appeal pursuant to section 11-3-25. Recognizing that the section 11-3-25 limits the court

Id. at 787.
Id Among the prior cases cited in Frymier-Halloranwas Walter Butler Bldg. Co. v. Soto,
97 S.E.2d 275 (W. Va. 1957), in which the court also decided that an interpretation of the word
"anew" that would allow the circuit court to hear new evidence beyond that heard by the Tax
Commissioner would run afoul of article V, section 1 of the Constitution of West Virginia. Id. at
279. There, the court held that the Tax Commissioner acts administratively in assessing and fixing the amount of a tax, and likewise when he acts administratively upon the petition of the taxpayer for reassessment of a tax. Id. at 278. By contrast, the court held that the legislature intended
to authorize the court to review and determine judicial questions such as the validity of the assessment of the tax and the applicability of the section of the statute which imposes the tax upon
the activity of the taxpayer and subjects him to liability to pay it, and held that these matters
"present essentially judicial questions the determination of which requires the exercise of the
judicial function." Id. at 281. An interpretation of the statute that would permit the court to begin
anew and fix the amount of a tax would thus invest in the circuit court an administrative function,
and thus would violate article V, section 1. Id. The court observed that "[a]ny attempt to confer
administrative or other nonjudicial power upon the court or to extend the scope of the provision to
include any nonjudicial function, which might or could be implied from the language of the provision, is of no force or effect." Id. at 282.
524
W. Va. Code § 11-3-24.
525 W. Va. Code § 11-3-25.
522

523
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to reviewing the record made before the board of equalization and review,526 the
court applied Frymier-Halloranand found it controlling, and declared that
"judicial review of a decision of a board of equalization and review regarding a
challenged tax-assessment valuation is limited to roughly the same scope permitted under the West Virginia Administrative Procedures Act, W. Va. Code ch.
29.,527

Because a county commission is not an administrative agency, Justice
Cleckley's analysis in Frymier-Halloranof the constitutional deference due to
decisions of an administrative agency cannot fully explain the Court's decision
in American Bituminous. Nevertheless, separation of powers principles were
clearly implicated in that case, because a county commission is itself a creature
of the Constitution of West Virginia. While, as Professor Robert M. Bastress,
Jr. has observed, "it is clear that the commissions are to function as their county's executive and legislative bodies, and the Legislature has placed on them a
broad range of powers to superintend and administer the counties' affairs[,]" 5 28
they are also constitutionally prohibited from exercising judicial functions. Following the ratification of the Judicial Reorganization Amendment of 1974,529
article IX, section 11 of the Constitution of West Virginia defines the powers of
the county commissions as follows: "[s]uch commissions may exercise such
other powers, and perform such other duties, not ofa judicialnature, as may be
prescribed by law."530 Also, were the legislature to attempt to assign to a county
commission a judicial function, that assignment would violate the constitutional
provision now found at article VIII, section 1 which provides that "[t]he judicial
power of the State shall be vested solely in a supreme court of appeals and in the
circuit courts, and in such intermediate appellate courts and magistrate courts as
shall be hereafter established by the legislature, and in the justices, judges and
magistrates of such courts."53 ' Fixing the value of property and the amount of
ad valorem tax due is an executive or administrative function, not a judicial
function, and the result in American Bituminous limiting the scope of a circuit

The court is so limited when "there was an appearance by or on behalf of the owner before
the county court, or if actual notice, certified by such court, was given to the owner." See W. VA.
CODE § 11-3-25 (2010).
527
In re Tax Assessment Against Am. Bituminous Power Partners, 539 S.E.2d 757, 762 (W.
Va. 2000).
528
Robert M. Bastress, Jr., Constitutional Considerationsfor Local Government Reform in
West Virginia, 108 W. VA. L. REv. 125, 155 (2005).
529
The Judicial Reorganization Amendment of 1974 renamed the county courts as county
commissions and moved the provisions relating to them from Article VillI (the Judicial Article) to
Article IX (the County Organization Article).
530
W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 11 (emphasis added).
531
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
526
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court's review of a decision of a board of equalization and review was certainly
properly based on the separation of powers principle.53 2
One issue not addressed by the court in American Bituminous is the
provision then contained in W. Va. Code § 11-3-25 that "[i]f, however, there
was no actual notice to such owner, and no appearance by or on behalf of the
owner before the county court, or if a question of classification or taxability is
presented, the matter shall be heard de novo by the circuit court."533 A similar
provision has been carried forward in SB 401.
If fixing the value of property
and the amount of ad valorem tax due is an executive or administrative function,
so too is determining the proper classification for the property and determining
whether property is taxable in the first place. Certainly, these are areas in which
we would expect the executive branch of government to have extensive experience and expertise. Given the decisions in American Bituminous and FrymierHalloran,the statutory provision for de novo review in any appeal of tax issue
first adjudicated by a county commission or the Tax Commissioner also violates
the separation of powers principle.
3.

Review of Decisions by County Commissions in Certiorari

County commissions also hear property tax exoneration requests. Since
the legislature has not seen fit to provide for appeals from a decision of a county
commission by statute, a circuit court can only review the county commission's
decision in certiorari. 5 35 The original property tax exoneration statute (the statue
that was at issue Bayer Corp.) was enacted in 1911.136 It is axiomatic that
"[w]hen the Legislature enacts laws, it is presumed to be aware of all pertinent

See, e.g., Walter Butler Bldg. Co. v. Soto, 97 S.E.2d 275, 281 (citing State ex rel. Hallanan
v. Rocke, 113 S.E. 647 (W. Va. 1922)) (The State Tax Commissioner acts administratively in
assessing and fixing the amount of a tax.).
532

5
534

W. VA. CODE § 11-3-25.
See W. VA. CODE § 11-3-25(c) (2010).

s35
See State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha Cnty. v. Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d 282,
287 n.7 (W. Va. 2008).
This Court has previously held that '[n]o express remedy having been provided for reviewof [a Commission's] action [under W. Va. Code § 11-3-27],
the circuit court has jurisdiction to review the same by the writ of certiorari.'
Syl. pt. 4, Humphreys v. CountyCourt of Monroe County, 90 W. Va. 315, 110
S.E. 701 ( 1922). See also City of Huntington v. State Water Comm'n, 135 W.
Va. 568, 576-577, 64 S.E.2d 225, 230 (1951) ('Wherever by a dearth in a statute there is given no statutory right of review, the writ of certiorari is available in order to obtain judicial review of the findings of an administrative
board.'). Consequently, a challenge to a Commission's decision under W.
Va.Code § 11-3-27 may be done through a petition for a writ of certiorari.

Id.
536

Acts 1911, c. 50, § 132a (now codified at W. VA. CODE § 11-3-27 (2010)).
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judgments rendered by the judicial branch."537 In 1911, the legislature would
have been aware of the court's holdings in Alderson v. Commissioners where
the court ruled that "[t]he circuit court, where such further proceedings outside
the record before it are necessary, cannot retain and try the cause, but must remand to the inferior tribunal for such proceedings." It would have been aware
of the court's decisions in Morgan v. Ohio River Railway Co., Michaelson v.
Cautley, and McClure-Mabie Lumber Co. v. Brooks, holding that the purpose of

the certiorari statutes was to diminish the differences between appeals and proceedings in certiorari. It would have been mindful of the court's discussion in
Poteet v. Cabell County Commissioners, of the limitations on the scope of a
circuit court's review of decisions of a county commission imposed by the Constitution's separation of powers provision. Given that legal context, if the legislature intended for the circuit court's review of a county commission's decision
in an exoneration case to be de novo, it would have explicitly said so to eliminate any doubt. Even then, there is substantial doubt that such an explicit direction could have survived a substantive analysis of its constitutionality under the
separation of powers provision.
By the same logic as Walter Butler Building Co. v. Soto, a county commission does not and cannot act in a judicial capacity in hearing a request for
exoneration, 53 8 and it therefore violates the separation of powers principles, reaffirmed in Frymier-Halloranand American Bituminous, to allow a circuit court
to usurp a commission's administrative authority to decide exoneration requests
by reviewing those non-judicial determinations de novo.

Kessel v. Monongalia Cnty. Gen. Hosp., 648 S.E.2d 366 (W. Va. 2007) (quoting Syl. pt. 2,
Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H., 465 S.E.2d 841 (W. Va. 1995) (citations omitted)).
5
Although the syllabus in Humphreys v. County Court of Monroe County provides, inter alia,
that "[i]n passing upon an application for exoneration from taxes charged against the applicant,
... a county court acts judicially[,]" that provision was rendered inoperable by the ratification of
the Judicial Reorganization Amendment in 1974, limiting the county commission to legislative
and executive functions. Moreover, it is apparent that the court's own analysis has evolved since
Humphreys was decided. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 21 S.E.2d 143, 146
(W. Va. 1942) ("We wish to note and correct in passing a statement made in the opinion in the
case of Wheeling Bridge & Terminal Railway Co. v. Paull, Judge, 39 W.Va. 142, 147, 19 S.E.
55 1, to the effect that the ascertainment of the value of property is strictly a judicial function. For
the purpose of taxation, it is primarily an executive or administrative function with which the
courts will not interfere unless shown plainly to have been abused. Great Northern Ry. Co. v.
Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 151, 56 S.Ct. 426, 80 L.Ed. 532."). See also In re Brandon Lee H.S., 629
S.E.2d 783, 791 (W. Va. 2006) (reiterating vitality of separation of powers provisions at county
level, and stating that the "separation of powers provision precludes courts from exercising administrative duties relating to executive branch in refusing to use judicial power of mandamus to
control fiscal affairs of county court") (citing State ex rel. Canterbury v. Cnty. Court, 158 S.E.2d
151, 156 (W. Va. 1967)).
5
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Shortcomings in the Supreme Court'sAnalysis in State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha County v. Bayer Corp.

Against this backdrop of the court's prior cases on the scope of review
in proceedings in certiorari before a circuit court, the shortcomings of the decision in State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha County v. Bayer Corp.
can be demonstrated. There, the court ruled that in proceedings in certiorari, the
standard of review by a circuit court in a writ of certiorari proceeding is de novo. 5 3 9 This decision was not based on the 1996 decision in Lipscomb, (which
the Court didn't mention) but relied primarily on Harrisonv. Ginsberg, decided
in 1982:
Bayer contends that the circuit court's review should have been
limited to "arbitrary and capricious." We disagree for the reasons stated in Harrison:
There is language in some relatively recent opinions of this
Court indicating that if an inferior tribunal's decision is arbitrary and capricious it should not be affirmed by the circuit
court on certiorari. While we agree that an arbitrary and capricious decision of an inferior tribunal should not be affirmed by
the circuit court on certiorari, in light of the language of W. Va.
§ 53-3-3 these cases cannot be read as limiting the circuit court
on certiorari to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
Such a result would be inconsistent with our [recognition] that
in proper circumstances, the circuit court on certiorari is authorized to take evidence independent of that contained in the
record of the lower tribunal.
Moreover, we recently held in ... a case involving review by
the circuit court on certiorari of a county board of education
administrative ruling, that [w]hen the circuit court sits in review
of the decisions of . . . administrative tribunals it shall record

findings of fact and conclusions of law along with the judicial
orders which it issues. It is obvious that the circuit court could
not comply with this requirement without making its own independent review of the law and facts pertinent to the case.
. . . . Since the circuit court in this case limited its review to an
arbitrary and capricious standard, its decision affirming the appellant's denial of AFDC benefits is erroneous.

5

Syl. pt. 2, Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d at 282.
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Harrison, 169 W.Va. at 175-176, 286 S.E.2d at 283-284 (internal citations and quotations omitted). For the reasons set out in
Harrison,we also reject other standards of review suggested by
Bayer. 540
The decision in Harrison,however, was based on an overly broad interpretation of the "proper circumstances" under which a circuit court is permitted
to hear new evidence beyond that included in the record from the proceeding
before the inferior tribunal.
1.

Exceptions to the Rule That No New Evidence Is Permitted

Harrisonrelied heavily on North v. West Virginia Board of Regents,54 1

in which the supreme court decided that a student is entitled to substantial due
process protection in disciplinary hearings that could result in the student's expulsion from school. Because the circuit court rejected an application for a writ
of certiorari, the record before the West Virginia Supreme Court did not reflect
what transpired at the various hearings held at West Virginia University.54 2 After deciding that the student was entitled to substantial due process protection
and that the petition for a writ of certiorari did state a valid claim for relief, the
court addressed the extent of the hearing that should be afforded under the writ
of certiorari by the circuit court. 54 3
The court reviewed the effect of the enactment of West Virginia Code
sections 53-3-2 and 53-3-3 in 1882, and concluded that the statutes broadened
the scope of the writ of certiorari in the sense of the type of inferior tribunals
from which certiorari would lie, so that afterwards "actions taken by inferior
tribunals acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, where no common law or
statutory appeal rights were permitted, became reviewable by certiorari." 5" It
further concluded that the statutes also broadened the extent of review afforded
under the writ, so that "the court may review the action of the lower tribunal to
determine if it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." 545
In North, the court characterized Beverlin as "one more progression in
the line of cases expanding the statutory writ of certiorari."S46 It also included
McClure-Mabie Lumber Co. v. Brooks in this category of cases, observing that

in that case, "[t]o correct an untruthful return, evidence outside the record must

'A

Id. at 290 n.12.

541

233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).
Id. at 413.

542

54

Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 418.

545

Id. at 419 (citing Beverlin v. Bd. of Educ. of Lewis Cnty., 216 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1975)).

546

id

543
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be obtained."5 47 Ignoring the explicit reservation in McClure-Mabie that the
court there refused to "say [the statute] allows new pleadings or evidence," and
ignoring any possible distinction between evidence as to the correctness of a
return of service and evidence on the merits of the case, and on the basis only of
its reading of Beverlin and McClure-Mabie, the court in North concluded that
on certiorari where, as here, substantial rights are alleged to
have been violated by the inferior tribunal, the circuit court is
authorized to take evidence independent of that contained in the
record of the lower tribunal to determine if such violations have
occurred. To hold otherwise is to frustrate the clear statutory
mandate that the certiorari review satisfy the requirements of
law and justice.548
Syllabus point 4 in North provides:
A writ of certiorari will lie from an inferior tribunal, acting in a
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, where substantial rights are
alleged to have been violated and where there is no other statutory right of review given. Upon the hearing of such writ of
certiorari, the circuit court is authorized to take evidence, independent of that contained in the record of the lower tribunal, to
determine if such violations have occurred.549
The court was quick, however, to observe in North that the separation of
powers principle still limited the scope of review:
In arriving at this conclusion, we are mindful that the concept of
an "inferior tribunal" under the certiorari statute, W.Va.Code,
53-3-3, may involve a tribunal which, besides exercising quasijudicial powers, also operates in administrative areas. Our
holding is consistent with prior decisions of this Court as to the
scope of judicial review on matters arising out of administrative
agencies which exercise quasi-judicial functions.sso
The court also reaffirmed that the scope of review is "also consistent
with the extent of review afforded in contested cases under W.Va.Code, 29A-54(f) of the Administrative Procedures Act[,]" which limits appeals to being held
"without a jury and shall be upon the record made before the agency" and noted
5
548

North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411, 419 (W. Va. 1977).

5

Id. at Syl. pt. 4; accordAdkins v. Gatson, 624 S.E.2d 769, 773 (W. Va. 2005).

Id.

North, 233 S.E.2d at 419 n.11 (citing State v. Huber, 40 S.E.2d 11 (W. Va. 1946)); United
Fuel Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Conun'n, 80 S.E. 931 (W. Va. 1914).
550
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that "[n]or do we by our holding intend to overrule those decisions that require
the exhaustion of administrative remedies before access to the courts may be
obtained."55 1 The court then remanded the matter to the circuit court with instructions to "hold such evidentiary hearing as is necessary to determine petitioner North's claim of due process violations."5 52
The result in North seems to be predicated on two constitutional guarantees: the guarantee of substantial procedural due process rights in hearings before the inferior tribunal under the state and federal constitution, and the guarantee of the right to access to the courts for remedy to insure that those rights
were, in fact, accorded. 5 It was perhaps not strictly necessary for the court to
have interpreted the certiorari statutes themselves as permitting the circuit court
to hear evidence of whether Mr. North's procedural due process rights were
violated, so much as it was to hold that those statutes could not prohibit Mr.
North from having his day in court for a hearing on his due process issues.
In any event, the court in North specifically confirmed its long standing
interpretation that the scope of review in certiorari is similar to that in appeals
under the APA. West Virginia Code section 29A-5-4(f) (2010) spells out a similar exception to the rule that the review by the circuit court be limited to the
record: "[t]he review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be
upon the record made before the agency, except that in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the agency, not shown in the record, testimony
thereon may be taken before the court." Under the new Rules Governing Administrative Appeals, the circuit court is limited to considering "evidence which
was made part of the record in the proceeding before the administrative agency,
'unless there are alleged irregularities in the procedure before the agency, not
shown on the record."' 5 54 If, however, the record made before the inferior tribunal is sufficient to permit a review of whether sufficient procedural due
process protections have been afforded (as it was in Beverlin), then the deferential scope of review must be utilized by the circuit court.
2.

In Harrison,the Supreme Court Misconstrued North

In Harrison v. Gibson, the court again reviewed the genesis of the remedy afforded by the writ of certiorari. The court cited Long v. Ohio River R.
Id. (citing Bank of Wheeling v. Morris Plan Bank & Tr. Co., 184 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va.
1971)).
552
Id. (emphasis added).
5
U. S. CONST. amend. XIV; W. VA. CONST. art. III, §§ 10, 17.
5
W. Va. R. P. Admin. Ap. 6(a). These rules "govern the procedures in all circuit courts for
judicial review of final orders or decisions from an agency in contested cases that are governed by
the Administrative Procedures Act, W. Va. Code § 29A-5 et. seq." but "do not apply to extraordinary remedies such as certiorari which are governed by Rule 71 B(a) of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure." See Rule 1(a). Rule 6(c) further provides that "[iun the event a party alleges
irregularities in the procedure before the agency, the circuit court may hold a hearing and consider
other testimony and evidence solely on that issue." (emphasis added).
551
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Co. 555 and Harbert v. Monongahela River R. Co. for the proposition that the
statutes authorized the circuit court to rehear the issues on the evidence certified
from the inferior tribunal.556 It cited Humphreys, for the propositions that the
circuit court could "hear and determine the matter in controversy, upon the
record made in the county court, and enter such judgment as the county court
should have entered"557 and "the circuit court shall enter such judgment as the
inferior court should have entered, not only in consideration of questions of law
but of fact as well."558 It cited Snodgrass v. Board ofEducation,s 9 in which case
the court held that the scope of the review "makes the circuit court, to all intents
and purposes, a fact finding tribunal upon the record as it was before the inferior
court., 560 None of these cases speaks to the issue of whether new evidence can
be taken or whether deference is due to the findings and conclusions of the inferior tribunal.
In Harrison,the court characterized the scope of review under an arbitrary and capricious standard as "a narrow one, the issues being limited to
whether the agency decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment," and observed that
"[a]lthough the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard requires a searching and careful inquiry into the facts, the ultimate scope of review is narrow, and the reviewing court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."s6'
While it recognized that "[t]here is language in some relatively recent opinions
of this Court indicating that if an inferior tribunal's decision is arbitrary and
capricious it should not be affirmed by the circuit court on certiorari,"562 the
court nevertheless concluded that "[t]he role of the circuit court on certiorari as
a fact finding tribunal, with the power to enter judgment as law and justice may
require, is inconsistent with the arbitrary and capricious standard of review,"
holding that "[s]uch a result would be inconsistent with our holding in North
that in proper circumstances, the circuit court on certiorari is authorized to take
evidence independent of that contained in the record of the lower tribunal."5 63
The conclusion in Harrisonthat the arbitrary and capricious standard is
inappropriate was unwarranted. The court essentially ignored the fact that the
"proper circumstances" that the Court was referring to in North were limited to
5s5
556

13 S.E. 1010 (W. Va. 1891).
Harrison v. Ginsberg, 286 S.E.2d 276, 282 (W. Va. 1982).

Id. (quoting Syl. pt. 5, Humphreys v. Cnty. Ct. of Monroe Cnty., 110 S.E. 701 (W. Va.
1922)).
558
Id. at 283 (quoting Snodgrass v. Bd. of Educ., 171 S.E. 742, 742-43 (W. Va. 1933) (citing
Humphreys, 110 S.E. at 701)).
ss9
171 S.E. 742 (W. Va. 1933).
s6
Harrison,286 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting Snodgrass, 171 S.E. at 742-43)).
5

561

Id.

562

Id.

563

Id.
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situations in which "where substantial rights are alleged to have been violated"
and where the record from the inferior tribunal is insufficient to permit a determination of whether violations occurred. Nothing in North can be read to permit the circuit court to hear new evidence on the merits of whether the student
should have been dismissed. Also missing from the decision in Harrisonis any
recognition that in North, the court explicitly recognized that the separation of
powers principle limits the scope of review under certiorari. Finally, there is no
mention in Harrisonof the court's observation in North that the scope of review
is consistent with the extent of review afforded in contested cases under the
APA, or that the introduction of new evidence is contemplated by the APA under the same circumstances as permitted under North, i.e., "in cases of alleged
irregularities in procedure before the agency."
In Harrison, the court also indicated that the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review would be inconsistent with its holding in Golden v. Boardof
Education of the County of Harrison, West Virginia56 that a circuit court must
include findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order when it reviews the
decisions of administrative tribunals in proceedings in certiorari, stating that
"[i]t is obvious that the circuit court could not comply with this requirement
without making its own independent review of the law and facts pertinent to the
case."565 However, even if the circuit court is required to defer to the inferior
tribunal's findings and conclusions and can only reverse if it found that the inferior tribunal's decision was arbitrary and capricious, the circuit court could still
be required to state the facts and reasoning upon which its decision is based.
Golden by no means compels the conclusion that no deference is due the findings and conclusions of the lower court.
In Harrison,the court didn't explain why any of its previous cases stating that the purpose of the certiorari statutes was to diminish or eliminate the
differences between the writs of error and appeal and the writ of certiorari weren't applicable, nor did it discuss, much less overrule, any of its prior cases.
holding that that de novo review is not permitted. Nor did the court explain why
separation of powers issues were not implicated, given that the case arose from
a determination of an administrative agency as opposed to a lower court in the
judicial branch. Finally, since in cases decided after Harrison such as Jefferson
Utilities, Corliss, and FarAway Farm, the court reached the opposite conclusion and ruled that de novo review in certiorari was not appropriate without
mentioning Harrison, it seems clear that Harrison,not Alderson, was the more
likely candidate to have been overruled in Bayer Corp.

s6
565

285 S.E.2d 665 (W. Va. 1981).
Harrison,286 S.E.2d at 283.
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The Supreme Court Abandoned All of North's Limitations

In Bayer Corp., after starting out with only a partial definition of the
term "de novo," (see supra, and after quoting a portion of its discussion on of
the history of West Virginia Code section 53-3-3 in Harrison, the court then
cited Long v. Ohio River Railway Co. for the proposition that
[t]he principal use of this writ with us before 1868 was to bring
up records, in whole or in part, in aid of some other proceeding;
but the statute of 1882... has very much enlarged its scope, giving power to rehear after judgment on the evidence certified, as
well as correct errors in law, and in a proper case to retain for
trial de novo[.]s 6
By omitting important language from the end of the quote (in this instance, the
phrase "being thus in effect an appeal from the judgment ofa justice in a certain
class of cases" 5 67 ), the court overlooked the fact that the 1889 amendment to the
statute (and the constitution) permitted only cases that arose from a justice (that
is, cases that arose from the judicial branch) to be tried anew in the circuit court.
The court also noted that "[w]e have also observed, in passing, that 'under the expanded role accorded certiorari by West Virginia Code § 53-3-3, the
circuit court, in effect, takes the matter de novo,, 568 Here, the court relies on
mere dicta. There was no fact-finding at issue in MacQueen. To the contrary,
the case involved a petition for prohibition presenting a pure legal issue: in
which county venue in a certiorari proceeding was proper. MacQueen simply
does not speak to the issue whether a circuit court is obligated to engage in de
novo review on certiorari review from the decision of a county commission. It
would have been perhaps more understandable for the court to have cited Lipscomb v. Tucker County Commission, but the court did not do so.
In fact, the court's entire holding on the standard of review in Bayer
Corp. depends on an incomplete reading of North: "[w]e have also indicated
that '[u]pon the hearing of [a] writ of certiorari, the circuit court is authorized to
take evidence, independent of that contained in the record of the lower tribunal[.]"' 5 69 The court explicitly stated that its holding that de novo review was
appropriate was "based upon the fact that a circuit court is permitted to consider
evidence that was not submitted to a lower tribunal .

.

. [t]he circuit court was

permitted to consider this evidence only because W. Va.Code § 53-3-3 has been
State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha Cnty. v. Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d 282, 289
n.11 (W. Va. 2008) (quoting Long v. Ohio River R. Co., 13 S.E. 1010, 1011 (W. Va. 1891)).
567
Long, 13 S.E. at 1011 (emphasis added).
568
Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d at 290 (citing Bd. of Ed., Lincoln Cnty. v. MacQueen, 325 S.E.2d
355, 357 (W. Va. 1984).
569
Id. at 290 (quoting Syl. pt. 4, North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411, 413 (W. Va.
1977)).
5
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construed as authorizing the submission and consideration of such evidence."s70
While in Harrison, the court at least paid lip service to the fact that the circuit
court' authority to hear new evidence was limited to the "proper circumstances;" 57 1 here, the court unabashedly left out critically important limitations in
the syllabus point in North limiting the introduction of new evidence to situations where "substantialrights are alleged to have been violated17 2 and limiting the new evidence to that required to permit the circuit court to decide "if
5 73
such violations have occurred."
The court also attempted to justify its position in State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha County v. Bayer Corp. by observing the "the record
reveals that Bayer attached to its pre-and post-reversal memoranda of law exhibits and affidavits that were not submitted into the record before the Commission." 574 It noted that "Bayer attached two exhibits to its pre-reversal memorandum of law, and two affidavits to its post-reversal memorandum of law." 5 75
While those statements are strictly true, they don't provide any justification for
the court's decision, because the circuit court explicitly stated that it relied only
on the record made in the hearing before the county commission. 7 Moreover,
the exhibits appended to Bayer's original Memorandum of Law in the circuit
court were directed to peripheral matters, and neither of these matters was referenced, even obliquely, in the court's Final Order Granting Writ of Certiorari
and Denying Respondent Relief.57 7 Finally, the circuit court explicitly declined
to consider either of the two affidavits, one of which was filed with Bayer's
Motion for New Trial, and the other filed a couple of days later.578
In fact, the West Virginia Supreme Court was fully aware of the fact
that none of the new evidence offered by Bayer had been considered by the circuit court, because it also declared that "[e]ven if the circuit did not rely on the
exhibits and affidavits in rendering its decision, this would not alter the fact that
570
State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha Cnty. v. Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d 282, 29091 (W. Va. 2008).
5
Harrison v. Ginsberg, 286 S.E.2d 276, 283 (W. Va. 1982).
572
Syl. pt. 4, North v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411, 413 (W. Va. 1977)
573
Id. The court in Bayer Corp. also cited Adkins v. Gatson, 624 S.E.2d 769 (W. Va. 2005),
which contains the same abbreviated quote from North in a discussion of the scope of review in
certiorari in circuit court. In Adkins, however, that language is mere dicta because the court ruled
that the circuit court in that case could not hear the case in certiorari since a mechanism for an
appeal was provided by statute.
574
Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d 291.

55Id.

at 291 n. 15.

See id., Final Order at 7 ("The Commission held a hearing on Bayer's petition which produced the evidence and testimony upon which this Court relies.").
Both of the exhibits were letters, one of which (from the Attorney General's office) argua57
bly could have been considered by the court as a proper subject for judicial notice under Rule 201
of the Rules of Evidence. The other was directed to a matter raised by the prosecuting attorney
that was not addressed by either the circuit court or the West Virginia Supreme Court.
578
See Order Den. Bayer's Rule 59(a) and 59(e) Mots. at 4.
576
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such evidence was presented and could have been considered."5 79 Of course,
cases should be decided on the basis of what is in the record before it, not on the
basis of what could have been in the record, and on the basis of a complete reading and understanding of the prior cases law. Neither was present in Bayer
Corp.
4.

The Supreme Court Ignored Bayer's Separation of Powers Argument

Having already arrived at its conclusion, the court gave short shrift to
Bayer's contention that a de novo review is proscribed by the separation of
powers principle. In a footnote, the court recognized that Bayer made that argument, and conceded that, in Danielley v. City of Princeton, and FrymierHalloran v. Paige, it had ruled that a circuit court could not exercise executive
functions. It even went so far as to recognize that in American Bituminous, it
held that a circuit court can only review a county commission's tax valuation
ruling based upon the record created at the county commission hearing, not de
novo. However, it attributed that limitation in American Bituminous to be a
statutory limitation found at West Virginia Code section 11-3-25, not a constitutional limitation,580 but that doesn't explain this language in American Bituminous:
[a]s this Court's previous cases suggest, and as we have recognized in
other contexts involving taxation, e.g., Frymier-Halloranv. Paige,judicial review of a decision of a board of equalization and review regarding
a challenged tax-assessment valuation is limited to roughly the same
scope permitted under the West Virginia Administrative Procedures
Act, W. Va.Code ch. 29A. 58 1
Ignoring the fact that a county commission is constitutionally prohibited
from exercising judicial functions, and the attendant conclusion that, in reviewing a decision on a request for exoneration from a county commission, a circuit
court is reviewing a decision from a different branch of government, the court
brushed aside this issue, ruling that "the cases cited by Bayer were fact specific
and therefore distinguishable from the nature of the issues presented in this
case" without identifying what those facts were or how they affected its analy* 582

579
580

Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d at 291 n.16.
Id. at 291 n.17.

5
In re Tax Assessment Against Am. Bituminous Power Partners, 539 S.E.2d 757, 762 (W.
Va. 2000) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
582
Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d at 291 n.17.
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5.

The Supreme Court Didn't Explain Why Different Standards of
Review Should Apply

The legislature designated county commissions as the first level adjudicatory bodies responsible for hearing and deciding exoneration requests. It also
designated county commissions as the first level adjudicatory bodies responsible
for hearing and deciding valuation disputes between taxpayers and the taxing
authority. In the later situation, the legislature by statute provided for an appeal
to a circuit court on the record made before the county commission. In American Bituminous, the court confirmed that the scope of review in the circuit court
was limited to one similar to that in an appeal contemplated by the APA, that is,
the county commission's decision can't be reversed unless it was not supported
by substantial evidence; was in contravention of any regulation, statute, or constitutional provision; was clearly wrong; or was arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion.58 3
Certainly, if the scope of judicial review in a valuation appeal is constitutionally limited as in American Bituminous, so too should be the scope of review in a review of an exoneration decision. The decision under review in Bayer Corp. was made by the same people that decide valuation disputes, wearing
their county commission hats as opposed to their board of equalization and review hats. As in Corliss, the county commission conducted "a comprehensive
and seemingly thorough public review" as to the nature of the errors that led to
Bayer's overpayment of taxes. The county commission decided that it had
enough justification to find that Bayer satisfied both of the statutory criteria, cut
off the presentation of evidence, and voted to grant the taxpayer's request.
Unlike in North where it was necessary for the circuit court to act as a
fact-finder in the first instance, there was no claim in the circuit court by the
Assessor that she was denied procedural due process before the commission, nor
by the county commission that it denied procedural due process to itself. The
circuit court's review should therefore have been limited to the record made at
the hearing before the county commission, and should have unfolded in the
same deferential manner as this court outlined in Adkins v. Department of Education. The county commission made findings of fact in this case based on the
extensive evidence submitted, including the commission's assessment and
weighing of live testimony, and the circuit court should not have been permitted
to substitute its assessment of the facts and application of the statutory standards
it administers in section 11-3-27 and to make its own credibility determinations
when it lacked access to live witness testimony of the sort considered by the
county commission.584
In re Tax Assessment Against Am. Bituminous Power Partners, 539
Va. 2000).
584
See Webb v. W. Va. Bd. of Med., 569 S.E.2d 225, 232 (W. Va. 2002)
minations by the finder of fact in an administrative proceeding are 'binding
out basis in the record."') (quoting Martin v. Randolph Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
583
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There is also a practical reason why a circuit court should not have the
authority to review the cold record and decide that the evidence was insufficient
to show that a taxpayer is entitled to relief. In Bayer's case, the county commission cut off the presentation of evidence because the hour was late and it felt
that it had heard enough after three hours to permit it to reach a conclusion.
Since the circuit court is constitutionally prohibited from hearing new evidence
and substituting its judgment for that of the county commission, it should either
have ruled that there was sufficient evidence presented to support the county
commission's ruling in favor of the taxpayer, or should have remanded the matter to the county commission for a new hearing, at which the taxpayer would
have the opportunity to present any evidence that it was not allowed to present
in the original hearing.
Because the legislature designated county commissions as the appropriate body to decide exoneration requests, it was simply not proper for the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County to usurp that role.sas By giving no deference to the
decision of the county commission made in its executive or administrative capacity and in substituting its own decision for that of the county commission,
the circuit court undertook to perform a function that the legislature directed the
county commission to perform, in violation of article IX, section 9 of the West
Virginia Constitution. In this case, the circuit court sat as an appellate court
reviewing the factfinding of the commission. As such, the West Virginia Supreme Court's well-established precedents require that a circuit court review the
lower tribunal's factfinding for clear error.58 6 Accordingly, the circuit court's
decision to apply a de novo standard of review should have been reversed. Because there was no basis upon which to hold that the commission's findings
were arbitrary and capricious, the commission's order should have been reinstated. But that's not what happened. Instead, the supreme court misread its own
prior decisions and overlooked the increase in workload for the circuit courts
resulting from the required de novo review in certiorari proceedings and established a markedly different standard of review for proceedings in certiorari than
for an appeal to which the APA applies.
True, the court did limit the types of proceedings in certiorari that are
now suddenly subject to de novo review. Syllabus point 2 of Bayer Corp. provides that "[u]nless otherwiseprovided by law, the standard of review by a cir(W. Va. 1995)); Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 497 S.E.2d 531, 538 (W. Va. 1997) ("A reviewing
court cannot assess witness credibility through a record."); Gum v. Dudley, 505 S.E.2d 391, 398
(W. Va. 1997) ("A reviewing court cannot assess witness credibility through a record.").
585
See Corliss v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 591 S.E.2d 93, 102 (W. Va. 2003)
("Just as the circuit court completely sidestepped the Board's decision as to adequacy, the court
similarly ignored the expertise the administrative entities involved in this case have developed
with regard to land measurement and its consequent obligation to accord such expertise/judgment
a significant level of deference barring any clear error.").
586
See, e.g., Morgan v. Ohio River R. Co., 19 S.E. 588, 589-90 (W. Va. 1894) (explaining that
certiorari "is an appellate writ"); Corliss, 591 S.E.2d at 97-98 (reviewing fact-finder for clear
error on certiorari).
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cuit court in a writ of certiorari proceeding under W. Va. Code § 53-3-3 (1923)
(Repl.Vol.2000) is de novo."s8 The court explained that
[o]ur holding is qualified because there are statutes which authorize review by a petition for a writ of certiorari, but expressly
prohibit de novo review. See, e.g., W. Va.Code § 8A-96(b)(2004) (Repl.Vol.2007) ("If it appears to the court or judge
that testimony is necessary for the proper disposition of the matter, the court or judge may take evidence to supplement the evidence and facts disclosed by the petition and return to the writ
of certiorari, but no such review shall be by trial de novo.")588
Note, however, that either section 8A-9-6 or its precursor, section 8-2464, was in force when Wolfe, Jefferson Utilities, Corliss, Maplewood Estates,

and FarAway Farm were decided. However, that statute was never used as the
basis for the limited standard of review in any of those cases. Rather, they were
based more on separation of powers considerations such as respect for the expertise of the administrative bodies charged with specific responsibilities by the
legislature. In fact, only two cases (Jefferson Utilities and Maplewood Estates)
even cite either of these statutes. In Jefferson Utilities, the court was discussing
whether a board of zoning appeals owes deference to a zoning administrator; the
statute isn't directly applicable to that issue because it deals instead with the
standard of review in circuit court of a decision of a board of zoning appeals.
And in Maplewood Estates, the court cited W.Va. Code § 8A-9-6(c) which provides that "[i]n passing upon the legality of the decision or order of the planning
commission, board of subdivision and land development appeals, or board of
zoning appeals, the court or judge may reverse, affirm or modify, in whole or in
part, the decision or order,"590 but did not cite section 8A-9-6(b) (which prohibits de novo review); rather, as did the other cases, it cites syllabus point 5 of
Wolfe for the standard of review ("[w]hile on appeal there is a presumption that
a board of zoning appeals acted correctly, a reviewing court should reverse the
administrative decision where the board has applied an erroneous principle of
law, was plainly wrong in its factual findings, or has acted beyond its jurisdiction").s9 '
See Syl. pt. 2, Bayer Corp., 672 S.E.2d 285.
Id. at 290 n.14.
59
See Jefferson Utils., Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 624 S.E.2d 873, 885 (W.
Va. 2005) (finding that "there is no basis for concluding that this review process mandates that the
Board is required to start from scratch in conducting its review of a matter before it. Cf W. Va.
Code § 8-24-64 (1969) (Repl.Vol.2003) (expressly providing that circuit court's review of appealed zoning matters shall not 'be by trial de novo'))" (emphasis added).
Maplewood Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Putnam Cnty. Planning Co., 629 S.E.2d 778,
590
781-82 (W. Va. 2006).
5'
Id. at 782 (quoting Syl. pt. 5, Wolfe v. Forbes, 217 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 1975)).
5

588

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011

133

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 113, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 7
924

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113

While the court in State ex rel. ProsecutingAttorney of Kanawha County v. Bayer Corp. decided that the de novo standard of review is applicable when
circuit courts reviews decisions of an inferior tribunal in certiorari unless the
Legislature specifically prohibits it, that rule is clearly a new rule resting on an
entirely new foundation. The court did not, however, expressly overrule any of
its prior case law, nor did it explain why the circuit court must defer to an administrative agency's decision and is precluded from hearing new evidence on
the merits of the claim when the legislature specifically provides for an appeal
to circuit court, but can conduct a de novo review if the legislature fails to explicitly add the magic words providing for an appeal to circuit court. Nor did the
court attempt to discern any reason why the legislature might provide for review
by the circuit court in certiorari, but in some cases would expressly preclude de
novo review, while permitting (by omission) de novo review in others. In light
of the history of the court's interpretation of the purpose of the certiorari statutes
as being intended by the legislature to afford a litigant the same opportunity for
relief as an appeal provided by statute, the result in Bayer Corp. simply makes
no sense. In North, the court characterized Beverlin as "one more progression in
the line of cases expanding the statutory writ of certiorari"; here, it would be
accurate to say that Bayer Corp. is one more progression in the line of cases
(beginning with Harrison)misconstruing North.
E.

Cases Decided After State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha
County v. Bayer Corp.

In Wysong ex rel. Ramsey v. Walker,592 the West Virginia Supreme
Court reaffirmed the standard of review announced in Bayer Corp. when a circuit court reviews as administrative decision, this one by the Board of Review
of the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources:
This Court has recognized that "[o]n certiorari the circuit court
is required to make an independent review of both law and fact
in order to render judgment as law and justice may require."
Syllabus Point 3, Harrison v. Ginsberg, 169 W.Va. 162, 286
S.E.2d 276 (1982). In other words, "unless otherwise provided
by law, the standard of review by a circuit court in a writ of
certiorari proceeding under W. Va.Code § 53-3-3 (1923) (Repl.
Vol. 2000) is de novo." Syllabus Point 2, [State ex rel. Prosecuting Attorney of Kanawha County v.] Bayer, supra. Therefore, the circuit court was not required to give deference to the
decision of the hearing officer. See West Virginia Div. of Envtl.
Prot. v. Kingwood Coal Co., 200 W.Va. 734, 745, 490 S.E.2d
823, 834 (1997), quoting Fall River County v. S.D. Dept. of
592

686 S.E.2d 219 (W. Va. 2009) (per curiam).
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Rev., 552 N.W.2d 620, 624 (S.D.1996) ("'De novo refers to a
plenary form of review that affords no deference to the previous

decisionmaker. ').593

Subsequently, in Jefferson Orchards, Inc. v. Jefferson County Zoning
Bd. of Appeals, 594 one would have expected the court to again apply the new
rule from Bayer Corp. Since this case is yet another in the long line of cases
concerning zoning in Jefferson County, and since the court in Bayer Corp. recognized that the applicable zoning statute precludes de novo review, this case
was the perfect case to integrate the decision in Bayer Corp. with the court's
prior cases mandating a limited standard of review in zoning cases.
The court quoted the applicable statute:
In the context of land use planning and zoning, circuit court jurisdiction in certiorari to review the decisions and orders of various local entities is described in W. Va.Code, 8A-9-1 (2004), et
seq. Relevant to the circumstances herein is W. Va. Code, 8A-9-6
(2004), which states:
(a) The Court or judge may consider and determine the sufficiency of the allegations of illegality contained in the petition
without further pleadings and may make a determination and
render a judgment with reference to the legality of the decision
or order of the planning commission, board of subdivision and
land development appeals, or board of zoning appeals on the
facts set out in the petition and return to the writ of certiorari.
(b) If it appears to the court or judge that testimony is necessary
for the proper disposition of the matter, the court or judge may
take evidence to supplement the evidence and facts disclosed by
the petition and return to the writ of certiorari, but no such review shall be by trial de novo.
(c) In passing upon the legality of the decision or order of the
planning commission, board of subdivision and land development appeals, or board of zoning appeals, the court or judge
may reverse, affirm or modify, in whole or in part, the decision
or order.595
Instead of citing its new rule from Bayer Corp., however, the court the
cited several of its previous zoning cases:
593

Id. at 223-24.

594

693 S.E.2d 781 (W. Va. 2010).

s9s

Id. at 786.
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See, Maplewood Estates Homeowners Assoc. v. Putnam County
Planning Commission, 218 W.Va. 719, 629 S.E.2d 778 (2006)
(applying an abuse of discretion standard in the context of
W Va. Code, 8A-9-6 (2004)); Jefferson Utilities, Inc. v. Jefferson
County Board of Zoning Appeals, 218 W.Va. 436, 448, 624
S.E.2d 873, 885 (2005) (A circuit court's review of a zoning
matter shall not be by trial de novo.).
In syllabus point 5 of Wolfe v. Forbes, 159 W.Va. 34, 217
S.E.2d 899 (1975), this Court held: "While on appeal there is a
presumption that a board of zoning appeals acted correctly, a
reviewing court should reverse the administrative decision
where the board has applied an erroneous principle of law, was
plainly wrong in its factual findings, or has acted beyond its jurisdiction." Syl. pt. 1, Jefferson Utilities, Inc., supra; syl. pt. 1,
Corliss v. Jefferson County Board of Zoning Appeals, 214
W.Va. 535, 591 S.E.2d 93 (2003).9
And, in fact, syllabus point 3 in Jefferson Orchards again relies on
Wolfe:
While on appeal there is a presumption that a board of zoning
appeals acted correctly, a reviewing court should reverse the
administrative decision where the board has applied an erroneous principle of law, was plainly wrong in its factual findings,
or has acted beyond its jurisdiction."597
Confusingly, however, the court also cited Wysong and Harrison in its
discussion of the standard of review before the circuit court:
Pursuant to W.Va. Const. art. VIII, § 6, circuit courts shall have
original and general jurisdiction of proceedings in certiorari and
such other jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law. See,
W. Va.Code, 53-3-1 (1923), et seq. (confirming circuit court jurisdiction in certiorari proceedings). With regard to circuit court
jurisdiction in certiorari as a reviewing tribunal, syllabus point 3
of Harrison v. Ginsberg, 169 W.Va. 162, 286 S.E.2d 276
(1982), holds: "On certiorari, the circuit court is required to
make an independent review of both law and fact in order to
render judgment as law and justice may require." Syl. pt. 2, Wysong ex rel. Ramsey v. Walker, 224 W.Va. 437, 686 S.E.2d 219
Id. Syllabus point 5 of Wolfe v. Forbes is also Syllabus point 1 in FarAway Farm.
597 Syl. pt 3, Jefferson Orchards, Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 693 S.E.2d 781
(W. Va. 2010) (citing Syl. pt. 5, Wolfe v. Forbes, 217 S.E.2d 899 (1975)).
596
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(2009). See, syl. pt. 5, Humphreys, Adm. v. Monroe County
Court, 90 W.Va. 315, 110 S.E. 701 (1922) (indicating that,
upon certiorari from the action of a county court, the circuit
court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter in controversy, "upon the record made in the county court," and enter
such judgment as the county court should have entered.).s"s
While the court's previous zoning cases indicated that the circuit court
was limited to a limited standard of review, the quoted language in Harrison
was the justification for the court's ruling there that the circuit court was not
limited to the arbitrary and capricious standard. Harrison,in turn, was the basis
for the court's ruling in Bayer Corp. that the de novo standard was applicable
unless prohibited by statute, but the court didn't even cite Bayer Corp in its discussion of the standard of review applicable in the circuit court.
In Jefferson Orchards, the appellant complained that the circuit court
used the deferential standard of review in reviewing the decision of the Board of
Zoning Appeals because the Board of Zoning Appeals didn't have jurisdiction
to hear the case in the first place; rather, as the court found in FarAway Farm,
the Jefferson County Planning Commission had the authority to issue or deny
the CUP. 599 It wasn't so much the standard of review that Jefferson Orchards
objected to; instead, the objection was that the circuit court deferred to the decision of a tribunal that didn't have jurisdiction to hear the matter in the first
place. Nevertheless, the supreme court agreed that the circuit court used the
incorrect standard of review and held that "[i]n the final order of December 30,
2008, the Circuit Court incorrectly set forth a 'plainly wrong' standard as a basis
upon which to consider the findings of the Board."600 Considering that the court
cited several of its previous zoning cases that specifically held the plainly wrong
standard of review is applicable, considering that the court included syllabus
point 5 from Wolfe mandating the plainly wrong standard as one of the syllabus
points here, and considering the court didn't specify what the standard of review
should have been instead (perhaps because it also held that error was not dispositive)60 one can not avoid coming away from a reading of this case utterly
confused as to the proper standard of review in a zoning appeal before a circuit
court. The applicable statute precludes de novo review, but the plainly wrong
standard apparently isn't the right one, either, despite the fact the court cited,
apparently with approval, several cases requiring exactly that standard.
Another aspect of Jefferson Orchards is troubling. The circuit court,
having been ordered to reconsider its decision in the light of FarAway Farm,
concluded that it too should render a final decision upon the record before it,
s9s

Id at 785-86 (footnote omitted).

'

Id at 787.

60

Id at 788.

601

Id.
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rather than remand the decision to the Planning Commission that actually had
jurisdiction to make a decision on the application for a CUP. Perhaps the supreme court was justified in not remanding the application in FarAway Farm to
the Planning Commission for a decision, since it found that the applicant "addressed all the unresolved issues at the public hearing and its evidence was unrefuted.,s 2 In Jefferson Orchards,however, the court, after reciting its finding on
the sufficiency of the evidence in FarAway Farm, observed that "the evidence
was in sharp conflict concerning the average density in the vicinity of Jefferson
Orchards' proposed residential subdivision[.]" 603 Only if the de novo standard
of review is applicable in the circuit court's review would it make sense for the
circuit court to render the final decision instead of remanding it to the Planning
Commission that should have made the decision in the first place. Since the de
novo standard is precluded by statute, however, how could it have been proper
for the circuit court to have rendered the final decision when the evidence was
in "sharp conflict?"
If, as the court has long held, the purpose of the certiorari statues is to
diminish the differences between appeals and reviews in certiorari, and if the
separation of powers principle dictates that the judicial branch defer to the proper exercise of the functions of the executive and legislative branches of government, it seems clear that the proper outcome in Jefferson Orchardswould have
been for the court to have remanded the case to the circuit court with directions
to remand it to the Planning Commission for its consideration and decision. If
that decision were later appealed, the standard of review specified in Wolfe and
its progeny should be applicable before the circuit court. In fact, the standard of
review specified in Wolfe and its progeny should be applicable to all reviews in
certiorari in circuit court.
VI. CONCLUSION
All three of the decisions discussed in this article favor the taxing authority at the expense of the taxpayer, and it should now be clear to all that there
is no practical avenue of appeal for any taxpayer, large or small, from excessive
property tax assessments set by the county assessors or Tax Commissioner. Nor
is there any economical way to correct accidental overpayments due even to
simple errors if the taxing authority wants to keep the money and elects to contest the issue. As a result of these decisions, Mr. Caryl's conclusion that "[flew
arrangements in public administration in West Virginia are less able to measure
up to minimal due process legal standards . . . than our current system of property tax assessment review"60 rings more true today than in 1995.
Far Away Farm, LLC v. Jefferson County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 664 S.E.2d 137, 145 (W.
Va. 2008).
6
Jefferson Orchards, Inc. v. Jefferson Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 693 S.E.2d 781, 788 (W.
Va. 2010).
W4
Caryl, supra note 1, at 361.
602
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The West Virginia Supreme Court's ruling in Foster and Bayer MaterialScience that a county commission can properly function as both the fiscal
agent and budgeting authority for a county and, at the same time, can serve as an
impartial adjudicator of a taxpayer's valuation dispute was based on a misreading of the United States Supreme Court's rulings in Ward and Tumey as reaffirmed in Caperton. Likewise, its ruling in Bayer Corp. that a circuit court can
review de novo a county commission's decision on a taxpayer's request for exoneration was based on a misreading of its own rulings in North and Harrison.
In Concrete Pipe, the United States Supreme Court explained that a standard of
proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence can itself raise constitutional
concerns, especially when the tribunal may not be impartial. Nevertheless,
without engaging in the applicable analysis specified by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews, the West Virginia Supreme Court found no issue with
the imposition of the clear and convincing standard of proof before a county
commission, either when the commission sat as a board of equalization and review in the valuation appeals in Foster and Bayer MaterialScience, or in hearings before the commission on requests for exoneration in Bayer Corp.
The fundamental unfairness of the current property tax appeal procedure
system is immediately apparent to any taxpayer who contemplates using it, and
it is even more obvious to a corporate taxpayer that does business in other states.
Had the West Virginia Supreme Court properly researched the law in other
states, it would have discovered that the majority of states have evened the playing field in terms of the standard of proof required to prove the true and actual
value of a taxpayer's property, and many have established tribunals that are both
impartial and that have the training and expertise to fairly evaluate a taxpayer's
claims. While the Legislature made some improvements to the overall process
in 2010, it is clear that the counties had enough political clout to protect their
unfair advantage, and West Virginia remains numbered among the States with
archaic tax laws. While many would argue that it is entirely proper for the court
to decline to act as the "principal agent of reform,"os few would argue that the
citizens of this state have every right to expect the court to correctly interpret
and apply existing law and to insure that the government treats its citizens fairly.
In that, we are solely disappointed.

605

Id. at 337.
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